University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp. v. Erie Insurance Exchange

BLOOM, Judge. The sole issue presented b/ this appeal is whether the anti-stay provision in Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Law, 1 relating to appeals to the circuit courts from decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, applies to Commission orders to pay previously incurred medical bills. We hold that it does not and, accordingly, we shall affirm the summary judgment granted by the Circuit Court for Caroline County (Wise, J.) in favor of appellee, Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), in the action brought against Erie by ²⁰⁷ appellant, University of Maryland Medical Systems Corporation (UMMSC). Background Arthur Thomas, while employed by Prettyman Trucking Company, Erie’s insured, sustained an injury on 29 July 1982 when a loaded pallet was placed on or dropped on his right little toe.

When he first sought medical treatment, a week later, he was admitted to the hospital. He later left the hospital against medical advice and remained without treatment for over 30 days. In December 1982 he was admitted to Dorchester General Hospital, where by-pass surgery was unsuccessful and gas gangrene developed in his right foot. A below-the-knee amputation of Thomas’s right leg was performed later that month.

Thomas was hospitalized in Easton for a mild heart attack in October 1983. He was transferred to appellant’s University Hospital and there placed in a hyperbaric chamber because gangrene had developed again in his right leg. The remainder of his right leg was amputated in November 1983. He was readmitted to University Hospital in October 1984, and his left leg was then amputated.

He was discharged from therapy on 4 July 1985. Following the July 1982 accident, Thomas applied for Workers’ Compensation benefits. The Commission initially disallowed his claim, finding (1) that he had not sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and (2) that the disability to his right foot was not causally related to the alleged accidental injury of July 1982. That decision was reversed on appeal, the jury finding for Thomas on both issues that had been decided against him by the Commission.

Consequently, by order dated 29 August 1983 the Commission rescinded the prior decision and made findings consistent with those of the jury. In 1985 a series of issues were presented to the Commission, and decisions favorable to the claimant were made. ²⁰⁸ There followed another appeal and a remand by virtue of a consent order that left open for further decision issues regarding causal relationship between the accidental injury of July 1982 and the subsequent disability to the claimant’s heart and left leg. In December 1987 the Commission entered an order that, inter alia, affirmed its prior decision that Thomas’s heart and left leg disabilities were caused by the July 1982 accidental injury and ordered Erie to pay medical expenses relating to the heart and both legs. In January 1988 that order was amended to specify that Erie was required to pay UMMSC bills of $33,752.70 (for the claimant’s 1983 hospitalization, primarily as a result of his heart attack) and $122,528.57 for the 1984 admission (at which time his left leg was amputated).

Erie appealed, and the case was submitted to Judge Wise without a jury (Case No. CV1292). Based on the Commission’s order that Erie pay its bills, UMMSC filed its own action against Erie in the Circuit Court for Caroline County, asking for a summary judgment (Case No. CV1629). Erie filed a defense. Despite the summary judgment motion, UMMSC’s action remained dormant until Erie’s Workers’ Compensation appeal was decided.

On the basis of medical testimony to the effect that Thomas’s heart attack and the amputations • attributable thereto resulted from a multitude of pre-existing medical conditions (obesity, diabetes, smoking, heart and artery disease), claimant’s delay in seeking treatment, and his leaving the hospital against medical advice, Judge Wise reversed the Commission. He determined that the Commission had erred in finding a causal relationship between the claimant’s initial injury and UMMSC’s treatments and in ordering Erie to pay for those treatments. An appeal from that judgment was dismissed by this Court for failure to file an information report. Md.Rules 8-205 and 8-206(a).

Thereafter, Judge Wise denied UMMSC’s motion for summary judgment and granted Erie’s motion for summary judgment in Case No. CV1629. He said: ²⁰⁹ As will appear by reference to the attached copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order filed in CV1292 case on July 10, 1989, the Commissioner’s Orders and awards were reversed by this Court. Plaintiff’s appeal in that case was dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals and that judgment is therefore final and binding on all parties. Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel is applied, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment here.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied this 5th day of November 1990, and defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. In this appeal from that judgment, UMMSC relies on the anti-stay provision in art. 101, § 56(a), 2 in contending that, despite the eventual determination that Erie, as Thomas’s employer’s compensation insurance carrier, is not responsible for the payment of UMMSC’s charges for treating Thomas, Erie had to pay the bills. By virtue of that statute, UMMSC argues, Erie’s appeal from the Commission’s order to pay those bills did not stay that order. We disagree.

