State v. Garnett

MURPHY, C.J. The parties to this appeal from the Circuit Court for Wicomico County — the State of Maryland, appellant, and Jacqueline Mae Garnett, appellee — have previously been before the Court of Appeals, and are now back before this Court for a second time. At this point in the litigation, appellant presents two questions for our review: 1. Did the circuit court err as a matter of law in finding that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude it from granting Garnett’s Motion to Dismiss and to Correct Illegal Sentence? 2. Did the circuit court err as a matter of law in finding that the imposition of the criminal restitution obligation was illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a)?

For the reasons that follow, we shall answer “no” to each question, and therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court that a sentence of “restitution” cannot be imposed on a defendant who has been found “not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.” ⁵⁶⁰ Background As stated above, the parties have previously been before the Court of Appeals. In State v. Garnett, 384 Md. 466 , 863 A.2d 1007 (2004) (Garnett I), the Court of Appeals set forth the “[procedural [hjistory” of the case at bar, and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat that history at this point. Suffice it to say that in Garnett I the Court of Appeals came to the following conclusion: The order of restitution in favor of the Maryland State Police that was entered as part of criminal proceedings against [appellee] was a penal sanction to which she was subject, despite a finding of guilty but not criminally responsible. Because the restitution ordered in this case was a criminal sanction, it was not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.

Thus, the State’s Motion to Allow Garnishment should have been granted. Id. at 481 , 863 A.2d 1007 . Thereafter, (in the words of appellant’s brief): [Appellee] ... filed a “Motion to Dismiss and to Correct Illegal Sentence” in the circuit court, seeking that the State’s Motion to Allow Garnishment be dismissed and that the money judgment be vacated. [Appellee] claimed that the restitution order was illegal because she was found not criminally responsible and should not be held to account at all for the numerous crimes for which she was convicted. The State opposed the motion.

On June 27, 2005, the circuit court granted [appellee’s] motion and dismissed the Motion to Allow Garnishment and vacated the July 25, 2001 money judgment. In spite of the Court of Appeals prior holding that the State’s motion should have been granted, the circuit court held that the imposition of the criminal restitution obligation on [appellee] was illegal as [appellee] alleged. This appeal followed. ⁵⁶¹ I. Even though Md. Rule 4-345(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time,” appellant argues that “the law of the case” doctrine prohibited the circuit court from correcting a sentence that it found to be illegal under the circumstances. According to appellant (in the words of its brief): The lower court’s holding simply misapplies the law of the case doctrine and actually misquotes what the doctrine actually provides.

As stated infra, the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation between the same parties of issues that were or could have been raised in the prior litigation. As an issue that could have been raised in the prior litigation, the law of the case governs the legality of the judgments under Rule 4-345(a), and hence, the lower court went beyond its authority when it allowed [appellee] to challenge and hence, religitate whether the State was entitled to its wage garnishment. At some point, the litigation must end, and notwithstanding the lower court’s holding, the litigation concerning whether the State was entitled to its wage garnishment actually did end with the Court of Appeals’ decision [in Garnett I]. [Appellee] is not entitled to a rematch. In Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170 , 840 A.2d 715 (2004), the Court of Appeals stated that “once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case.” Id. at 183 , 840 A.2d 715 (footnote omitted).

While we agree with appellant that there are occasions on which this doctrine precludes a party from asserting a claim that “could have been raised in prior litigation,” we are persuaded that Md. Rule 4-345(a) permits a defendant to assert an “illegal sentence” argument that was not previously addressed by an appellate court. ⁵⁶² Obviously, the law of the case doctrine would prevent relitigation of an “illegal sentence” argument that has been presented to and rejected by an appellate court. For example, on December 20,1999, the Court of Appeals considered— and rejected — claims of two “lifers” who argued that they were serving sentences that had become illegal as a result of Governor Glendening’s “Life Means Life” parole policy. See State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170 , 742 A.2d 508 (1999), and Herrera v. State, 357 Md. 186 , 742 A.2d 517 (1999). Maryland Rule 4-345(a) would not entitle either of those petitioners to relitigate the “illegal sentence” issue decided by the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, Md. Rule 4-345(a) would be meaningless if the law of the case doctrine were extended to sentences that could have been — but were not — challenged as illegal at the time an appellant filed his or her first appellate brief in this Court. The Garnett I Court expressly stated that “[t]he issue of the constitutionality of imposing a criminal sanction upon a person found guilty but not criminally responsible ... is not before us, as Garnett has not raised it.” 384 Md. at 475 n. 10, 863 A.2d 1007 . Judge Wilner’s concurring opinion in Garnett I concluded as follows: Garnett has not challenged the validity of the statutory construct that permits a court to enter a criminal penalty against someone who has been found not criminally responsible. That authorization is certainly inconsistent with the conclusion we reached in Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 269 , 465 A.2d 475, 478 (1983), however, that a finding of not criminally responsible relieves the defendant of liability for punishment under the criminal law and that “[n]o criminal sentence may even be entered on the guilty verdict____” Indeed, imposition of a criminal penalty upon a person found not criminally responsible would raise serious Constitutional issues.

Because those issues have not been raised in this case, the court has not considered them. They most certainly do lurk, however. Id. at 482, 863 A.2d 1007 . Under these circumstances, we conclude that the “law of the case” doctrine did not prohibit ⁵⁶³ the circuit court from considering the merits of appellee’s “illegal sentence” claim.

II

The circuit court filed an OPINION AND ORDER that included the following findings and conclusions: This case comes before this Court on remand from the Court of Appeals and the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Garnishment of Wages and Correct an Illegal Sentence. The Imposition of a Criminal Penalty Against a Not Criminally Responsible Defendant and the Constitutionality of Sections 11-601 and 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article The Legislature has provided that “[a] court may enter a judgment of restitution that orders a defendant ... to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime ... if: (1) as a direct result of the crime ... property of the victim was damaged.” Md.Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-603 (2001, 2004 Cum.Supp.). Section 11-601 defines a “defendant” for the purposes of restitution as a person “who has been found guilty of a crime, even if the defendant has been found not criminally responsible[.]” Ms. Garnett therefore qualifies as a “defendant” for the purposes of the statute.

Maryland precedent has firmly established that “a defendant may be found both guilty and not criminally responsible for a crime so that the defendant does not stand convicted of a crime, and ‘no criminal sentence may ever be entered on the guilty verdict.’ ” State v. Garnett, 384 Md. 466, 474 [, 863 A.2d 1007 ] (2004) (quoting Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 268-69 [, 465 A.2d 475 ] (1983) (explaining Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 598 [, 399 A.2d 578 ] (1979))). A finding of not criminally responsible “relieves her of liability for punishment under the criminal law,” Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. at 269 [, 465 A.2d 475 ] (mother ⁵⁶⁴ found guilty of drowning her child); see also Garnett, 382[384] Md. at 482[, 863 A.2d 1007 ]. “[T]he clear legislative intent regarding the successful interposition of a plea of insanity is not that an accused is to be found not guilty of the criminal act it was proved he committed, but that he shall not be punished therefore.” Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 114 [, 512 A.2d 389 ] (1986) (citing Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 598 [, 399 A.2d 578 ] (1979)). The federal courts have consistently held that defendants found not criminally responsible or insane, cannot be punished either criminally or civilly for