Sabisch v. Moyer

Joshua Sabisch v. Stephen T. Moyer et al. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, No. 6, September Term, 2019 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS – MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. (1974, 2013 REPL.

VOL., 2015 SUPP.) (“CJ”) § 3-702(a) – “COMMITTED, DETAINED, CONFINED, OR RESTRAINED FROM [] LAWFUL LIBERTY WITHIN [] STATE” – PROBATION – Court of Appeals held that, under plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to petition for writ of habeas corpus, person must be “committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within [] State[,]” nothing more and nothing less. At time that petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed, petitioner, who was on unsupervised probation and living in Michigan, was not committed, detained, confined, or restrained in Maryland, as required by CJ § 3-702(a), and thus was not eligible to seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland. Court of Appeals concluded that, consistent with historic purpose of writ of habeas corpus, plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) does not limit eligibility for habeas corpus relief to those in physical custody. Under plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), petition for writ of habeas corpus is not foreclosed where person is placed on probation with conditions that significantly restrict or restrain person’s lawful liberty within State.

Court concluded that people who are committed, detained, or confined within State or persons on probation with conditions that significantly restrain person’s lawful liberty within State are entitled to seek habeas corpus relief. In short, under CJ § 3-702(a)’s plain language, to be eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, person must be committed, detained, confined, or restrained in Maryland, which may involve physical custody or significant restrictions of person’s lawful liberty within State. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-C-17-006383 Argued: September 6, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ JOSHUA SABISCH v. STEPHEN T. MOYER ET AL. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Battaglia, Lynne A.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________ Filed: November 20, 2019 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2019-11-20 14:36-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk A writ of habeas corpus—meaning “that you have the body” in Law Latin—is “employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal[.]” Habeas Corpus, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This Court has observed that “the great object” of a writ of habeas corpus “is the liberation of parties who may be imprisoned or detained without sufficient cause.” Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 345 , 44 A.2d 807, 809 (1945) (cleaned up). The common law writ of habeas corpus was codified in a Maryland statute in 1809, and later encompassed by the protections of the Maryland Constitution of 1867. See id. at 346 , 44 A.2d at 809 .

Specifically, the Maryland Constitution provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Md. Const., Art. III, § 55. Today, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl.

Vol., 2015 Supp.) (“CJ”) § 3-702(a) generally governs who may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, providing: A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his [or her] behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus to the end that the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may be inquired into. Upon receipt of a properly filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus, among other things, “the judge shall grant the writ unless[] the judge finds . . . that the individual confined or restrained is not entitled to any relief[.]” Md. R. 15-303(e)(3)(A). In this case, we must determine whether a person who was placed on unsupervised probation by a Maryland trial court and subsequently moved to another State was committed, detained, confined, or restrained within Maryland. Following a bench trial in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County, Joshua Sabisch, Petitioner, was found guilty of fourth-degree sex offense.

The District Court stayed the entry of judgment and offered Sabisch probation before judgment (“PBJ”) with conditions, which he accepted. Five months later, Sabisch appeared before the District Court for a violation of probation hearing, and the District Court found that Sabisch had violated his probation. The District Court modified the conditions of probation to be “unsupervised” to accommodate Sabisch’s desire to move from Maryland to Michigan. Sabisch subsequently filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the terms of his probation constituted an unlawful restraint on his liberty and raising various grounds for relief related to the proceedings in the District Court.1 At a hearing on the petition, the circuit court denied the petition.

Sabisch appealed, and, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, holding that, at the time that Sabisch filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was neither physically restrained nor within the State. Thereafter, Sabisch filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. Against this backdrop, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that, to be entitled to habeas corpus relief pursuant to CJ § 3-702(a), a person must be physically restrained within Maryland, and that Sabisch was not entitled to habeas 1 Stephen T. Moyer, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Joseph F. Clocker, Director of Parole and Probation, and Ashley Jung, Sabisch’s probation agent (collectively, “Respondents”), identified in the petition as the respondents, opposed the petition. -2- corpus relief because he was not physically restrained within the State. We hold that, under the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a person must be “committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within the State[,]” nothing more and nothing less.

The plain language of CJ § 3- 702(a) does not limit eligibility for habeas corpus relief to those in physical restraint. Under the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not foreclosed where a person is placed on probation with conditions that significantly restrict or restrain the person’s liberty within the State. We hold that people who are committed, detained, or confined within the State or persons on probation with conditions that significantly restrain the person’s lawful liberty within the State are entitled to seek habeas corpus relief. In short, under CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, a person must be committed, detained, confined, or restrained in the State, which may involve physical custody or significant restrictions of a person’s liberty within the State.

