Williams v. State

HARRELL, J. Petitioner, Melvin D. Williams, was prosecuted in the Circuit Court for Harford County for controlled substance and resisting arrest offenses. Following his convictions, Williams appealed to the Court of Special Appeals arguing that: (1) the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by failing to respond to a letter he sent to the court, prior to trial, seeking to discharge his counsel, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the charge of resisting a lawful arrest under Maryland Code (2002, 2011 Cum.Supp.), Criminal Law Article, § 9-408(b)(l). The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Williams asks us to reverse on the grounds that the letter he sent to the trial court (filed in the case jacket) was sufficient to trigger Rule 4-215(e) and that the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry consistent with the mandates of the Rule is reversible error.

He asks us also to hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it held that the use of force element necessary to sustain a conviction for resisting arrest may be satisfied by the deployment of force against a civilian who assisted voluntarily the arresting law enforcement officers in the capture of Williams. We hold that Williams’s letter to the trial court was sufficient to trigger the rigors of Rule 4-215(e), and further that the trial court’s failure to inquire into the reasons behind Williams’s request to discharge counsel was reversible error. We hold also that, on this record, the intermediate appellate court did not misinterpret Maryland’s resisting arrest statute. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and shall direct remand ultimately to the Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On 8 October 2008, the State’s Attorney for Harford County filed in the Circuit Court a four-count criminal information charging Melvin D. Williams with three controlled dangerous ⁴⁷⁹ substances offenses and one count of resisting a lawful arrest. John Janowich, Esquire, from the local Office of the Public Defender entered his appearance as Williams’s counsel on 11 February 2009. On 27 January 2010, Williams sent from jail a letter that reads in its entirety: Case No 12-K-08-1673 The Honorable Judge?? 1/27/2010 My name is Melvin Williams JR Im writting to request New representation From the Public defender’s office. Pending me being able to afford an attorney.

MR John Janowich has truly No interest on my behalf in trying to help me on my case. I truly feel Im being mis-represented. May U please remove him from my case. I’ll truly be appreciated.

Sincerely Melvin Williams This letter, filed in the court jacket, has a date stamp by the Circuit Court Clerk as being received on 29 January 2010. An entry on the docket confirms the Circuit Court’s receipt of Williams’s letter: “Letter of Defendant requesting new representation from the public defender’s office. Filed: 1/29/10 Entered: 2/17/10.” An additional notation in the same docket entry states “Copies sent to SAO, and PD 2/17/10,” presumably meaning that the Clerk sent copies of Williams’s letter to the State’s Attorney’s Office and the local Office of the Public Defender. 1 There was utterly no response to Williams’s letter documented. Mr. Janowich continued to represent Williams over the course of the next sixteen months, including a hearing in the Circuit Court on 7 June 2010, three subsequent hearings, ⁴⁸⁰ and a two-day jury trial. 2 There is no further mention in the record of Williams’s letter by any of the four judges who presided over those various proceedings, by Janowich, by the assistant state’s attorney who prosecuted the case, or by Williams.

At Williams’s jury trial, two law enforcement officers testified to the following facts pertinent to the circumstances of Williams’s arrest. 3 During the evening of 15 September 2008, Deputies Grant Krulock and Robert Schultz of the Harford County Sheriffs Office (collectively, “the Officers”) were in uniform and on bicycle patrol in Edgewood, Maryland. At approximately 11:00 P.M., the Officers were talking to a group of civilians clustered around a van parked on the side of Fountain Rock Way. During this conversation, Melvin Williams, who the Officers did not know or recognize at the time, was observed walking toward them down the center of the street, holding his left hand inside of his shorts. Williams veered toward the driver’s side of the van, but, after making eye contact with Krulock, changed direction and walked past the van and returned to the center of the street.

At that point, Krulock, with Schultz close behind, began to follow Williams on their bicycles. Krulock asked Williams to stop so the Officers could identify him. He also asked Williams to take his hand out of his pants. Williams removed his left hand from his pants, but, while doing so, turned away from Krulock.

The Officer saw a clear plastic baggie fall to the ground from Williams’s hand. Krulock decided then to detain Williams, and asked him to put his hands behind his back. Williams began to comply, but suddenly ran away. The Officers yelled for Williams to stop running.

Schultz deployed his Taser to no avail. A chase ensued, in which Williams, with the Officers in hot pursuit, ran around a nearby ⁴⁸¹ apartment building. Krulock’s literal narrative picks up the “Cat Ballou-like” chase: We continued to pursue the subject on foot around the apartment building. We completely circled the apartment building that we were originally in front of.

