Whiting v. State

BATTAGLIA, J. Petitioner Wesley Whiting, also known as Jeffrey Wilson and Lynell Whiting, seeks review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Whiting’s motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of alleged illegal searches of 810 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland, a house owned by the City in which Whiting was a “squatter.” On April 7, 2005, this Court granted Whiting’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to address the question that Whiting has presented to us for review: Did the lower Court err by ruling that Petitioner did not have standing to challenge the legality of the search of the house where he was residing without a property interest? Whiting v. State, 386 Md. 180 , 872 A.2d 46 (2005). We hold that, although Whiting did possess a subjective expectation of privacy in the second floor rear bedroom of 810 East Preston Street, his expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable, and as a result, he did not have standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the searches. 1 ³³⁸ I. Background On April 7, 2001, Baltimore City Police Officers responded to 1136 Homewood Avenue in Baltimore to try to find William Jerome Moore, Jr., a Correctional Officer who had failed to report to work for two days. Upon arriving at the home, the officers discovered Moore’s body.

An autopsy showed that Moore’s death was caused by blunt force trauma. During the investigation, detectives were able to identify Moore’s cellular phone number, despite failing to recover the phone. The cellular phone records were subpoenaed from the phone company and reflected use after Moore’s death. On April 26, 2001, after having traced calls made from the cellular phone, detectives located and spoke with a witness’who had received a call from Whiting and believed that Whiting had called from a number resembling Moore’s phone number.

Another witness also made a photographic identification of Whiting as the individual in possession of Moore’s cellular phone, and an acquaintance of Whiting reported that Whiting lived at 810 East Preston Street in Baltimore, where, in fact, he had been arrested on April 21, 2001, on unrelated charges. The investigation eventually culminated in the execution of two search warrants on April 27, and May 4, 2001 at 810 East Preston Street where police recovered various items of personal property, some of which contained blood. On April 30, 2001, Whiting was served with an arrest warrant for the murder of Moore. He was later indicted for one count of first degree murder in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Section 407 of Article 27, 2 one ³³⁹ count of first degree assault in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Section 12A-1 of Article 27, 3 one count of second degree assault in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol.), Section 12A of Article 27, 4 one count of robbery in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Section 486 of Article 27, 5 and one count of theft in violation of ³⁴⁰ Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Section 342 of Article 27. 6 Whiting moved to suppress the evidence seized during the April 27 and May 4, 2001 searches of 810 East Preston Street.

The State countered by contesting Whiting’s standing to challenge the searches, alleging that Whiting was a “squatter” or trespasser in the house. At the suppression hearing, Whiting argued that he had standing to challenge the searches of 810 East Preston Street because he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the second floor room where he was staying and, as evidence of such, introduced items seized during the April 27th search of 810 East Preston Street, including: one college registration in the name of Wesley Whiting, his address listed at 39 Liberty Road; four photographs; one letter addressed to Jeffrey Wilson at 300 East Madison Street from Crystal Whiting, and one letter addressed to Crystal Whiting at 609 29th Street from Wesley Whiting with his return address listed as Forrest Street. Whiting also introduced the affidavit in support of the application for the April 27th search warrant of 810 East Preston Street, which included the phrase that “a witness who reported knowing Wesley Whiting said when interviewed that Wesley Whiting had told him that he had ³⁴¹ been living at the address determined to be the vacant house at 810 East Preston Street.” The State, conversely, argued that Whiting did not have standing to challenge the searches and introduced a copy of a deed reflecting that the Housing Authority of Baltimore City owned 810 East Preston Street, and a copy of the last lease for the premises, showing that Joyce Melvin, Robert Anderson, Corderio Washington, and Donna Fowles had been the last tenants, having vacated the premises in May of 2000. The State also submitted the processing information and Statement of Charges against Whiting, showing that Whiting had not provided any home address, as well as the intake facility processing information for Whiting, in which he listed his address as 39 Liberty Street, a copy of Whiting’s arrest information showing his address as 609 North Ellwood Avenue, and a copy of Whiting’s motor vehicle records showing he reported his home address as 550 Saint Mary’s Street and 828 East Preston Street.