Here, when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed, Sabisch, who was on unsupervised probation and living in Michigan, was not committed, detained, confined, or restrained in Maryland, as required by CJ § 3-702(a). Under the circumstances of this case, when Sabisch filed his habeas corpus petition, he was not significantly restrained in Maryland, and thus was not eligible to seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland pursuant to CJ § 3-702(a). BACKGROUND Although the issues in this case do not involve resolution of the merits of the claims that Sabisch raised in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for context, we set forth the circumstances that gave rise to the imposition of probation and conditions of probation. -3- Pretrial Proceedings in the District Court In 2016, the District Court tried Sabisch on the sole count of fourth-degree sex offense. It was alleged that Sabisch had sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl and that he was at least four years older than she was.

See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.) § 3-308(b)(3) (“A person may not engage in . . . vaginal intercourse with another if the victim is 14 or 15 years old, and the person performing the act is at least 4 years older than the victim.”). On October 26, 2016, Sabisch appeared, without counsel, in the District Court for the first time, seeking a postponement of the trial date.

When Sabisch’s case was called, the prosecutor explained that the State was not opposed to a postponement. The District Court asked Sabisch whether he had heard the court “explain the importance of having an attorney to the other” defendants who preceded him on the court’s docket, and Sabisch responded “[y]es.” The District Court asked Sabisch: “What are you going to do about getting an attorney?” Sabisch responded that he had not “thought about it[,]” and the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: All right. Well, you need to think about it. You need to either hire private counsel, pay them and have them enter their appearance on your behalf.

Or make application to the Office of the Public Defender if you cannot afford private counsel. That’s their information, sir. You need to see them at that location in person that’s listed there in Towson immediately. Don’t wait.

This week or next week. You would not want to come back without an attorney and attempt to represent yourself. It would not be in your interest; do you understand that, sir? [SABISCH]: Yes. (Paragraph breaks omitted). -4- Trial Proceedings in the District Court and Probation Before Judgment On December 8, 2016, Sabisch appeared, without counsel, in the District Court for trial.

The prosecutor advised the District Court that it was his “understanding [that] Sab[]i[s]ch [was] entering a guilty plea to his sole charge[,]” and Sabisch agreed that that was correct. At that time, the District Court gave Sabisch the following advisements: THE COURT: Sir, the maximum possible penalty of this charge is one year in jail. The State is deferring to me. That[] means they’re saying, Judge, it’s up to you.

I want you to understand I could still impose that maximum sentence. Do you understand that? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes. THE COURT: Now, I want you to understand that you certainly don’t have to plead guilty. You are entitled to either a judge or a jury trial.

In either instance, what would happen is, the State would call in witnesses that they had. They would testify in the witness chair like this one to my left. You could question any witnesses that are called against you. You could call witnesses on your own behalf.

You could call yourself as a witness. Or you could say, you choose a judge trial, which you didn’t want to testify. If you did that, I would not draw any inference from your silence. If this case was called for a jury trial and a jury was provided, you could tell the judge presiding at that jury trial that you did not want to testify.

And the judge would tell those jurors they could draw no inference from your silence. Now, for a trial like that, a judge or a jury, it would be up to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt respectively to the fact finder, be that a judge or a jury, that you were guilty of the charge. Now, if it was a jury trial, the jury’s verdict would have to be unanimous. That means all 12 jurors would have to agree.

By proceeding like this, pleading guilty, you’re waiving your right to have a judge and a jury trial. Do you understand that? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes. THE COURT: Sir, if you were on parole or probation to anybody on August the 20th when this event allegedly occurred, the plea that you’re entering here in all likelihood would violate that parole or probation. Do you understand that? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes. -5- THE COURT: Sir, the offense you’re pleading guilty to is that you engaged in intercourse with a person 14-years-old, you being at least four years old[er] than the victim.

Are you admitting that in fact that your defenses to that offense, it is correct that you did that? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes. The District Court asked whether it was Sabisch’s “final decision to plead guilty[,]” and Sabisch responded that he would “like to have the witness come forward.” The following exchange occurred: THE COURT: All right. So do you want to plead guilty or do you want to have a trial? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: What happens if I -- I don’t quite understand if I have a trial. THE COURT: So if you had a trial, what’s going to happen is, as I explained to you, witnesses will testify.

And you question those witnesses, you could call witnesses on your own behalf. You could testify yourself if you want to or you can remain silent, as I explained to you. It will be up to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you’re guilty of the charge. You have the right to have your case tried.

You also certainly have the right to accept the plea. In either instance, you’re going to be able to address me in terms of the case. If you plead guilty, however, you’re not going to be able, effectively, to stand up and say[:] well, I want to tell you this didn’t happen. If you want to give me what’s called mitigation through yourself or through someone else in terms of an explanation as to why this happened, you can do that.

But again, you have the right to have a trial. Nobody’s trying to talk you out of that. Most importantly, I’m not trying to talk you out of that. So you are in a situation right now where you have the right to either have a trial before me and a trial before a jury or proceed by way of a guilty plea the State told me that you guys agreed to.