As we came around back to the area where we originally tried to detain him, one of the subjects as I mentioned earlier that we were talking to at the van, he came running along side [sic] the building and pursued the subject in front of us and he ended up tackling him and holding him down on to the ground for us to catch up. As soon as we turned the corner we saw the subject that we were originally talking to holding the subject down on the ground who was attempting to get away at the time and then we approached him. I advised for the subject to get down on the ground and he refused to listen to my commands. Several times I then advised that he was going to be Tased if he did not listen to commands.

He continued to ignore my commands. At that point I Tased him to gain compliance and detain him and end up getting the cuffs on him. Krulock concluded by stating that he searched Williams’s wallet, finding a fingernail-sized plastic bag containing crack cocaine. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Williams moved for judgment of acquittal on the resisting arrest count, arguing that the force used against the officers, if any, was de minimis.

The Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the use of force was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Williams testified in his defense. Much of his testimony contradicted that of the Officers. In particular, although Williams admitted to running from the Officers, he did not admit to using force against the bystander who tackled him.

On direct examination, Williams stated: I ran. Basically, when I got back into the middle of the street I gave up because I’m safe now, but a guy that I ⁴⁸² remember when I was a little kid, he jumps on me. I gave up. I got my weight back from not using [drugs].

He was only like about 100 pounds and I was 250, real big. He didn’t pin me nowhere. I gave up. Williams testified similarly in response to cross-examination questioning regarding his arrest: I ran back in the middle of the street by the civilians where everybody had a visual of what was going on with me.

I just gave up. I was laying on the ground. A citizen was supposedly holding me, a ond [sic] hundred pound pound [sic] guy. Following his testimony, Williams rested his case and renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal on the resisting arrest count.

The Circuit Court denied the motion for the same reasons as before. The jury found Williams guilty on the counts of misdemean- or possession of cocaine and resisting arrest. 4 Following sentencing, Williams filed timely a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Williams argued that the Circuit Court failed to comply with Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by not addressing his written request to discharge counsel. Further, he insisted that the State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction on the charge of resisting arrest.

The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion initially, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. The State filed a Motion to Designate for Reporting the Unreported Opinion. The Court of Special Appeals granted the State’s motion and filed subsequently a reported opinion. Williams v. State, 208 Md.App. 622 , 57 A.3d 508 (2012).

Williams sent a letter to this Court on 6 December 2012, which we treated as a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We notified Williams that he had until 7 January 2013 to supplement his Petition. On that date, the Office of the Public ⁴⁸³ Defender filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on behalf of Williams. We granted the Public Defender’s Petition to consider the following questions: Where Petitioner stated unequivocally and conspicuously his desire to discharge his attorney in a letter filed with the court, was the court required to comply with the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-215(e), without the need for Petitioner to repeat his request in open court?

Did the Court of Special Appeals misinterpret Maryland Code (2002, 2011 Cum.Supp.), Criminal Law Article, § 9-408 in upholding Petitioner’s conviction for resisting arrest where the force allegedly used in resisting arrest was “employed against someone other than the police officer who is attempting to effectuate the arrest”? Williams v. State, 430 Md. 644 , 62 A.3d 730 (2013). STANDARD OF REVIEW We are called upon here to interpret provisions of the Maryland Rules and the Maryland Code. Our interpretations of both “are appropriately classified as questions of law.” Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 , 861 A.2d 78, 80 (2004).

As such, “we review the issues [without deference] to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters.” Id. We use “the same canons and principles” of construction to interpret the Rules and the Code, as we do generally with legislation. Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 88 , 46 A.3d 413, 420 (2012) (quoting Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 85-86 , 945 A.2d 638, 644 (2008)); see also Grade v. State, 431 Md. 85, 102 , 64 A.3d 197, 207 (2013) (“[T]he canons of construction applicable to statutes are equally applicable to rules.”). We explained recently those canons and principles that are pertinent to this case: We look to the plain meaning of the language employed in the[] rules and construe that language without forced or subtle interpretations designed to limit or extend its scope.

We avoid a construction of a rule or statute that is unrea ⁴⁸⁴ sonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. We construe statutes and rules as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Black v. State, 426 Md. 328, 338-39 , 44 A.3d 362, 368 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ANALYSIS I. We address first the question of whether Williams’s letter to the Circuit Court was sufficient to require the Circuit Court to conduct an inquiry consistent with the rigors of Rule 4-215(e).

A. Williams advances four interlocking arguments in pursuit of his quest for a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals based on the trial court’s asserted non-compliance with Rule 4-215(e). First, he argues that, once Rule 4-215(e) is triggered, the court must inquire into the defendant’s reasons for discharge. As Williams sees it, he triggered the Rule in the present case by “unequivocally and conspicuously stat[ing] his desire to discharge counsel.” Second, he contends that the plain language of the Rule does not require that the modality of expression be oral and made in open court, nor does it require that the request, once made, need be repeated thereafter. Third, Williams claims that the Court of Special Appeals’s reliance on State v. Northam, 421 Md. 195 , 26 A.3d 344 (2011), is misplaced because we did not hold there that a trial court may ignore a request to discharge counsel when the request was sufficient to trigger Rule 4-215(e) at the time it was advanced.