Detective Ronald Berger testified at the suppression hearing that when he visited the premises in April and May of 2001, the front door of 810 East Preston Street was sealed shut with either brick or boards while the rear door was unlocked. Berger could not recall whether the rear door’s doorknob had a functioning lock, or if he had occasion to use any lights in the house. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City later confirmed that the meters for the electricity were never disconnected to the home, but that the electricity had not been used since 2000. Detective Berger also identified photographs taken on April 27, 2001 of the premises which showed that the rear door to the 810 East Preston Street had a broken window in it with “some type of material patching behind the inside area of the broken glass” and that the rear door also had a bolt-type lock above the door knob.

The photographs also showed a second floor rear bedroom with a green wall where Whiting had been staying; the room contained bedding on the floor, along with some “personal items about in the room,” a television, and a ³⁴² piece of plywood on the wall that appeared to cover a window. In another room on the second floor, distinguished by its white wall, there was also “some bedding” on the floor and a window frame with red trim covered by plywood. A May 4th photograph reflected the addition of a green trash can in the second floor rear bedroom with the green wall. Robert Jones, also known as Crystal Whiting, also testified at the suppression hearing.

Jones noted that he temporarily had been staying at 810 East Preston Street. He stated that he shared the second floor rear bedroom of the house with Whiting, and that approximately four other people also lived in the house. According to Jones, Whiting kept people out of the room by means of a lock on the door, for which Whiting had the only key. Jones acknowledged that he never paid rent for staying at 810 East Preston Street, nor did he ever have keys to the home.

He stated that he gained admission to the house through the back door, which was always unlocked. Jones did not know, however, whether the other people who resided in the home had keys or how they entered the house because he did not “socialize” with them. In ruling that Whiting lacked standing to challenge the searches, Judge Joseph P. McCurdy stated: Well, I think as a matter of fact I can find that the property at issue in this case, which is 810 East Preston Street, is owned by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City. I find as a matter of fact that the property was not — there was no operable lease in effect regarding this property at the time of the search and seizure, or at the time the Defendant arguably occupied the premises, the last lease having expired in the year 2000.

I find, as a matter of fact, and this is essentially admitted by the Defendant, that the Defendant was what would normally call [sic] a squatter in the abandoned property, or a trespasser in the ... of the law. That Defendant had no rights to the property whatsoever, no possessory interest in the property at all that’s recognized under the law, either the constitution, which would be a property right, or any statutory law or common law in Maryland. I find as a matter of fact that the Defendant ³⁴³ was occupying the property in some manner. And it’s unclear if he was actually living there full-time, or whether he spent time there.

It does appear that there was some personal property on the premises. There’s no evidence that the property, the television, the bedding, and those items that belonged to the Defendant. The only evidence of any property belonging to Defendant that’s been admitted is copies of the correspondence addressed to the Defendant at another address, and a copy of a registration form for Baltimore City Community College in the name of the Defendant at another address. There’s evidence through the exhibits that the Defendant had other addresses at some point in the past.

There’s a Liberty Road address, I think there’s another Mary Street address that was mentioned. I think that the conclusion here is that the Defendant, at some point, at some time, occupied this property as a trespasser. Now, this objective question of whether or not he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property, I suppose he did. Because I suppose he felt that he could have some privacy interest in that property if he could keep some things in there, he wasn’t expecting the general public to walk in and out and to pick up his property.

The other part of the issue though is society prepared to recognize that expectation of privacy, and I say it is not. Because the public policy of the City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland is to keep these properties vacant. In fact, the property owner who culpably allows their property to be occupied by squatters is himself in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code. So the Defendant is trespassing on the property, is essentially committing a criminal act, although a very minor criminal act, and expecting to generate from that an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize, and I do not agree with that principle.

I note the closing statements and dissent in the case of Commonwealth versus Gordon, which is the Pennsylvania case cited by the State, and the closing words of the defense is; the poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all forces of the crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the wind may ³⁴⁴ blow through it, the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the king of England cannot enter. All his force dares not cross this ruined tenement. Well that assumes that the Defendant has a right to be there to begin with.

