Singfield v. State

SALMON, J. Harold Singfield, Jr., was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second-degree murder, use of a handgun in commission of a felony or a crime of violence, and unlawfully wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. 1 After sentencing, Singfield noted this appeal and presents three questions for our review: ¹⁷⁰ I. Did the trial court err in declining to ask the jury on voir dire whether the nature of the case — murder with a handgun — would make it impossible or difficult to render a fair and impartial verdict?

II

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to allow cross-examination of Devon Harrison concerning whether Harrison thought he might be offered a deal on his pending charges if he picked appellant out of a photo array?

III

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in permitting the State to make unfairly prejudicial comments in rebuttal argument? We answer appellant’s first question in the affirmative and reverse and remand appellant’s case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a new trial. In light of our decision, we need not address appellant’s remaining questions, nor is it necessary to set forth the evidence presented at trial that supported appellant’s convictions. I. ANALYSIS A. At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court inquired if counsel had any requests for additional voir dire.

Defense counsel responded: Yes, Your Honor. I would request that the court ask the question that I propounded in my voir dire, Question Number 5, which asks if the nature of this case, specifically because it involves murder with a handgun, would make it impossible or difficult to render a fair and impartial verdict. [2] The court declined to ask the additional question, stating: ¹⁷¹ Well, we’ve asked the jury — we’ve advised the jury of the nature of the charges. We’ve also advised the jury to ask— to tell us if there’s — they’ve been the victim of a weapon’s charge — or victim of a weapon’s crime or had someone in the family who was accused of a weapon’s crime. We’ve also asked them if they had any reason whatsoever ... that would affect their ability to render a fair and impartial decision.

I think when you take all those questions into — in totality, they have been presented with circumstances that are covered by this question without being asked this question in this form. So we will decline to answer — ask this question or represent this further question to the jury. Defense counsel excepted to the court’s failure to ask the question. On appeal, appellant asserts that the proposed question was nearly identical in purpose and form to the question at issue in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002).

In Thomas , this Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have been asked the proposed question. He also refers us to Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1 , 806 A.2d 265 (2002), in support of his position. The State counters that the rationale of Thomas , which involved a violation of the narcotics laws, and Sweet , which involved assault and sexual abuse charges, should not be extended to encompass all other charges. The State further asserts that the trial court correctly concluded that the questions already propounded would have uncovered any bias the prospective jurors possessed concerning murder with a handgun.

In Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34-35 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993), the Court said: ¹⁷² The common law of this State vests trial judges with discretion to regulate voir dire. ... [T]he scope of voir dire, and the form of the questions propounded rests firmly within the discretion of the trial judge. The trial judge’s discretion regarding the scope of a proposed avenue of voir dire is governed by one primary principle: the purpose of “the inquiry is to ascertain ‘the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose.’ ” McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58 , 146 A.2d 194 (1959) (quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140 , 88 A.2d 556 (1952) (citations omitted))---“Questions not directed to a specific ground for disqualification but which are speculative, inquisitorial, catechising or ‘fishing,’ asked in the aid of deciding on peremptory challenges, may be refused in the discretion of the court, even though it would not have been error to have asked them.” McGee, 219 Md. at 58-59 , 146 A.2d 194 . (Some citations omitted.) Furthermore, “[t]here are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service, and (2) ‘an examination of a juror ... conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.’ ” Baker v. State, 157 Md.App. 600, 611 , 853 A.2d 796 (2004) (quoting Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36 , 633 A.2d 867 (citations omitted) (emphasis added in Davis)). In Thomas v. State, 139 Md.App. 188 , 775 A.2d 406 (2001), aff'd, 369 Md. 202 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002), the defendant was convicted of distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine.

We held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to ask the prospective jurors: Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it ¹⁷³ would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged? Id. at 195, 775 A.2d 406 . We concluded that the question “aims directly at biases related to the defendant’s alleged criminal act, which when uncovered, will disqualify a juror if the bias is so strong as to impair the juror’s impartiality.” Id. at 202 , 775 A.2d 406 . We further explained: Plainly stated, observing that most citizens have a bias against proscribed criminal acts is not extraordinary.