Fourth, Williams disagrees with the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that the four Circuit Court judges, who presided over the collective hearings and the trial that took place after the letter was received, could infer reasonably that any problems between Williams and his counsel were resolved after the letter was sent merely because ⁴⁸⁵ Williams did not reiterate subsequent displeasure or dissatisfaction with Janowieh and allowed the representation to continue (even through trial), especially in view of defense counsel’s ethical obligations under the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct to note for the court any discontent on his client’s part. The State counters that Williams did not trigger Rule 4-215(e) because he refrained from re-asserting the discharge of counsel issue during any of his five court appearances following sending the letter. In support of that argument, the State contends that Maryland case law, including Northern, creates an additional requirement for the defendant who expresses the desire to discharge counsel in a modality other than in open court, to “utter something in open court that can reasonably be construed as a present desire by the defendant to discharge counsel.” By failing to reiterate his desire to terminate counsel’s representation in open court, the State continues, Williams waived effectively his initial request. Urging us to reject Williams’s assertion that the content of his letter is more direct than, and therefore distinguishable from, the letter at the heart of Northam , the State argues that the “motion” must be brought again to the court’s attention regardless of how clearly and succinctly Williams styled it in his letter.

The State contends also that it would be “absurd” to require that a trial court “should sua sponte involve itself in the attorney-client relationship,” where defense counsel did not apprise the court of Williams’s unhappiness with his representation. B. The purpose of Rule 4-215 is to “protect that most important fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel, which is basic to our adversary system of criminal justice.” Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 281 , 523 A.2d 597, 607 (1987). That right is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, ⁴⁸⁶ 29 , 997 A.2d 780, 784 (2010) (citing Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 634 , 980 A.2d 435, 441 (2009)).

Accordingly, “we have held consistently that the requirements of the Rule are mandatory,” that its “mandates [ ] require strict compliance,” and that “a trial court’s departure from the requirements of Rule 4-215 constitutes reversible error.” Pinkney, 427 Md. at 87-88 , 46 A.3d at 419 ; see also Davis, 415 Md. at 31 , 997 A.2d at 785 (“The failure to inquire into a defendant’s reasons for seeking new counsel when the proper request has been made to the court is reversible error.” (citing Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 131 , 406 A.2d 98, 103 (1979))). The first part of subsection (e) of Rule 4-215, the only provision of the Rule at issue in this case, states: “(e) Discharge of Counsel — Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request.” The Rule does not define “what level of discourse is required to discharge counsel.” State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 629 , 870 A.2d 217, 224 (2005). Furthermore, a review of the Rule’s history “contains no commentary on the meaning of the phrase ‘requests permission to discharge an attorney.’ ” Campbell, 385 Md. at 628 n. 4, 870 A.2d at 224 n. 4.

Our prior interpretations of Rule 4-215(e) (and its predecessor, Rule 723c) assist, however, in clarifying what constitutes a cognizable discharge request under the Rule. We explained that a defendant need not “utter a talismanic phrase,” Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 124 , 486 A.2d 163, 169 (1985), or “state his position or express his desire to discharge his attorney in a specified manner” to trigger the rigors of the Rule. Davis, 415 Md. at 32 , 997 A.2d at 786 . Moreover, a request to discharge an attorney need not be explicit.

See State v. Hardy, 415 Md. 612, 623 , 4 A.3d 908, 914 (2010) (“A defendant makes such a request when his or her statement constitutes more a declaration of dissatisfaction with counsel than an explicit request to discharge.”). Rather, Rule 4-215(e) is triggered by any statement from which a court could ⁴⁸⁷ conclude reasonably that the defendant may be inclined to discharge counsel. State v. Taylor, 431 Md. 615, 634 , 66 A.3d 698, 710 (2013); Hardy, 415 Md. at 623 , 4 A.3d at 914 ; Davis, 415 Md. at 31 , 997 A.2d at 785 ; Leonard, 302 Md. at 124 , 486 A.2d at 169 . Once Rule 4-215(e) is triggered, the trial court has an affirmative duty to address the defendant’s request.

As we explained in Taylor , when it is (or should be) clear objectively that a defendant is making a request to discharge counsel, “the defendant must be provided [ ] with a forum in which he or she (and/or counsel) may explain the underlying reasons for the purported request to discharge counsel.” State v. Taylor, 431 Md. at 633, 66 A.3d at 709 . We held recently in Northam that the defendant’s choice to send to the trial court a letter of a certain content did not trigger Rule 4-215(e), and therefore did not require an inquiry by the court. There, the defendant’s writing, captioned as a Motion for Change of Venue, contained in its fourth and final paragraph, the following language: Regardless of my race, gender, or ethnic belief I feel as a American citizen I have the right to be judge properly and be granted the ability to be represented by a Firm who has represented. Thereselves with Integerty and Justice.