Simply stated, this is not his house. He did not have permission to be there, he was not authorized by the owner or anyone on the owner’s behalf, he is a trespasser. So I’m going to grant the State’s Motion regarding a lack of standing of the Defendant to challenge the search and seizure of 810 East Preston Street. Thereafter, the jury found Whiting guilty of first degree murder, possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to injure, robbery with a deadly weapon, first degree assault, and theft, and not guilty of the charge of theft of property valued at greater than $500.

Whiting later filed an unsuccessful motion for a new trial. On June 24, 2002, Whiting was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and to a consecutive twenty-five year term of incarceration for the conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon. For the purposes of sentencing, the first degree assault conviction was merged into the first degree murder conviction, and both the possession of a deadly weapon, and the theft convictions merged into the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction. Whiting noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the May 4th search of the bedroom at 810 East Preston Street and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. 7 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction and, with respect to the standing issue, held that, “[bjecause the Housing Authority could enter the premises or could permit anyone else to do so, and because [Whiting] had no right to exclude anyone from the premises ... afiy expectation [Whiting] had that the police ³⁴⁵ would not enter was unreasonable.” Whiting v. State, 160 Md.App. 285, 304 , 863 A.2d 1017, 1027-28 (2004).

II

Standard of Review In reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consider only the evidence before the court at the suppression hearing, and not that of the record of the trial. State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581 , 861 A.2d 62, 67 (2004); Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 533-34 , 842 A.2d 773, 779-80 (2004); State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 607 , 826 A.2d 486, 493 (2003); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439, 443-44 (2003). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion. Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34 , 842 A.2d at 779-80 ; Green, 375 Md. at 607 , 826 A.2d at 493 ; Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93 , 821 A.2d 372, 376-77 (2003) (quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07 , 790 A.2d 660, 663 (citing Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 , 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990))).

Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we review independently the application of the law to those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and, accordingly, should be suppressed. See Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34 , 842 A.2d at 779-80 ; Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 493 ; Wallace v. State, 373 Md. 69, 78 , 816 A.2d 883, 888-89 (2003).

III

Discussion Whiting argues that he has standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the searches of 810 East Preston Street because he lived there and, therefore, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house. He argues that, although 810 East Preston Street was owned by the City of Baltimore, he kept possessions in a locked room in the home and there was no indication that the City had made any effort to remove him. Moreover, he notes that the City had kept the electricity on, reflecting its acquiescence to his presence in the home. Whiting iterates that an indigent’s expectation of privacy in ³⁴⁶ the place where he or she stays should be acknowledged, just as the law respects the “millionaire’s” right to privacy, because to do otherwise, would be to discriminate against the homeless and destitute.

Conversely, the State argues that the Court of Special Appeals properly affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling that Whiting lacked standing to contest the searches under the Fourth Amendment. The State alleges that Whiting has failed to provide any evidence of a right to exclude others from the house where he was residing or any other factor that could constitute a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, the State contends that Whiting never held title to the premises, nor did he have permission from the owner of the home to be there. According to the State, as a squatter or trespasser in the vacant house, Whiting does not have an expectation of privacy that society would consider reasonable or legitimate.

A. Standing Under the Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment of the United States, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees individuals the right to be secure in “their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 8 United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir.2005); Nieves, 383 Md. at 583 , 861 A.2d at 68 ; Laney, 379 Md. at 545 , 842 A.2d at 786 . The capacity to invoke Fourth Amendment protection requires the individual to establish that he or she maintained “a legitimate expectation of privacy” in the house, papers, or effects searched or seized. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 512 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 , 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2481 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538, 545-46 (1977); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 , 91 S.Ct. 1122, 1126 , 28 L.Ed.2d 453, 459 (1971); Laney, 379 Md. at 545 , ³⁴⁷ 842 A.2d at 786 ; Wallace, 373 Md. at 79 , 816 A.2d at 889 ; Simpson v. State, 121 Md.App. 263, 277, 708 A.2d 1126, 1133 (1998). Accordingly, to determine whether an individual has standing under the Fourth Amendment, we must examine whether the individual possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects or premises searched or seized, thereby implicating substantive rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.