Yet, a bias that is so strong against a particular criminal act that it distorts a juror’s ability to render a fair and impartial verdict must be uncovered. [The proposed question] was reasonably likely to identify jurors with strong feelings toward narcotics laws that could hinder their ability objectively to resolve the matter presented. Such a bias may exist for any number of reasons, including, but not limited to, a juror’s own struggle with substance abuse or a juror’s friend or family member whose life had been negatively altered by the influence of drugs in our society. Furthermore, it is important to note that such bias does not readily present itself to the court without the aid of properly phrased voir dire questions. Id. at 203-04 , 775 A.2d 406 .

In affirming our decision, the Court of Appeals wrote in Thomas, “A question aimed at uncovering a venire person’s bias because of the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged is directly relevant to, and focuses on, an issue particular to the defendant’s case and, so, should be uncovered.” State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 214 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002) (citation omitted); see also Thomas, 139 Md.App. at 207-08 , 775 A.2d 406 (the question presented by the defendant was “reasonably likely to uncover a bias ‘directly related to the crime ’ ”) (quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 10 , 759 A.2d 819 (2000)). In Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1 , 806 A.2d 265 (2002), the defendant was convicted of second-degree assault and third- ¹⁷⁴ degree sexual offense against a minor. The defendant requested that the trial court ask the jury panel: “Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?” The trial court declined to ask the question. Relying on Thomas, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to pose the question because it was directed at biases specifically related to the defendant’s alleged criminal acts that, if uncovered, would be disqualifying because such a bias would impair the ability of the prospective juror to be fair and impartial.

Id. at 9-10, 806 A.2d 265 . But see Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 561-62 , 832 A.2d 869 (2003) (in a murder trial, defendant’s requested voir dire inquiry into whether jurors had strong feelings about guns or gun owners was “a far-ranging, almost open-ended exploration of juror attitudes, experiences, and philosophies that might have been of immeasurable value in guiding the appellant’s use of his peremptory challenges” and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow this “very peripheral probing of attitudes”). In Newman v. State, 156 Md.App. 20 , 845 A.2d 71 (2003), rev’d on other grounds, 384 Md. 285 , 863 A.2d 321 (2004), the defendant was alleged to have conspired with a friend to kill her husband because she believed that he was sexually molesting their two sons. Newman was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and related offenses.

At trial, Newman wanted the court to ask the following voir dire questions: Has any member of the jury been accused or charged with child abuse, physical abuse, or domestic violence? Is any member of the jury a member of groups advocating fathers’ rights in divorce and custody hearings? The trial court declined to ask the aforementioned questions, and on appeal, Newman alleged that this constituted reversible error. We disagreed and held that the “questions asked by the trial court were sufficient to identify potential ¹⁷⁵ bias related to child abuse or custody as they relate to [Newman’s] prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder.” Id. at 52, 845 A.2d 71 (footnote omitted).

We further wrote: At the beginning of the voir dire process, the trial court informed the venire of the basic facts of the case, including the fact that the State relied on appellant’s failed attempts to gain custody of her children as the motive for the conspiracy. The court then asked a series of questions designed to draw out possible bias of the venire, including: Does any member of the prospective jury panel feel such sympathy for persons in the defendant’s circumstances that you would be biased in the defendant’s favor? Likewise, does anyone harbor feelings that would bias you in favor of the prosecution? Id. at 53 , 845 A.2d 71 (footnote omitted).

More recently, in Baker v. State, 157 Md.App. 600 , 853 A.2d 796 (2004), the defendant was alleged to have shot the victim. The trial court declined to ask the prospective jurors: “[D]o you have any bias or prejudice concerning handguns which would prevent you from fairly weighing the evidence in this case?” We concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to so inquire. Judge James Eyler wrote for this Court: [A]ppellant shot an unarmed man with a handgun, allegedly in self-defense or defense of his girlfriend. One of the facts the jury might have to decide was whether appellant used reasonable force.

The trial court should have asked whether any prospective juror had strong feelings about handguns that would have affected his or her ability to weigh the issues fairly. Baker, 157 Md.App. at 613 , 853 A.2d 796 . The defense’s proposed voir dire in Curtin v. State, 165