State v. Webster

HARRELL, Judge. This case involves two principal questions: whether the trial judge had the authority to modify appellee Craig Nathaniel Webster’s sentence; and even if he did not, whether the State, appellant here, had any right to appeal that action to this Court. Normally these questions would be approached in reverse order for obvious reasons. In this case, however, for reasons we shall explain anon, we address them as stated.

We hold, under the facts of this case, that the trial court lacked the authority to modify the sentence, and we further hold that, because of the nature of that legal error, the State possessed a common law right to appeal the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s modified sentence, and we remand with directions that the prior sentence be reimposed. FACTS On 15 July 1993, Craig Nathaniel Webster was convicted in a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County of daytime ⁵⁸⁸ housebreaking and felony theft. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4 — 245(c), the State, on 21 July 1993, served appellee with proper notice of its intent to seek a mandatory sentence pursuant to article 27, section 643B(c) of the Maryland Code (1957,1996 Repl.Vol.).

Article 643B(c) mandates: [A]ny person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years. The court may not suspend all or part of the mandatory 25-year sentence required under this subsection____ The State offered the following convictions for crimes of violence as the basis for the mandatory sentence: (1) On 25 February 1985, appellee was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County for the crime of daytime housebreaking (the court suspended the sentence of eighteen months, but defendant ultimately served nine months of the sentence for a violation of probation conviction related to the housebreaking conviction); and (2) on 8 February 1989, appellee was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to six years in the Department of Corrections. Appellee’s conviction for daytime housebreaking in the instant case constituted the third conviction of a crime of violence for purposes of the mandatory sentence. On 25 January 1994, the court merged the theft and daytime housebreaking convictions and sentenced appellee, pursuant to section 643B(c), to a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 1 At the ⁵⁸⁹ time of sentencing, appellee’s prior convictions for robbery and daytime housebreaking, as well as his contemporaneous conviction for daytime housebreaking, constituted crimes of violence as defined by article 27, section 643B(a).

See Md. Code (1957, 1992 RepLVoL, 1993 Supp.), Art. 27 § 643B(a). One day after appellee’s sentencing, on 26 January 1994, the Maryland Senate introduced Senate Bill 322 which, among other things, proposed deleting daytime housebreaking from the list of section 643B(a) crimes of violence. 1994 Senate Journal, at 369. On 22 February 1994, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b), 2 appellee filed a Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence. In his motion, appellee did not offer a reason for the open-ended request for modification or reduction of his sentence.

On 16 March 1994, the trial court, without elaboration, deferred ruling on appellee’s motion. On 26 May 1994, Senate Bill 322 was enacted, including the provision deleting daytime housebreaking from the section 643B(a) list of crimes of violence. See Act of May 26,1994, ch. 712, 1994 Md. Laws 3162 (“the Act”). It provided that the law would take effect on 1 October 1994.

See id. § 5. In section 3 of the Act, it was stated: That the changes that are made to Article 27, § 643B of the Code by this Act shall apply prospectively only to defendants who are sentenced after the effective date of this Act and may not be construed to apply in any way to defendants who are sentenced before the effective date of this Act. Id. § 3. Over two years later, 3 on 19 December 1996, the trial court held a substantive hearing on appellee’s 22 February 1994 ⁵⁹⁰ Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence.

There, for the first time, appellee contended that the trial court had the discretion, pursuant to Rule 4-345(b), to reduce appellee’s sentence based on the 1 October 1994 change in the definition of “crime of violence” to exclude daytime housebreaking. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge stated that it would “take the matter under advisement.” He noted that “the way I have always looked at it is that it’s a mandatory twenty-five [years] without parole which means I don’t have any discretion.” He continued, “I don’t think that the reclassifications of the criminal offenses for future offenses have altered that, but it’s certainly a possibility worth looking at.” He asked the parties to present, in writing, any authority on the issue. On 29 January 1997 and after reviewing the parties’ memoranda, the court filed a Memorandum and Order granting appellee’s motion to the extent of allowing a new sentencing hearing. The trial judge, in light of the fact that the 1 October 1994 definition of “crime of violence” excluded daytime housebreaking, stated: [I]t would be unjust not to provide a new sentencing hearing for the Defendant in light of the Court’s expression at the time of sentencing and at various points in the proceedings that it would not have imposed the twenty-five year sentence without parole if it had any discretion or other option.

The type of crime that Mr. Webster was convicted of— daytime housebreaking — is precisely the type of crime that the General Assembly found to be inappropriate to include as a crime of violence. The judge further noted that one of the two predicate convictions was also for daytime housebreaking. At the re-sentencing hearing on 9 May 1997, the trial court vacated the 25 January 1994 sentence and instead ordered two concurrent ten year sentences for daytime housebreaking and ⁵⁹¹ felony theft. From that decision, the State appeals and raises a single issue for our consideration: Whether the trial court lacked the authority to modify a sentence legally imposed pursuant to the mandatory provisions of article 27, section 643B of the Maryland Code.

Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the State possessed no statutory or common law right to appeal the trial court’s decision. As noted earlier, we first address the trial court’s authority to modify the appellee’s original sentence, and because we conclude that the trial court lacked such authority, we then address the State’s right to appeal the trial court’s actions. Our unusual order of discussing these issues is dictated by the fact that our resolution of appellee’s motion to dismiss, i.e., the State has a common law right of appeal in this instance, is dependent on the ground of our decision regarding the merits of the State’s appellate argument, i.e., the court, in modifying appellee’s sentence, exceeded its authority or power. DISCUSSION I. The State argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that Rule 4-345(b) vested it with so broad a revisory power to modify a sentence that it could ignore a seemingly clear statutory mandate circumscribing its discretion in this matter.

The State contends that the legislature intended the 1 October 1994 definitional change to apply prospectively and, therefore, that it intended the prior version of the statute should govern all those defendants who, like appellee, were sentenced prior to the effective date of the change. For some degree of guidance, we consider first the effect of statutory definitional changes relative to pre-existing statutory offenses committed prior to the modifying enactments. In doing so, we recognize a fundamental difference between such cases, where a major issue is the determination of criminality (or the elimination thereof) accorded whatever conduct is involved, and the present one, where the major thrust does ⁵⁹² not implicate the assignment or withdrawal of criminality, but concerns the appropriate punishment. In Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602 , 471 A.2d 730 (1984), the Court of Appeals noted that “ ‘[tjhere is a general presumption in the law that an enactment is intended to have purely prospective effect.

In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect.’ ” Id. at 607 , 471 A.2d 730 (citing Traore v. State, 290 Md. 585, 593 , 431 A.2d 96 (1981)); see also State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 343 , 402 A.2d 876 (1979) (“It is a widely recognized principle that the retroactive operation of a statute is disfavored.”). In keeping with this principle, “most legislatures have enacted general savings statutes which have the effect of continuing a repealed statute in force for the purpose of punishing offenses committed prior to repeal.” Johnson, 285 Md. at 344 , 402 A.2d 876 . Maryland has enacted such a general savings clause. Article 1, section 3 of the Maryland Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol.), provides: The repeal, or the repeal and reenactment, or the revision, amendment, or consolidation of any statute, or part of a section of any statute, civil or criminal, shall not have the effect to release, extinguish, alter, modify or change, in whole or in part, any penalty, forfeiture, or liability, either civil or criminal, which shall have been incurred under such statute, section or part thereof, unless the repealing, repealing and reenacting, revising, amending or consolidating act shall expressly so provide; and such statute, section or part thereof, so repealed, repealed and reenacted, revised, amended or consolidated, shall be treated and held as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any all proper actions, suits, proceedings or prosecutions, civil or criminal, for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability, as well as for the purpose of sustaining any judgment, decree or order which can or may be rendered, entered or made in such actions, suits, proceedings or prosecutions imposing, inflicting or declaring such penalty, forfeiture or liability. ⁵⁹³ (emphasis added).

This provision “sav[es] any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under a statute which is subsequently repealed or amended unless the repealing act expressly provides otherwise.” Johnson, 285 Md. at 345 , 402 A.2d 876 . In determining the legislative intent of a statute, “ ‘[t]he primary source ... is, of course, the language of the statute itself.’ ” State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 (1996) (citing Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986)). In some circumstances the Court only needs to look at the “statutory language to determine the legislative purpose,” however, the Court “may always consider evidence of legislative intent beyond the plain language of the statute.” Pagano, 341 Md. at 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 .

In construing a statute, the Court “seek[s] to avoid results which are ‘illogical,’ ‘unreasonable,’ or ‘inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1 (1995) (citing Tucker, 308 Md. at 75 , 517 A.2d 730 ). Here, section 643B(a) enumerates the crimes included in the definition of “crime of violence,” but, on its face, makes no reference to the retrospective operation of any crimes previously included, but which have been excluded or deleted at any point during the life of the statute. 4 The Act amending section 643B, however, specifically refers to the statutory change excluding daytime housebreaking from the list of crimes constituting crimes of violence. See Act of May 26, 1994, ch. 712, sec. 3, 1994 Md. Laws 3162 . In section 3 of the Act, the legislature stated: ⁵⁹⁴ That the changes that are made to Article 27, § 643B of the code by this Act shall apply prospectively only to defendants who are sentenced after the effective date of this Act and may not be construed to apply in any way to defendants who are sentenced before the effective date of this Act.

Id. Furthermore, in a committee note, the legislature stated that the deletion of daytime housebreaking from the definition of “crime of violence” is a substantive change that is intended to enhance the fairness and uniformity of sentencing practices in the State. The Committee believes that the mandatory minimum sentences established in this section should be applicable only to crimes against persons or crimes that directly involve a threat to human life. In addition, the deletion of the crime of daytime housebreaking is a logical change because this bill eliminates the distinction between daytime and nighttime housebreaking---- Under Section 3 of this bill, this change will apply prospectively to cases in which a defendant is sentenced after the effective date of the bill. 1994 Md. Laws 3158 -59.

A plain reading of the statute, in combination with the legislative history, indicates that if a court sentences a defendant prior to 1 October 1994, the new definition of crime of violence does not apply because the legislature clearly stated