Do you understand the three options you have? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: I want a trial. THE COURT: Do you want to have your case tried before me or do you want to have it tried before a jury? -6- [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Before you. Although Sabisch advised the District Court that he wanted to proceed by way of a bench trial, Sabisch also continued to tell the District Court that he wanted to plead guilty. At that time, the District Court indicated that Sabisch apparently did not understand the legal consequence of a guilty plea, and the following exchange ensued: THE COURT: Okay.

Now, I’m not going to continue to go back and forth. Not because I don’t want to, but effectively unless someone is entering what’s called a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, I’m just going to enter a not guilty plea on your behalf and call the case for a trial. If you enter a guilty plea, all that’s going to happen is, the State’s Attorney is going to tell me what happened here. After I’ve heard that, you’re going to have the opportunity to address me and tell me why it happened and anything else you want to tell me.

As I told you, if you plead guilty, the one thing you can’t do is, you can’t then stand up and say, Judge, it didn’t happen. Because you’re admitting if you plead guilty. If you want to plead not guilty, there’s going to be live testimony. The State’s going to call witnesses. [] SAB[]I[S]CH: I plead not guilty.

THE COURT: You want to plead guilty? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Not guilty. THE COURT: Not guilty. The District Court took a brief recess, and asked Sabisch for his “final decision[.]” Sabisch advised that he was asking for a postponement “[t]o get a Public Defender.” The District Court asked Sabisch what he had done to obtain a lawyer since October—when he was advised of his right to a Public Defender—and Sabisch responded: I’ve been trying to get, because I’m on [Supplemental Security Income], and I’ve been trying to get the money to save out, but I’ve also, because I’ve been homeless, trying to get an apartment and transportation, it’s very hard for me. But I’m aware of these charges and I will work even -7- harder if you give me a postponement to get an attorney.

I can even go down today to fill out and get a Public Defender. The District Court denied the request for a postponement, and the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: I’m going to have to deny your postponement request, Mr. Sab[]i[s]ch, under the circumstances. Now, you have the right to have your case tried before a jury or a judge. A few minutes ago you indicated to me you wanted to have your case tried before a judge and you’re waiving your right to a jury trial, is that correct? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: I honestly don’t understand, but I’d like to plead guilty.

I mean, I don’t understand any of this, because I’ve never really done this before. THE COURT: All right. I’ve explained to you a couple of times about the difference between a guilty plea and a not guilty plea. And I’m candidly not convinced that you understand what a guilty plea is.

And I can only accept the guilty plea if I’m convinced that it’s a knowing[] and a voluntary plea, and it’s an intelligent plea. And it’s that third element that I’m struggling with and I’m not convinced you understand what it is. Because you told me you have a witness here. Shortly thereafter, a short bench trial occurred.

As the sole witness for the State, the victim, who was fourteen years old at the time of trial, testified that she met Sabisch on the internet. The victim testified that, while she was fourteen years old, she had vaginal intercourse with Sabisch, who was twenty years old. Sabisch called the victim’s mother as a witness. On cross-examination, the victim’s mother acknowledged that, “[f]rom what [she had been] told,” the victim and Sabisch had vaginal intercourse.

The District Court asked Sabisch whether he would like to testify or remain silent, and Sabisch responded: “I want a jury trial.” The District Court explained that a jury trial was no longer an option, and again asked Sabisch whether he wanted to testify or remain -8- silent. After briefly conferring with an assistant public defender who happened to be in the courtroom, Sabisch advised that he would “like to remain silent.” The District Court found Sabisch guilty of fourth-degree sexual offense, but stayed the entry of judgment and offered him PBJ. The District Court explained that probation would be supervised for twelve months, and would require Sabisch to comply with probation conditions, including no contact with the victim, a substance abuse evaluation, “regist[ration] with law enforcement[,]” and waiver of the right to appeal. Sabisch told the District Court that he did not understand PBJ, and the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: So there’s a guilty finding that I made, but I struck it in favor of probation before judgment.

Now, if you want to accept it, you are waiving your right to an appeal, because there’s no guilty finding to appeal to. If you violate my probation, there’s 12 months incarceration that is hanging over your head, if you will. And if you violate my probation, I will put you in jail. But hopefully that will not come to pass.

Having said all of this, do you now understand what probation before judgment is? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Do you want to accept it and waive your right to an appeal? [] SAB[]I[S]CH: I do. The bench trial concluded shortly thereafter. Post-Trial Proceedings in the District Court A week later, on December 15, 2016, Sabisch—now represented by counsel—filed a motion for modification or reduction of his sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(e).