I Section 56 of article 101 dealt generally with appeals to circuit courts from decisions of the Commission. We would not describe subsection (a) thereof as prolix or pleonastic, but it was, to say the least, lengthy and detailed. The anti-stay provision contained therein was, by contrast, short, succinct, and concise — almost terse. It said: An appeal shall not be a stay of an order of the Commission directing payment of compensation or any order or supplemental order requiring the furnishing of medical treatment. ²¹⁰ Appellant’s contention that Erie must pay the bills, total-ling $156,281.27, despite its successful appeal of the Commission’s order to pay, is based upon the proposition that Erie’s appeal did not stay the Commission’s order.

That proposition, in turn, is based upon a conclusion that the order to pay those bills for medical care that had been furnished years before was an order directing payment of compensation or, in the alternative, an order requiring the furnishing of medical treatment within the meaning of the anti-stay provision in § 56(a). We do not so interpret the statute. There are numerous canons of statutory construction, several of which have been applied to the Workers’ Compensation Law. Generally, the canon most cited and relied upon is the “plain meaning” rule: where a statute is free of ambiguity or obscurity, the words used are conclusively presumed to embody the meaning of the legislature in enacting the statute.

Board of County Commissioners of Howard County v. Fleming, 13 Md.App. 261, 264 , 282 A.2d 512 (1971). Another canon, relied upon by appellant, is that remedial legislation should be liberally construed and not, as other legislation in derogation of common law, strictly construed. Thus, Workers’ Compensation laws, being remedial in nature, are to be construed liberally in favor of the workman in order to effect this benevolent purpose. Id. at 269 , 282 A.2d 512 .

Nevertheless, as pointed out in Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987), the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. We look first, of course, to the words of the statute, “because what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.” Id. at 513 , 525 A.2d 628 . We also recognize the rule that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of words, but their meaning and effect in light ²¹¹ of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. (Citations omitted.) Id., quoting from Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). In order to effectuate the intent of the legislature, a court should consider the object or purpose to be attained by the statute, and the evil or mischief sought to be remedied, and so construe the statute as to carry out and effectuate, or aid in, the general purposes and policies thereof, and suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. If a statute is susceptible of more than one construction, it should, if possible, be given that construction which will effectuate or carry out its purpose or object, and it should not be given a construction that would do more than effect the legislative object or purpose. Johnson v. State, 75 Md.App. 621, 630-31 , 542 A.2d 429 (1988), cert. denied, 316 Md. 675 , 561 A.2d 215 (1989) (citations omitted).

Looking first, then, to the words of the anti-stay provision, we find that they are susceptible of more than one meaning. An employer’s obligation to furnish medical treatment to the employee may be met by directly supplying medical, surgical, and nursing care, as well as prosthetic devices and a wide range of other services that have been held to be within the meaning of medical treatment, or by furnishing such treatment indirectly by paying the bills incurred by the workman in obtaining medical care. 3 The word “compensation” itself has more than one meaning as used throughout the Workers’ Compensation Law. In various places within the statute, “compensation” has the limited meaning of the payments ordered in accordance with the schedules in § 36 for permanent total disability, temporary total disability, or permanent or temporary par ²¹² tial disability, 4 as distinguished from various other benefits awardable tiy the Commission. In other places throughout the Workers’ Compensation Law, however, the legislature used the word “compensation” in its broad sense, referring to all benefits provided in the article, which would include medical benefits as well as rehabilitation.

See Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Booker, 13 Md.App. 591 , 284 A.2d 454 (1971). Logically, it would seem that “compensation,” as used in the anti-stay provision, should be given its restrictive meaning. If “an order directing payment of compensation” were to be given a broad meaning to include an order