Maryland case law › Morton v. State

Morton v. State

284 Md. 526 (1979) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: ReversedCole✓ Good law
SummaryThis opinion is a partial concurrence and partial dissent by Cole, J., in Morton v. State. The majority held that the judgment below must be reversed because the accused was illegally arrested and searched. Judge Cole agreed with that conclusion but disagreed with the majority's decision to remand for a new trial. In his view, the Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), controlled and barred a retrial. He would have reached Morton's contention that his incriminating statement was improperly admitted as the fruit of the poisonous tree under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and State v. Ryon, 278 Md. 302 (1976). Finding no evidence of attenuation, he concluded the statement was inadmissible. Once the illegally seized items and the statement are excised, the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain th
Questions presented
  • Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a new trial where the evidence is legally insufficient after excluding illegally obtained evidence and an inadmissible statement.
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Cole J., concurring in part and dissenting in part While I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the judgment below must be reversed because the accused was illegally arrested and searched, I do not agree that a new trial is warranted. I believe that the holding of the Supreme Court in Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 , 98 S. Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), is controlling and militates against the granting of a new trial in this case. Contrary to the majority, I would consider Morton’s contention that his incriminating statement was improperly admitted into evidence. I believe that Morton’s statement was inadmissible as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); and the decision of this Court affirming Judge Orth’s opinion for the Court of Special Appeals in State v. Ryon, 278 Md. 302 , 363 A. 2d 243 (1976), aff'g Ryon v. State, 29 Md. App. 62 , 349 A. 2d 393 (1975).

There is simply no evidence in the record of this case that anything operated to attenuate the connection between Morton’s arrest and statement so as to dissipate the taint of the primary illegality. The majority refuses to consider this issue, and understandably so, for when the items seized and the incriminating statement are excised from the record due to their inadmissibility, the remaining evidence is insufficient to 536 sustain Morton’s conviction, and under Burks a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Burks Court held that “the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once a reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, [and] the only ‘just’ remedy available for [the] court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.” Burks, supra, 437 U. S. at 18 . Remanding these proceedings for a new trial subjects the accused to double jeopardy.

I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.