Sabisch requested that the District Court strike the requirement that he register as a sex offender, arguing that registration was within a trial court’s discretion when imposing PBJ -9- and, in his view, requiring him to register was contrary to the “ultimate sentence of probation before judgment.” Sabisch also offered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. The District Court held the motion sub curia. Approximately eight weeks later, on February 8, 2017, Sabisch pled not guilty to charges that he violated his probation by having contact with the victim. Sabisch also indicated that he was “not competent to stand trial[.]” The District Court ordered a competency evaluation, and a forensic psychologist found that Sabisch was competent because he demonstrated an understanding of “the nature and object of the proceedings and [an ability to] assist in his defense.” On his own initiative, on March 3, 2017, Sabisch submitted to another psychological evaluation.

The results of that evaluation revealed that Sabisch presented symptoms of bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and unspecified intellectual disability, and that Sabisch had a low-functioning cognitive ability and an IQ of 59. On May 3, 2017, the District Court conducted a violation of probation hearing; Sabisch was represented by counsel. The District Court found that Sabisch had violated probation by contacting the victim. Sabisch asked the District Court to modify his sentence to allow him to move back to Michigan, where he lived before he met the victim and where his family lived.

The District Court left the PBJ finding intact and agreed to modify the conditions of probation to accommodate Sabisch’s desire to move out of Maryland. The District Court imposed a sentence of eighteen-months “unsupervised” probation that permitted Sabisch to leave Maryland, but, as conditions of probation, required him to among other things, have no unsupervised contact with minors, report to his probation - 10 - agent by telephone every thirty days or as otherwise determined appropriate by the probation agent, provide his current address, and register as a Tier I Sex Offender.2 After returning to Michigan, Sabisch learned that, under Michigan law, he would be designated as a Tier III sex offender and required to register as a sex offender for life. Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis Meanwhile, on April 10, 2017, Sabisch filed in the District Court a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, asking the District Court to vacate the December 8, 2017 PBJ order for alleged trial errors. The District Court denied the petition on the ground that Sabisch was on probation, and thus ineligible for coram nobis relief.

Sabisch appealed. In June 2017, the circuit court dismissed the appeal on the same ground. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court The following month, on July 3, 2017, in the circuit court, Sabisch filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the circuit court “remedy the unlawful restraint on his liberty by the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services through the Division of Parole and Probation.” Sabisch alleged that the unlawful restraint on his liberty consisted of being “subject to unsupervised probation with the special condition that he report to [] his probation agent in Baltimore County[] by phone each month.” (Citations omitted). Although in the petition Sabisch mentioned other conditions of probation, he did not allege that those conditions constituted unlawful restraints on his liberty.

Sabisch 2 Pursuant to CP §§ 11-701(o)(1), 11-707(a)(4)(i), and 11-707(c), in Maryland, as a Tier I sex offender, Sabisch is required to register for ten to fifteen years, depending on whether certain conditions are satisfied for ten years. - 11 - alleged the following four grounds for relief: (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel; (2) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial; (3) in accepting the PBJ, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal; and (4) the District Court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry to determine whether he “was mentally competent to represent himself.” (Citations omitted). Sabisch asked the circuit court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, vacate the finding of guilt, and order a new trial. On July 17, 2017, the State3 filed an answer to the petition, opposing the petition on multiple grounds. The State argued that, procedurally, the petition was inadequate for two reasons: (1) Sabisch was not eligible for habeas relief in Maryland while he was in Michigan, i.e., an individual seeking habeas relief must “be restrained from lawful liberty within the State[,]” and Sabisch filed his petition while in Michigan; and (2) Sabisch had failed to pursue other avenues of relief, such as a motion for new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331 or a notice of appeal under Maryland Rule 7-104.

(Emphasis omitted). As to the merits, the State asserted that the petition was inadequate for several reasons, including that the “[a]dequacy of counsel is not reviewable under a writ of habeas corpus” (footnote omitted); Sabisch had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial; and Sabisch had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal by accepting the PBJ. Finally, as to Sabisch’s competency, the State maintained 3 Although the petition named Stephen T. Moyer, Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Joseph F. Clocker, Director of Parole and Probation, and Ashley Jung, Sabisch’s probation agent, as respondents, the answer was filed on behalf of the State. - 12 - that the District Court was not required to have Sabisch evaluated and contended that Sabisch’s “confusion with court proceedings did not demonstrate a failure to understand the nature and object of the proceedings or [his] inability to assist in his defense.” (Emphasis omitted). On October 13, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition.

At the hearing, the prosecutor asserted that, although Sabisch was still on probation, he was not “being restricted by anything in Maryland[,]” arguing: [T]he real reason we’re here today is because [the District Court] ordered [Sabisch] to register as a tier one sex offender, which carries, my understanding, in Maryland ten years, ten years of registration, [the District Court] gave him the benefit of [PBJ]. That is, those are the conditions of his probation here. Because [] Sabisch decided to leave, because he decided to go to Michigan, . . . he is being required to register for life. Now, I don’t believe that is a confinement.