The Supreme Court reconciled standing to challenge a search or seizure with the substantive rights protected by the Foui’th Amendment in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140 , 99 S.Ct. at 429 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 387 , stating: [T]his Court’s long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.... fB]y frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing. See also Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 26-27 , 537 A.2d 612, 619-20 (1988).

Thus, the question of whether an individual has standing under the Fourth Amendment is best analyzed in terms of the individual’s substantive rights and requires us first to look at whether the individual invoking the Fourth Amendment possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects or place searched or seized. 9 ³⁴⁸ A legitimate expectation of privacy has been defined by the Supreme Court as: [Mjore than a subjective .expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as “legitimate.” His presence ... is “wrongful;” his expectation is not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401 n. 12 (citations omitted); Ricks, 312 Md. at 27 , 537 A.2d at 620 ; Graham, 47 Md.App. at 293, 421 A.2d at 1389. In order to evaluate the legitimacy of a privacy expectation, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 512 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967), formulated a two-prong test which requires that the person claiming protection under the Fourth Amendment must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the item or place searched, as well as have proven that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Id. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. at 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d at 587-88 ; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 ³⁴⁹ S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226-27 (1979); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 , 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811 , 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 215 (1986); Laney, 379 Md. at 545 , 842 A.2d at 786-87 ; Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 626 , 589 A.2d 59, 63 (1991); Ricks, 312 Md. at 27 , 537 A.2d at 620 . In a later case, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 , 108 S.Ct. 1625 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), the Supreme Court embraced and further refined Justice Harlan’s two-prong test to require that the person claiming protection under the Fourth Amendment must manifest a subjective expectation of privacy that is “objectively reasonable.” The question that delineates whether a defendant possesses a subjective expectation of privacy is “whether ... the individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve something as private.’ ” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740 , 99 S.Ct. at 2580 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 226 quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 , 88 S.Ct. at 516 , 19 L.Ed.2d at 579 .

The Supreme Court found, for example, that the defendant had successfully met the subjective expectation criterion in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 , 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811 , 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 215 (1986), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 , 109 S.Ct. 693 , 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989). In California v. Ciraolo, the defendant challenged the search of his backyard by police. Id. at 209, 106 S.Ct. at 1810 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 214 . Observing that the defendant had surrounded his backyard by both a six foot high outer fence and a ten foot high inner fence, the Court noted, “[cjlearly — and understandably — respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits.” Id. at 211 , 106 S.Ct. at 1811-12 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 215 .

In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 , 109 S.Ct. at 696-97 , 102 L.Ed.2d at 842 , the defendant challenged a helicopter search of his greenhouse by the police, and the Court, noting the fact that two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed, and the other two obscured by trees and shrubbery, concluded that the defendant “no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the precautions he took protected against ground-level observation.” Id. ³⁵⁰ Despite being an integral part of the inquiry into whether the individual possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court nevertheless has remarked, that in some cases, the lack of a subjective expectation of privacy would not defeat a party’s claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316 , 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1147 , 94 L.Ed.2d 326, 344-45 (1987); Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 , 99 S.Ct. at 2580 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 226-27 . In fact, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court assumed that the defendant intended to maintain the privacy of the items searched and proceeded to measure the objective reasonableness of that expectation. 442 U.S. at 743 , 99 S.Ct. at 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d at 228-29 . As to the second prong of the test, whether an individual’s expectation is objectively reasonable, inquiry must be made into the substance of the defendant’s claim that he or she possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140 , 99 S.Ct. at 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 387 ; Wallace, 373 Md. at 81 , 816 A.2d at 890 . As the Supreme Court has explicated, in determining whether the individual’s expectation is objectively reasonable, we must evaluate the pragmatics of the situation, and although concepts of real or personal property law, or understandings recognized and permitted by society, are to be taken into consideration, “arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like” are not controlling in the inquiry. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140, 143 , 99 S.Ct. at 430, 433 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 387 ; see also Wallace, 373 Md. at 81 , 816 A.2d at 890 . B. The Maryland Experience Before the application of the Fourth Amendment to the States in 1961, this Court as early as 1932 in Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153 , 161 A. 244 (1932), clearly identified the sources from which an individual may derive a legitimate expectation of privacy in premises.

