O'Hearn v. O'Hearn

KARWACKI, Judge. This case involves a separation agreement, which was not under seal but was incorporated into a divorce decree, that provides for the payment by the husband of certain medical and dental expenses of his children. The issue presented is whether an action brought by the wife, seeking to recover a judgment for such expenses, is subject to the general three-year statute of limitations set forth in Maryland Code (1974, ²⁹⁴ 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter CJ) or to the twelve-year period of limitations provided for specialties in CJ § 5-102(a). 1 I John and Jennifer O’Hearn (“John” and “Jennifer”) were divorced on April 23, 1981, by a decree which incorporated a separation agreement that they had executed earlier that day. Under the agreement, John was to pay those bills not covered by insurance incurred for the medical treatment of the parties’ children and for bills incurred with his express consent for their orthodontic needs.

Jennifer filed a petition for contempt on December 2, 1991, seeking arrearagés in alimony and child support, and contending that John had not paid their children’s medical and orthodontic bills incurred since the divorce. In response, John asserted laches and limitations as defenses and filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the limitations issue. Jennifer answered the motion and contemporaneously filed an “Amended Complaint to Enforce Child Support Obligations,” requesting that John be held in contempt for his failure to pay medical and orthodontic bills incurred less than three years prior to December 2, 1991, and a monetary judgment against John for the unpaid medical bills incurred more than three years prior to that date. When the court declined to rule on the summary judgment motion, a full hearing on the issues raised by the parties was scheduled, and ²⁹⁵ the parties entered into a stipulation by which they agreed on the dates and amounts of the bills in question. 2 At the hearing, John argued that the bills incurred more than three years prior to December 2, 1991, were barred by the statute of limitations.

Jennifer responded that the bills should be treated in the same manner as alimony and child support obligations. If she could bring an action for unpaid child support and alimony to obtain a judgment for amounts over three years old, while bringing a contempt action for amounts less than three years old, Jennifer argued that the same reasoning should apply to the medical bills. The trial court agreed with Jennifer and on May 21, 1993, entered judgment against John for the amount of the bills incurred more than three years prior to December 2, 1991. As to those bills rendered within three years of December 2, 1991, the court ruled that the “Petition for Contempt will be dismissed if [they] are paid by June 10,1993.” John appealed that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals.

Proceeding on an expedited basis pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-207, John presented a single issue to the intermediate appellate court: “Whether or not the defense of the statute of limitations bars the recovery of those medical expenses incurred less than twelve years after the date of the Divorce Decree, but more than three years prior to the filing of the Petition for Contempt.” The Court of Special Appeals answered that question in the negative and affirmed. It reasoned: ²⁹⁶ “Our review of Marshall [v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107 , 163 A. 874 (1933) ], Bradford [v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512 , 171 A.2d 493 , (1961) ] and Miller [v. Miller, 70 Md.App. 1 , 519 A.2d 1298 (1987) ] leads us to conclude that, contrary to appellant’s position that the twelve-year limitation is ‘carefully confined’ to unpaid periodic installment payments only, these cases are premised upon the fact that in each instance there was a judgment or decree entered by the trial court.” O’Hearn v. O’Hearn, 99 Md.App. 537, 543 , 638 A.2d 1192, 1195 (1994). Having granted John’s petition for certiorari to review that judgment, we shall affirm. II John contends that all claims for unliquidated amounts are governed by the three-year statute of limitations, citing Bradford v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512 , 171 A.2d 493 (1961), for the proposition that the twelve-year statute of limitations must be “carefully confined” to unpaid periodic installment payments.

As the bills in this case were allegedly unliquidated and contested, he argues that reliance on Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107 , 163 A. 874 (1933) and Miller v. Miller, 70 Md.App. 1 , 519 A.2d 1298 (1987) is misplaced, because those cases did not address unliquidated periodic payments. John also asserts that Md.Code (1991), § 10-102 of the Family Law Article 3 and CJ § 5-111 4 directly answer the question at issue in this case, because, in John’s words, those ²⁹⁷ sections “limit the power and authority of a trial court to enforce its orders to those claims commenced within three years of the date that a payment became due.” John contends that Boucher v. Shomber, 65 Md.App. 470 , 501 A.2d 97 (1985), decided prior to Miller , also answers the question raised in this appeal, because in that case the court applied the three-year statute of limitations to a proceeding for failure to make child support payments. John further asserts that, although the annotations for § 10-102 of the Family Law Article and CJ § 5-111 refer the reader to Miller , that case is not controlling in the instant case, because Miller “did not concern the enforcement of a decree that had incorporated a separation agreement.” The code sections upon which John relies address only contempt actions, but John attempts to convince us that they are applicable here because a contempt proceeding is the only method of enforcing a divorce decree. As a natural consequence of that argument, John concludes that the statute of limitations for contempt proceedings must apply in this case.

He also draws a distinction between liquidated and unliquidated arrearages, contending that only liquidated amounts can be enforced through judgment and that unliquidated amounts requiring a contempt proceeding are at issue in this case. Jennifer responds that the proceedings below were not for contempt, and a judgment was actually obtained for expenses incurred after the original divorce decree of April 23, 1981. As this was not a contempt case, Jennifer argues that Boucher is inapposite, urging us to adopt the reasoning in Miller and hold that the twelve-year statute of limitations applies to all obligations under a divorce decree where the specific remedy requested is one other than contempt. Ill In Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107 , 163 A. 874 (1933), we described the procedures to be followed in a claim for arrearages in support payments: ²⁹⁸ “Preliminary to an execution on a decree like the one now under consideration, a proceeding to ascertain the amount of the unpaid installments, and the existence of the conditions upon which its enforcement is dependent, would be essential---- Until the passage of an order determining the amount due and authorizing execution, the decree would not become a lien on the defendant’s property, but would only have the effect of an adjudication of liabilities thereafter maturing at stated periods.

Upon a proper petition and order such a decree may be enforced by execution or attachment as to all unpaid installments which may have become due within the preceding twelve years. When a supplemental order to that end is procured, it should be docketed and indexed as an original decree or judgment creating a lien.” Id. at 116 , 163 A. at 877 . The divorce decree in Marshall provided that the husband was to pay fifty dollars to the plaintiff each month for the support of herself and their children. The defendant stopped making the payments, and when he later acquired an interest in a personal estate, the plaintiff sought recovery of the arrearages.

As the plaintiff had followed the proper procedure, and twelve years had not passed, we held that her claim was not barred by limitations. Jennifer followed the same procedure in the case at bar. The decree of divorce was a judgment that Jennifer sought to reduce to a monetary amount. She sought that remedy for those bills that had been incurred more than three years, but less than twelve years, prior to