It was his decision to go to Michigan. I didn’t tell him to go to Michigan. Sabisch’s counsel responded that probation was a restraint on liberty and, therefore, Sabisch was eligible to pursue habeas relief. Sabisch’s counsel contended that Sabisch was not disqualified from seeking a writ of habeas corpus simply because he resided in Michigan.

According to Sabisch’s counsel, Sabisch had restraints on his liberty in Maryland because he was still subject to the terms of the probation imposed by the District Court. Additionally, Sabisch’s counsel argued that the District Court failed to inform Sabisch of his right to counsel and of the importance of counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, stating: “It’s my judgment, based on the colloquy between [the District Court] and [Sabisch], that [the District Court] complied with the rule, that [Sabisch] understood what he was doing and, - 13 - therefore, [] your writ is denied.” On November 22, 2017, the circuit court issued an order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court also issued a memorandum opinion explaining the reasons for denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In the memorandum opinion, as to the procedural issues in the case, the circuit court rejected the State’s argument that Sabisch was not in Maryland for purposes of pursing habeas relief, explaining: [Sabisch], while living in Michigan, is subject to specific terms and conditions of probation imposed by [the District Court]. As such, [Sabisch] does not have unfettered liberty. The State’s implied request that the Petition be denied because [Sabisch] does not live in Maryland is denied. The circuit court nevertheless agreed with the State that the record demonstrated that Sabisch “knowingly waived his right to appeal[,]” as Sabisch “could have appealed the District Court’s ruling, but chose not to do so.” As such, the circuit court stated that, “[o]n that basis, the Petition [] would be denied.” The circuit court noted that, had Sabisch “elected to appeal, the matter would have been de novo and the other issues set forth in the Petition would not have been at issue.

However, because the issues were briefed and argued,” the circuit court would “address them.” Accordingly, the circuit court addressed the merits of the various issues raised in the petition. As to the waiver of counsel, the circuit court concluded that “[i]t [was] clear from the record that [Sabisch] was aware of the charges and possible penalties, the right to counsel[,] and the importance of assistance of counsel[,]” and that “it was not an abuse of discretion for [the District Court] to find that [Sabisch] waived his right to counsel by inaction.” The circuit court explained: - 14 - [The District Court] told [Sabisch] that it would not be in his best interest to return to Court without an attorney and [Sabisch] confirmed that he understood that. Never[]the[]less, [Sabisch] appeared for trial in the District Court without counsel in December 2016. In viewing the record as a whole, including the discussions that [Sabisch] had with [the District Court], it is clear that when [Sabisch] indicated that he did not understand, the [District Court] took [its] time to explain the matter to him until he comprehended.

As to waiver of the right to a jury trial, the circuit court determined that there was no evidence that Sabisch “did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.” The circuit court explained that “[t]here was no evidence presented concerning [Sabisch]’s IQ, nor that he did not understand [the District Court]’s explanation concerning the difference between a court and jury trial. . . . [Sabisch] has failed to set forth any evidence that he did not understand the difference between a court and a jury trial.” The circuit court reiterated that the record showed that, when Sabisch “did not understand something[,] the [District Court] took [its] time to explain the matters to him until he understood.” The circuit court concluded that Sabisch had validly waived the right to appeal, explaining: [Sabisch]’s counsel argues that [Sabisch]’s limited IQ would have prevented him from understanding and appreciating the significance of accepting [PBJ]. [Sabisch] bears the burden of proving his allegations. He has presented no evidence concerning his IQ, nor did he present any evidence that he did not understand that by accepting [PBJ], he would no longer have a right to appeal. The circuit court rejected the allegation that the District Court failed to determine whether Sabisch was competent to represent himself, stating that there was “no credible evidence that [Sabisch] was incompetent or lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the - 15 - consequences of his decisions.” In the meantime, on October 18, 2017, Sabisch filed a notice of appeal. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals On January 2, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

See Joshua Sabisch v. Stephen T. Moyer, et al., No. 1858, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 290291 , at ¹, 5-6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 2, 2019). The Court of Special Appeals held that, when Sabisch filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Sabisch was neither physically restrained nor within the State, and, therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider or provide habeas corpus relief. See id. at ⁵-6.

Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals determined that, although CJ § 3-702(a) “does not use the word ‘physical,’ Maryland case law does[,]” and “Maryland courts have held consistently that the writ of habeas corpus is not available to bailees or parolees because they are not in ‘actual, involuntary, illegal restraint.’” Id. at ⁵ (cleaned up). The Court of Special Appeals explained: Yes, there are more recent federal cases that define restraint more in terms of liberty restrictions than physical restrictions, and it[ is] also true that some Maryland cases interpreting the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”) have as well. But the federal cases do[ not] work—the UPPA occupies most of the field that the federal habeas corpus statute covers in the federal system, and the General Assembly has left a much narrower range of potential relief for habeas to provide. Id.