In Baum we recognized that only those whose “private” rights have been violated can challenge the legality of a search and seizure: ³⁵¹ [I]t is certain that one cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has no interest. Or, stating it conversely, those whose private rights have been or may be disturbed alone may invoke the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 157 , 161 A. at 245 . In Baum , police officers seized gambling paraphernalia from a house during a search, after calling and placing a bet with the person who answered the phone.

Id. at 158 , 161 A. at 246 . Various defendants, not owners of the house, moved to suppress the evidence, but this Court denied the claim, “for the reason that the immunity from illegal search and seizure is a privilege personal to those whose rights thereunder have been infringed, and they alone may invoke it.” Id. at 156 , 161 A. at 245 . We further refined the concept of lawful occupancy of premises in Resnick v. State, 183 Md. 15 , 36 A.2d 347 (1944), in which the police, pursuant to a search warrant, seized betting slips and other gambling accouterments. Various individuals, who claimed to have worked in the home for approximately a year, challenged the legality of the search and seizure.

We determined that they failed to prove “that the property or possessions seized and searched were owned, leased, controlled or rightfully possessed by them or that they had any interest in them,” and so lacked “a valid claim of lawful occupancy” in order to challenge the search warrant. Id. at 18 , 36 A.2d at 348 . In Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57 , 75 A.2d 327 (1950), we explained that one must “lawfully occupy” the premises; mere presence is not sufficient: [O]ne cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has no interest 10. Only recently we cited the cases which followed that formula, and re-affirmed it as a positive statement of those who could complain.

Kapler v. ³⁵² State, 194 Md. 580 , 71 A.2d 860 . In all of these cases the words “lawfully occupies” are intended to be of the same nature and kind as the others used, and contemplate an occupation of some character which is connected with the property or the premises by some lawful means.... The occupancy must have some relation to the property or premises searched in order to enable such “occupants” to claim that their possessions have been unlawfully seized. It is not sufficient that they are merely there when the search is made.

They must be there with some show of right to be in possession of the premises or property. Id. at 64, 75 A.2d at 330 (emphasis in original); see also Carter v. State, 236 Md. 450, 453 , 204 A.2d 322, 323 (1964) (holding that appellants had no standing to challenge search of car because they had “no ownership or possessory rights of any kind in the car.”); Ferguson v. State, 236 Md. 148, 158-59 , 202 A.2d 758, 763 (1964) (holding that Ferguson had no right to complain of search because he was not “in lawful possession of the property.”); Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209 , 93 A.2d 280, 281 (1952) (concluding that defendants could not complain of search of apartment in which they had no interest but for illegal operations); Saunders v. State, 199 Md. 568, 573 , 87 A.2d 618, 620 (1952) (noting that accused cannot contest search of property in which he had no right, title, or interest); Lingner v. State, 199 Md. 503, 505-06 , 86 A.2d 888, 890 (1952) (holding that defendant could not complain of search and seizure of bags in which he disclaimed any ownership); Frantom v. State, 195 Md. 163, 167 , 72 A.2d 744, 746 (1950) (concluding that owner could contest search of garage that he had leased out to another person). Amidst this exploration of lawful occupancy and searches of premises, we also had the opportunity to address the two-prong test to evaluate the legitimacy of a claim of privacy articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz in Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 51-52 , 367 A.2d 949, 952 (1977). In Venner , the defendant challenged the search and seizure of the contents of his bedpan during his stay in the hospital.

Id. at 48-49, 950-51 . We concluded that, “[ujtilizing the criteria ³⁵³ of Mr. Justice Harlan, we are of the view that Venner could not have had an ‘expectation ... that society was prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” ’ ” Id. at 59 , 367 A.2d at 956 . This Court first applied Justice Harlan’s two-prong test within the purview of standing to challenge the search of premises in Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11 , 537