Sheetz v. Mayor of Baltimore

BLACKWELL, Judge. In this case, Baltimore City police seized narcotics and related paraphernalia from city correctional officers. According to the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City, the police did so without probable cause and without a warrant. 1 The issue here is whether such evi ²¹⁰ dence, taken in violation of the fourth amendment, is admissible in a civil administrative discharge proceeding. As a matter of Maryland administrative law, we hold that such evidence is admissible unless obtained in bad faith.

Because no finding was made as to whether the evidence, gathered in violation of the fourth amendment, was obtained in bad faith, we shall order this case remanded to the Baltimore City Civil Service Commission for that determination. I. The Facts The Baltimore City Police Department informed Warden Paul Davis (Warden) and Deputy Warden Thomas Corcoran of the Baltimore City Jail that Correctional Officer Lieutenant Clifford Weems (Weems) was being investigated for possible trafficking in illegal drugs. After the Warden made a cursory investigation which neither confirmed nor dispelled the allegations, the police department informed him that it would continue to investigate Weems. However the Warden, according to the administrative hearing officer, “at no time requested the Police Department and/or Captain Newman to press the investigation against Lieutenant Weems.” On November 3, 1983, the police kept Weems’ van under surveillance.

They observed people going in and out of the vehicle, which was located across the street from the jail. Undercover Officer White testified that he walked by and smelled marijuana in the van. Without obtaining a warrant, the police arrested Weems, the petitioner Melvin Sheetz (Sheetz) and several other correctional officers who were in the van. In a search made during the arrest, the police discovered cocaine, marijuana and related drug paraphernalia.

Sheetz was charged with resisting arrest and possession of narcotics and related paraphernalia. The State dropped these charges when the District Court held that the procedure by which the evidence was obtained violated the fourth amendment, and the evidence was therefore inadmissible at ²¹¹ trial. The Warden then initiated a disciplinary proceeding against Sheetz and the other correctional officers. Correspondence indicates that the State’s Attorney’s Office had urged the Warden to follow through on his decision to press administrative charges after the State had dropped its own case against all the correctional officers except Weems. 2 Relying on the illegally seized evidence, the Warden ruled that Sheetz had conducted himself in a manner “unbecoming of an employee of the City” and had therefore violated Baltimore City Civil Service Commission Rule 56(l)(f). 3 In a letter dated January 13, 1984, the Warden discharged Sheetz based on this finding.

A Civil Service Commission representative heard the case, held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to civil administrative proceedings 4 and recommended that the Warden’s decision be upheld. The commission approved the hearing officer’s recommendation. Arguing that the illegally obtained evidence should have been excluded, Sheetz filed an action for a Writ of Mandamus in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against respon ²¹² dent Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The circuit court denied Sheetz’s request.

In affirming the agency ruling, the court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil administrative disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed based on a balancing test of the costs and benefits of employing the rule. Sheetz v. City of Baltimore, 72 Md.App. 51 , 527 A.2d 787 (1987).

II

As a general matter, the federal exclusionary rule applies to criminal proceedings. However the Supreme Court has extended the rule to at least one civil proceeding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). There the Court held that illegally obtained contraband evidence could not be admitted in an automobile forfeiture case. Noting that the cost of forfeiture was quasi-punitive in nature and exceeded the cost of the criminal fines, the Court reasoned that “[i]t would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible.” One Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 701 , 85 S.Ct. at 1251 , 14 L.Ed.2d at 175 .

However since then, the Court has declined to extend the rule to other civil proceedings. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (declining to apply the rule to federal tax proceedings where criminal evidence had been obtained by state police); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (refusing to apply the rule in the context of civil deportation proceedings). This Court has itself considered the extension of the exclusionary rule in three civil proceedings. See Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673 , 537 A.2d 250 (1988) (proceeding for the return of records); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224 , 522 A.2d 1348 (1987) (probation revocation proceed ²¹³ ing); Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 , 514 A.2d 4 (1986) (public nuisance action).

Of these cases, Chase is most on point with the instant case. There, we held that, “[i]n revocation of probation proceedings, the exclusionary rule does not apply to bar evidence illegally seized by the police from the probationer.” Id. 309 Md. at 251 , 522 A.2d at 1362 . We concluded that society’s need to obtain accurate information regarding criminals who may have been released on probation exceeds the marginal increase in deterrence of improper police searches and seizures to obtain such information. We emphasized that proceedings revoking probation are not punitive in nature, since punishment has previously been allocated by the sentencing judge.

However we established in Chase an exception to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence: “when the officer has acted in bad faith and not as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances, the evidence should, in any event, be suppressed.” 309 Md. at 253 , 522 A.2d at 1362 . The Court reasoned that “it would derogate due process of law to presume conclusively that in such cases the police officer acted in good faith.” 309 Md. at 253 , 522 A.2d at 1863 . Thus “[ejvidence concerning the officer’s conduct which would be sufficient to call upon the State to rebut is credible evidence indicating prima facie to the satisfaction of the hearing judge that the officer’s actions were not in accord with reasonable law enforcement activities but were prompted by improper motives.” 809 Md. at 254, 522 A.2d at 1363 . Emphasizing that there was no evidence that the officers were aware of the defendant’s probationary status and that probable cause was a close call, we found that the warrant-less search of the probationer in Chase was objectively reasonable.

Given the lack of proof of bad faith, the evidence was admissible in the probation revocation hearing. ²¹⁴ III. Because we find that the deterrent benefits of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule are minimal in the context of discharge proceedings, we find that the exclusionary rule does not generally apply in such cases. We explain. Administrative discharge proceedings are typically designed to evaluate employees’ actions as they relate to future job performance, rather than to punish employees for past wrongs. 5 See Garrett v. Lehman, 751 F.2d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.1985) (“The function of [military discharge] proceedings is to determine eligibility for further military service; not to punish for past wrongs.”); Governing Bd. of Mountain View Sch.

Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal.App.3d 546 , 111 Cal.Rptr. 724, 727 (1974) (holding that the primary purpose of discharging a teacher is to protect his students, rather than to punish the teacher). 6 The Baltimore City Charter regarding cause for discharge reflects this proclivity for basing discharge on job efficiency, rather than on retribution. 7 By contrast, criminal laws seek to punish parties for their past wrongs. ²¹⁵ The police