As such, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, given the limited context of habeas corpus in Maryland, [] Sabisch’s [PBJ] status places him in the same position as parolees and people out on bail—his liberty was fettered, to be sure, but he was not committed, detained, confined, - 16 - or restrained, and we do[ not] have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus relief for him. Id. The Court of Special Appeals noted that “Sabisch was not in Maryland when he filed his petition[.]” Id. at ⁶. The Court of Special Appeals explained: While he was on unsupervised probation, his ongoing requirement to check in with a probation officer fell short of creating a presence in Maryland that could justify common law habeas corpus relief here. [] Sabisch is[ not] wrong that federal cases interpreting the federal counterpart writ focus more on the physical location of the custodian than the petitioner.

But again, the federal version of the writ has a different scope, and unlike federal courts, Maryland courts can[not] compel production of a body that[ is] outside of our borders. Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals granted the motion to dismiss the appeal and did not consider the merits of the issues raised in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

See id. The Court of Special Appeals observed, though, that Sabisch may not be “out of options” because, “[a]s both sides acknowledged at oral argument, he has now completed his probation, and thus no longer is barred by that obligation from seeking a writ of coram nobis. Whether he is entitled to relief remains to be seen.” Id. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On February 27, 2019, Sabisch petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following three issues: 1.

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [Sabisch], while on [PBJ] and required as conditions of his probation to obey all laws, to have no contact with the victim, to have no unsupervised contact with children under age eighteen, to provide his current address to probation authorities, to register as a sex offender, and to report by telephone to his probation supervisor in Maryland every thirty days while residing in Michigan and to follow his supervisor’s lawful instructions, was not entitled to petition for the - 17 - writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [CJ] § 3-702, because he was not subject to “physical” restraint? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [Sabisch], while on [PBJ], was not entitled to petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [CJ] § 3-702, because he was not present in Maryland at the time of the filing of his petition and because the conditions of [Sabisch]’s probation did not create a sufficient “presence” in Maryland while [Sabisch] was residing in Michigan? 3. Did the circuit court err in denying [Sabisch]’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on grounds that [Sabisch] accepted [PBJ] and waived his right to appeal pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. [(2001, 2008 Repl.

Vol., 2015 Supp.) (“CP”)] § 6-220? On April 10, 2019, this Court granted the petition. See Sabisch v. Moyer, 463 Md. 525 , 206 A.3d 315 (2019). DISCUSSION4 The Parties’ Contentions Sabisch contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief pursuant to CJ § 3-702 because he was not subject to physical restraint.

Sabisch argues that the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) does not require a person to be subject to physical restraint to be entitled to habeas corpus relief, and that case law does “not compel adherence to a jurisdictional requirement of physical restraint in a strict sense (e.g., placement behind bars)[.]” Sabisch asserts that probation, which may 4 Because the first two issues raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari involve interpretation and application of CJ § 3-702(a), we consolidate the issues. And, because we hold that Sabisch was not entitled to seek habeas corpus relief under CJ § 3-702(a), we need not—and do not—address the third issue raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari, concerning whether the circuit court properly denied habeas corpus relief on the ground that Sabisch accepted PBJ and waived his right to appeal pursuant to CP § 6-220. - 18 - require that a person comply with a condition “that limits his or her liberties, falls squarely within the requirement that a person petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus be restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty.” (Cleaned up). Sabisch maintains that, unlike the terms “committed,” “detained,” and “confined,” the word “restrained,” as used in CJ § 3-702(a), does not necessarily imply application of physical force. According to Sabisch, at the time that he filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was subject to actual restraint by operation of the various conditions of his probation.

Sabisch contends that the Court of Special Appeals also erred in holding that he was not entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he was not in Maryland at the time of the filing of the petition and because the conditions of his probation did not create a sufficient presence in Maryland while he was living in Michigan. Sabisch argues that physical presence in Maryland at the time of filing a habeas corpus petition is not a jurisdictional requirement of CJ § 3-702(a). Sabisch maintains that, for purposes of CJ § 3-702(a), “the critical presence is that of the custodian or respondent, because if Maryland does not have personal jurisdiction over the respondent, no inquiry may be made into the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint.” Respondents counter that “the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over” the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, when the petition was filed, “Sabisch was neither in physical custody nor inside Maryland’s borders.” (Some capitalization omitted). Respondents contend that, as a statute codifying the common law, CJ § 3-702(a) declares the State’s public policy with respect to habeas corpus relief, and, in keeping with the common law, the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) requires physical custody.

