Simpson v. Moore

McAULIFFE, Judge. Trooper Carey S. Poetzman was killed in the crash of a Maryland State Police helicopter on 19 January 1986. On 17 January 1989, her surviving spouse, Robert J. Simpson (plaintiff), after first obtaining an award for workers’ compensation benefits, brought this action for wrongful death and survivor’s benefits. The plaintiff contends the accident resulted from the negligence of two of the decedent’s co-employees, and that either they, or the State of Maryland as their employer, should respond in damages.

Plaintiff contends the State has waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA), §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 1986 Cum.Supp.). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The individual defendants each claim immunity pursuant to § 12-105 of the MTCA. The State concedes it has waived sovereign immunity by the enactment of the MTCA, but argues: (1) the plaintiff’s action is barred because the plaintiff failed to file a claim with the State Treasurer, or the State Treasurer’s designee, within 180 days after the accident, thereby failing to satisfy a condition precedent to recovery established by § 12-106 of the MTCA; and (2) in any event the State is entitled to the immunity granted an employer which has provided workers’ compensation benefits, Art. 101, § 15, Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.). ²¹⁸ Judge Thomas Ward of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the defendants’ motion.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and we issued a writ of certiorari before consideration of the case by that court. We now affirm. I. We first consider the dismissal of the action against the State. The State’s sovereign immunity from tort actions has been substantially waived by the enactment of the MTCA.

Originally enacted by Chapter 298 of the Acts of 1981, the MTCA provided for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, but only as to certain specified tort actions. The MTCA was significantly amended, and the scope of waiver of immunity substantially enlarged, by Senate Bill 380, enacted as Chapter 538 of the Acts of 1985. Our determination of this action against the State turns upon the proper interpretation of the 1985 statutory amendment, and thus the intent of the legislature in enacting it. Prior to the 1985 amendment, 1 the MTCA provided for a limited waiver of “the immunity of the State, of its units, and of State personnel, who are acting in official capacities” as to certain tort actions.

See Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 448-49 , 545 A.2d 1312 (1988); Gardner v. State, 77 Md.App. 237, 239 , 549 A.2d 1171 (1988). Although the State personnel who caused the harm could be sued, joinder of the State was required if the plaintiff alleged a “tortious act or omission within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel.” Section 12-107 (1984). Section 12-107(d) at that time also provided that: (1) Any State personnel who acts within the scope of the State personnel’s public duties and without malice and ²¹⁹ gross negligence is not liable as an individual for any damages that result from tortious conduct for which immunity is waived under this subtitle, including damages that exceed the limitations on the State’s waiver of immunity. (2) A judgment in tort for money damages obtained under this subtitle against State personnel, in the State personnel’s official capacity, is a judgment against the State only and may not be executed against the State personnel individually.

Prior to the 1985 amendment, the MTCA also required, as a condition precedent to the initiation of an action under the Act, that the claimant submit a written claim to the State Treasurer or designee and that the claim be finally rejected. Section 12-105 (1984). A claim could be filed at any time within the period of limitations applicable to the tort alleged, and the filing of the claim tolled the running of limitations until sixty days after a final denial of the claim. Section 12-107(a) (1984).

A final denial consisted of an actual denial sent by the Treasurer or designee, or “at the option of the claimant, if the Treasurer or designee fails to give the claimant notice of a final decision within 6 months after the filing of the claim.” Section 12-106(d) (1984). A significant change effected by the 1985 amendment was the expansion of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity from a specific list of tort actions to tort actions generally. The 1985 amendment also deleted all reference to judgments against State personnel. 2 Additionally, by a change that is at the heart of the controversy here, the ²²⁰ General Assembly imposed a 180-day limitation upon the filing of a claim, and re-structured the limitations provisions. As amended, § 12-106 now provides: (a) Scope of section.—This section does not apply to a claim that is asserted by cross-claim or counterclaim.

(b) Claim and denial required.—A claimant may not institute an action under this subtitle unless: (1) the claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim; (2) the Treasurer or designee denies the claim finally; and (3) the action is filed within 1 year after the claim is denied finally or 3 years after the cause of action arises, whichever is later. The State argues the 180-day filing requirement of § 12-106 is “jurisdictional” and plaintiff’s action was properly dismissed because the claim was not timely filed. The plaintiff, although conceding that the literal language of § 12-106 creates a condition precedent with which he has not complied, contends that the legislature intended to engraft upon the MTCA a notice provision identical to § 5-306 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.). If, he argues, § 12-106 is “interpreted” to include all of the provisions that were contained in § 5-306 of the Courts Article, he will be able to qualify under the “good cause” and “absence of prejudice” criteria established by § 5-306(c) for waiver of the notice requirement.

The plaintiff contends the legislature intended to incorporate within the MTCA the 180-day notice provision which then applied to claims for unliquidated damages made against a county or a municipal corporation. This provision, ²²¹ codified at § 5-306 of the Courts Article, 3 provided in pertinent part: (a) Notice required; time for giving notice.—Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, no action for unliquidated damages for an injury to a person or his property may be brought against a county or municipal corporation unless the notice of the claim required by this section is given within 180 days after the injury. * * * * * * (c) Entertainment of suit in absence of notice.—Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, the court may, upon motion and for good cause shown, entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given, unless the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced thereby. In support of his contention, the plaintiff points to an “explanation of proposed changes” included in an initial draft of what was to become Senate Bill 380, and to portions of a summary of a Report of the Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings concerning Senate Bill 380. The “explanation” appeared at the end of proposed § 12-106, which inserted for the first time the requirement that a claim be filed within 180 days.