My Lawyers filed are updated but he has made no contact with me and trial is set at Sept 24 I’m requesting a Court appointed attorney and change of venue. Northam, 421 Md. at 203 , 26 A.3d at 348 . The first three paragraphs of the letter concerned the defendant’s request for a change of venue. The trial court denied Northam’s “motion” in a simple order filed on 11 September 2008.

Id. The transcript of a hearing held the following day contained no mention of Northam’s expressed desire to discharge his counsel; a docket entry from that day, however, stated “Defendant consents to continued representation by [defense counsel].” Northam, 421 Md. at 203-04 , 26 A.3d at 348-49 . At a final pretrial hearing on 24 September 2008, Northam attempted to address the court, but was told by the judge to “talk to [his] lawyer,” who in turn told the court that he needed to resolve ⁴⁸⁸ something with his client, and suggested that they may need a recess and reconvene the hearing. Northam, 421 Md. at 204-05 , 26 A.3d at 349 .

No request to reconvene was made that day. Northam, 421 Md. at 205 , 26 A.3d at 349 . Northam stood for trial the next day and was convicted. Id.

The Court of Special Appeals overturned, in an unreported opinion, Northam’s conviction, holding that Northam’s letter was sufficient to trigger a Rule 4-215(e) inquiry. See Northam, 421 Md. at 205 , 26 A.3d at 350 (citing the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals). On certiorari review, we reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The Court agreed with the State’s argument that Northam’s “vague request, that he wanted a ‘Court appointed attorney,’ buried in the final sentence of the final paragraph of what was captioned and pled specifically and solely as a change of venue motion stands in stark contrast to other cases where 4-215 inquiries were mandated.” Northam, 421 Md. at 206 , 26 A.3d at 350 .

We considered other cases where we held that defendants waived the opportunity for rulings on particular written requests that were part of larger “omnibus” motions because the defendants failed to re-assert undecided motions in open court. Following our review of those cases, we noted that Northam failed to reiterate a request to discharge counsel in three appearances in open court after sending his letter. Northam, 421 Md. at 206-07 , 26 A.3d at 350-51 . Consequently, we accepted the State’s argument that, in Northam’s case, “ ‘Rule 4-215(e) was not implicated, much less violated, by the trial court.’ ” Northam, 421 Md. at 207 , 26 A.3d at 351 .

Additionally, we refused to infer that Northam was attempting to request discharge of his counsel at the 24 September 2008 hearing when the judge cut him off because the court’s “talk to your lawyer” response was an appropriate one under the circumstances, and because “we shall not infer that [defense counsel] failed to comply with the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. C. We agree with Williams that his letter was sufficient to trigger the requirements of Rule 4-215(e). His letter ⁴⁸⁹ stated clearly, solely, and unequivocally that he intended to discharge his counsel. Unlike Northam’s fleeting reference in closing to wanting a “Court appointed attorney,” Williams’s request was neither vague nor embedded within extraneous matter in an unrelated written motion.

Indeed, by stating that he was writing “to request New representation From the Public defender’s office,” and asking the court to “remove [Mr. Janowich] from [his] case,” Williams posed a request that was just as explicit, focused, and direct in content, if not more so, than requests in other cases where we held that Rule 4-215(e) inquiries were necessary. See, e.g., Hardy, 415 Md. at 622 , 4 A.3d at 914 (defendant stated that he was “ ‘thinking about changing the attorney or something’ ”); Campbell, 385 Md. at 632 , 870 A.2d at 226 (defendant made several statements including “I don’t like this man as my representative” and “[y]ou all wouldn’t let me fire him”); Williams v. State, 321 Md. 266, 267 , 582 A.2d 803, 804 (1990) (defendant stated to the court “I want another representative”). The only difference was that Williams chose a written form of expression. The State’s argument that Williams’s letter was insufficient to trigger Rule 4-215(e) because the Rule requires that someone “utter something in open court that can reasonably be construed as a present desire by the defendant to discharge counsel” is well-intentioned, but unfounded.

First, the plain language of the Rule states only that a court must inquire into the reasons for discharge “[i]f a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney.” Nowhere in the Rule does it state that such a request must be oral, as opposed to written, or made in open court. We decline to adopt the State’s categorical view that an out-of-open-court, written request filed with the court cannot alone compel an inquiry and disposition by the court. The State bases its argument on the ground that our prior decisions in which we held that statements triggered Rule 4-215(e) all involved oral declarations made in open court. In none of those cases,