Respondents - 19 - assert that the common law required physical custody, and that Maryland case law has reinforced that requirement. Respondents maintain that CJ § 3-702(a) unambiguously incorporates the common law’s physical custody requirement by use of the terms “committed, detained, confined, or restrained,” as those “terms denote physical custody.” Respondents contend that, when the habeas corpus petition was filed, Sabisch was not in physical custody, but instead was “free on ‘unsupervised’ probation in Michigan with the duty to call his Maryland probation officer monthly.” According to Respondents, because Sabisch was not in physical custody, he was not entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under CJ § 3-702(a). Respondents argue that, additionally, CJ § 3-702(a) limits who may file a habeas corpus petition to those in custody within the State of Maryland. Respondents assert that, because Sabisch was in Michigan when he filed the petition, he was not authorized to seek a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under CJ § 3-702(a).

Respondents contend that “[t]he requirement that a petitioner be in custody ‘within’ the State is essential to a habeas court’s power to compel production of ‘the body’ and test the lawfulness of custody.” (Italics omitted). Respondents argue that the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) “connects the requisite custody to the petitioner’s body” and thus recognizes that Maryland courts cannot compel production of a body that is outside of the State’s borders. Standard of Review “An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s interpretation of a statute. [And, w]e review the Court of Special Appeals’s interpretation of [a] statute de novo.” Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 480-81 , 157 A.3d 272, 280 (2017) (cleaned up). - 20 - And, in Wilson v. Simms, 157 Md. App. 82, 91 , 849 A.2d 88, 93 , cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. State, 382 Md. 687 , 856 A.2d 723 (2004), as to denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “We review the denial of an application for habeas corpus relief under the standard set forth in Maryland Rule 8-131(c).

We will review the case on both the law and the evidence, and we will not set aside the judgment on the evidence unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted). “Questions of law, however, require our non-deferential review. When the trial court’s decision involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, this Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally correct.” Estate of Zimmerman v. Blatter, 458 Md. 698, 717-18 , 183 A.3d 223, 235 (2018) (cleaned up). See also State v. Hart, 449 Md. 246, 264 , 144 A.3d 609, 619 (2016) (“[W]here an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are “legally correct” under a de novo standard of review.” (Citation omitted)). Statutory Construction Because this case involves statutory interpretation, we set forth the following relevant rules of statutory construction: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly.

As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according - 21 - to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.

In addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends. Bellard, 452 Md. at 481 , 157 A.3d at 280 (citation omitted). Law Habeas Corpus in Maryland CJ § 3-702(a) generally governs who may apply for a writ of habeas corpus, providing in its entirety: A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his [or her] behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus to the end that the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may be inquired into.

This language has remained unchanged since 1973, when Md. Code, Art. 42 (1957, 1973 Supp.), § 3 was recodified as CJ § 3-702(a) as part of the creation of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Code of Maryland. See 1973 (July Extraordinary Sess.) Md. Laws 4, 129 (Ch. 2, S.B. 1). CJ § 3-702(b) sets forth additional provisions related to habeas corpus petitions, including that, upon receiving the petition, a judge shall grant the writ of habeas corpus immediately, if it appears that the petitioner is entitled to the relief. And, Maryland Rules 15-301 to 15-312 implement procedures and requirements related to habeas corpus petitions and proceedings in the State.

For example, Maryland Rule 15-302(a) sets forth - 22 - the information that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must include, such as “a statement that the individual by or on behalf of whom the writ is sought is unlawfully confined or restrained[,]” Md. R. 15-302(a)(1), and “the circumstances and the cause of the confinement[,]” Md. R. 15-302(a)(4). As to appeals in habeas corpus cases, in Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 652 , 574 A.2d 898, 906 (1990), this Court stated “that statutory provisions like [CJ] § 12-301 [] generally authorizing an ‘appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case,’ do not apply to habeas corpus cases.” Rather, “[a]n appeal may be taken from a final order in a habeas corpus case only where specifically authorized by statute.” Id. at 652, 574 A.2d at 906 (citations omitted). In Gluckstern, id. at 652 , 574 A.2d at 906-07 , this Court identified four statutes that permit appeals or applications for leave to appeal in habeas corpus cases: (1) what is now CP § 9-110, which “authorizes an appeal under certain conditions from the denial of a habeas corpus application in an extradition case”; (2) CJ § 3-707, which “provides for applications for leave to appeal from the denial of relief in habeas corpus cases regarding the right to bail or allegedly excessive bail”; (3) CJ § 3-706, which applies where a writ of habeas corpus is issued “on the ground that the law under which the person was convicted is unconstitutional[,]” CJ § 3-706(a); and (4) what is now CP § 7-107, which is part of the UPPA.5 (Footnote omitted). 5 CP 7-107(b) provides: (1) In a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus or the writ of coram nobis or by invoking a common law or statutory remedy other than - 23 - In separate cases decided several decades ago, this Court held that habeas corpus relief is not available to persons free on bail or parolees. In Hendershott v. Young, 209 Md. 257, 260 , 120 A.2d 915, 916 (1956), this Court held that a trial court properly denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was filed by a petitioner who had been released on her own recognizance, but the trial court’s decision was “predicated on the wrong grounds[.]” In that case, a Montgomery County lawyer contended that recent legislation from the General Assembly “had abolished the office of justices of the peace, and justices of the peace designated as committing magistrates . . . and transferred all of their former authority, power[,] and jurisdiction to the judges of the newly created People’s Court for Montgomery County.” Id. at 259 , 120 A.2d at 915-16 .