It stated: In subsection (b)(1) of this section, language is added to require notice of the claim within 180 days after the injury occurs. This period is comparable to the 180-day period specified in CJ § 5-306(a) for claims against a county or municipal corporation. The portions of the Committee Report relied on by the plaintiff state: This bill is intended to broaden the State’s tort liability and make several specific changes with respect to the State’s immunity from tort damages. ²²² This amendment also inserts language requiring that notice of a written claim submitted to the State Treasurer must be submitted within 180 days after injury to property or person, and eliminates the requirement to include medical expenses or special damages in ones claim for damages. Summary of Committee Report for S.B. 380, Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings, March 15, 1985.

Plaintiff also points to § 12-102 of the MTCA, which provides that “[t]his subtitle shall be construed broadly, to ensure that injured parties have a remedy.” Finally, plaintiff argues that a literal reading of the statute would render a part of § 12-106(b)(3) meaningless. From all of this, says the plaintiff, it must be obvious that the legislature (1) intended to incorporate a notice provision without disturbing the existing requirement of an administrative claim at some point within the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) intended to incorporate the 180-day notice provision then found in § 5-306 of the Courts Article, including the provisions of this section relating to the waiver of notice requirement upon a showing of good cause and in the absence of a showing of prejudice. The plaintiff is the first to concede that the plain language of the statute as amended is inconsistent with the result he seeks. He states: However, in preparing the amendment, the language did not conform with the legislative intent of requiring notice of a claim but rather combined into one what should have been two separate provisions.

The result was that the statute read as though the claim itself must be submitted within 180 days instead of merely notice of a claim. As a result, the clear legislative intent that notice to the State be given within 180 days does not conform with the actual language of the statute which appears to require that a claim be submitted to the State Treasurer within 180 days. ²²³ The real legislative intent versus the intention indicated by the literal meaning of the language in the 1985 amendment is what is at stake in this case. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 16, 21. The plaintiff argues that the “plain language” of a statute may not control when it is clear that the legislature intended something different.

In Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539 , 546 A.2d 465 (1988), this Court, quoting in part from Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987), said: [T]he plain-meaning rule is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention because the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears____ In determining the context of statutory language, we must consider any persuasive evidence ‘including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.’ Similarly, in Kaczorowski , we discussed the general rule that the intent of the legislature may ordinarily be determined by reference to the words of the statute, where those words produce a plain meaning. We said, however, quoting in part from Darnall v. Connor, 161 Md. 210, 215 , 155 A. 894 (1931), the plain-meaning rule “is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention____” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514 , 525 A.2d 628 . On the other hand, we have made it clear that “a court is not wholly free to rewrite a statute merely because of some judicial notion of legislative purpose.” Id. at 516 n. 4, 525 A.2d 628 . The plaintiff urges us to treat the 180-day filing requirement as a notice provision, because the sponsor of the bill and the committee considering it referred to, and borrowed from, an existing notice provision.

There are two significant shortcomings in this argument. First, the legislature ²²⁴ clearly did not, as it might have done, superimpose a notice provision upon the existing framework for the filing of a claim. Had it done so, the time for filing a claim would have continued to be any time within the period of limitations applicable to the claim, and there simply would have been an additional requirement that notice of the intent to file a claim be given within 180 days of the occurrence. While we may agree with the plaintiff that such an approach would have been preferable, that is clearly not what was done.

Instead, the legislature tied the 180-day provision directly to the requirement for the filing of a claim. Second, even if the legislature had superimposed a 180-day notice provision upon the existing claim procedure, and had not tied the two together, that would have availed the plaintiff of naught in the absence of an “escape” provision. When the notice provision relating to claims against counties and municipalities was first enacted, it did not contain an escape clause, and the decisions of this Court were consistent in holding that failure to comply with the notice requirement barred the action. See Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972) (fact that municipality knew about the accident and had investigated it would not excuse failure to give notice required by statute); Rich v. City of Baltimore, 265 Md. 647 , 290 A.2d 777 (1972) (giving of required notice was condition precedent to right to file action); Cotham and Maldonado v. Board, 260 Md. 556 , 273 A.2d 115 (1971) (discovery rule, applicable to statute of limitations triggered by accrual of cause of action, is not applicable to notice provision requiring notice within a specified time “after the injury or damage was sustained”); Neuenschwander v. Wash.

San. Com., 187 Md. 67, 76-77 , 48 A.2d 593 (1945) (legislature may properly condition the right to bring an action for damages against a municipal corporation upon the giving of written notice of the claim within a specified time). Although this Court has held that substantial compliance with the notice statute will suffice, Grubbs v. Prince George’s Co., 267 Md. 318, 324-25 , 297 A.2d 754 ²²⁵ (1972); Loewinger, supra, 266 Md. at 318 , 292 A.2d 67 ; Jackson v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs, 233 Md. 164, 167-68 , 195