The lawyer sought to create “a test case to establish that the justices of the peace, and . . . committing magistrates, were without legal power or authority,” so the lawyer parked her vehicle in a street intersection in violation of State law. Id. at 259 , 120 A.2d at 916 . The lawyer refused to sign a summons to appear at the People’s Court and instead was taken before “a justice of the peace who this title, a person may not appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals. (2) This subtitle does not bar an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals: (i) in a habeas corpus proceeding begun under § 9-110 of this article; or (ii) in any other proceeding in which a writ of habeas corpus is sought for a purpose other than to challenge the legality of a conviction of a crime or sentence of imprisonment for the conviction of the crime, including confinement as a result of a proceeding under Title 4 of the Correctional Services Article. - 24 - acted regularly as a committing magistrate[.]” Id. at 259-60, 120 A.2d at 916 .

The lawyer then refused to post collateral of $6.45 and was committed to the custody of the Montgomery County sheriff, with bail set at $50. See id. at 260 , 120 A.2d at 916 . That same afternoon, the lawyer sought habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on the ground that she was being illegally detained, and the court released the lawyer on her own recognizance, pending a hearing on the habeas corpus petition. See id. at 260 , 120 A.2d at 916 .

At the hearing on the petition, the lawyer argued that her commitment to jail by the justice of the peace was illegal and void because the new laws abolished the justice of the peace’s office and transferred that jurisdiction and power to the People’s Court. See id. at 260 , 120 A.2d at 916 . The trial court issued an opinion denying the habeas corpus petition and ruling that the General Assembly did not take away authority from justices of the peace sitting only as committing magistrates, and, therefore, the justice of the peace acted within the scope of his authority and the lawyer was to be remanded to the sheriff’s custody “until released by due process of law.” Id. at 260 , 120 A.2d at 916 (internal quotation mark omitted). This Court concluded that the lawyer was not entitled to habeas corpus relief for two reasons other than the reason given by the trial court.

See id. at 260-63 , 120 A.2d at 917 . First, this Court held that habeas corpus relief is not available to a person who is free on bail because there is no “actual or physical restraint of” such a person, explaining: Traditionally, and in practice, the writ of habeas corpus has been and is available only to liberate persons who are in actual, involuntary, illegal restraint. The courts have not lent themselves to the issuance of the writ - 25 - when restraint was theoretical or technical only, or was actual but by choice, and the real purpose of the writ was to test the validity of a law and not, in fact, to bring about release from involuntary confinement. It is clear that habeas corpus will not be granted one who is free on bail. . . .

Unless there be an actual or physical restraint of a person, the writ of habeas corpus may not issue, and a person released from imprisonment on bail is not so restrained of his [or her] liberty as to be entitled to the writ. This statement of the law is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority. . . . Indeed, we do not find a case in the books holding that a person out under bail is so restrained as to entitle him [or her] to the writ. Many courts agree with these holdings.

Id. at 261-62 , 120 A.2d at 917 (cleaned up). This Court held that habeas corpus relief also is not available to an individual whose confinement is voluntary: Made plain also by the cases is the rule that if the confinement is voluntary, there is no need for the issuance of the writ and it will be denied. In [a California case], the Court held that where the imprisonment involved is voluntary, as where an indicted person on bail procures his [or her] surrender solely to make a habeas corpus case, the writ will not issue. It said: the essential object and purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, as distinguished from voluntary, and relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

It was never contemplated, as anciently designed, or as at present guaranteed in the different jurisdictions of this country, that the writ should be invoked [o]n behalf of a person who was not actually in restraint and involuntarily and illegally so[.] Id. at 262-63 , 120 A.2d at 917 (cleaned up). Applying that law to the circumstances of the case, this Court determined that the lawyer’s “detention and restraint, such as it was, was self-contrived and self-imposed[,]” and that, after being released on her own recognizance, the lawyer had “been at liberty ever since.” Id. at 264-65 , 120 A.2d at 918-19 . We concluded that the lawyer was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, and that the trial court “should have denied the writ for the reasons we ha[d] set forth and need not have and should not have gone into the question of the jurisdiction and powers of the justice of the peace.” Id. at 266 , 120 A.2d at 919 . As - 26 - such, we remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the habeas corpus petition on the grounds set forth in the opinion.

See id. at 266 , 120 A.2d at 919 . Two years later, in McGloin v. Warden of Md. House of Corr., 215 Md. 630 , 630- 31, 137 A.2d 659, 660 (1958), where the petitioner was released on parole, this Court held that the case in which the