Wyndham v. Haines

COUCH, Judge. Paul Harrison Wyndham and his wife Rosalie Wyndham seek review by this Court of an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Kaplan, J.) dismissing their appeal from an adverse Health Claims Arbitration (HCA) award. The order also denied their petition to vacate the award. The award was rendered by an arbitration panel following a day long hearing on the merits.

At the conclusion of the claimants’ evidence, the health care provider, Dr. Haines, moved to dismiss the claim. Finding that the claimants had failed to establish a prima facie case of either of their causes of action, the panel unanimously agreed to grant Dr. Haines’ motion to dismiss. 1 Accordingly, an award of no liability was entered in favor of Dr. Haines. ²⁷² Within the prescribed time limits, the Wyndhams properly rejected the award in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by filing a notice of rejection with the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO). 2 In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, they filed an action to nullify, a declaration and a prayer for a jury trial. The claimants also filed a petition to vacate the award alleging that “the Panel Chairman failed to act in a neutral and impartial manner.” In response to these pleadings, the health care provider filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs’ failure to establish a prima facie case of liability at the arbitration level was tantamount to a refusal to properly submit their claim to arbitration. Prior to trial, a hearing was held concerning the pending motions.

Based solely on the arguments of counsel, the pleadings in the trial court, an affidavit of the panel chairman, the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto, the trial court ordered dismissal of the action. 3 In a written Memorandum and Opinion Order, the court found “that Plaintiffs failed to properly submit their claim to Health ²⁷³ Claims Arbitration because they failed to produce enough testimony at the arbitration hearing to establish a prima facie case of liability.” Plaintiffs also received an adverse ruling on their petition to vacate. The trial court held that there was “no basis for concluding that the Panel Chairman for the arbitration ... was biased or prejudiced to justify vacating the arbitration award under Section 3-224(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Consequently, the petition to vacate was denied. Appellants appealed these rulings to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to consideration by that court, appellants sought and received a writ of certiorari from this Court.

Because we find no statutory basis for the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, we reverse the dismissal of the action. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition to vacate. I Motion to Dismiss The Health Care Malpractice Act (the Act) requires all claims against a health care provider for medical injury in excess of five thousand dollars to be submitted to mandatory arbitration prior to the institution of traditional court action. 4 Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-2A-02(a) 5 .

See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274 , 385 A.2d 57 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 , 99 S.Ct. 60 , 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978). In certain circumstances, dismissal of a party’s complaint is an appropriate sanction for failure to comply ²⁷⁴ with the prescribed statutory arbitration procedure. Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91 , 447 A.2d 860, 865 (1982); Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md.App. 318, 324 , 452 A.2d 1302, 1305 (1982). But see Mitcherling v. Rosselli, 304 Md. 363 , 499 A.2d 476 (1985).

Thus, in resolving the first issue presented by this appeal, our task is to determine whether the Wyndhams’ presentation of their claim to the panel constituted compliance with the statutory guidelines mandated by the General Assembly. If so, the plaintiffs have satisfied the condition precedent to court suit, and dismissal of their action was inappropriate. If, however, the conduct of their arbitration falls short of the legislative- requirements, dismissal may have been proper. The primary duty imposed upon a health care claimant by the Act is that he initially “file his claim” with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office. § 3-2A-04(a).

In Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38 , 485 A.2d 265 (1984), we determined that the mere physical filing of the statement of claim without the presentation of any evidence at the arbitration hearing will not suffice to satisfy the condition precedent. This holding was premised in part on our determination in Attorney General v. Johnson that one of the goals of the General Assembly in enacting the Health Claims Arbitration Act was to reduce the number of medical malpractice court suits. 282 Md. 274 , 385 A.2d 57 . Additionally, we found support in § 3-2A-05 of the Act which requires the panel to “first determine the issue of liability with respect to a claim.” The panel’s proper performance of this function obviously requires the presentation and evaluation of evidence. Finally, we noted that in light of the elaborate mandatory arbitration scheme implemented by the legislature, the adoption of a construction making compliance optional would be illogical and therefore should be avoided.

See Kindley v. Governor of Maryland, 289 Md. 620 , 426 A.2d 908 (1981). The totality of these factors convinced us to hold: ²⁷⁵ “[Ujnder the Maryland statute, a plaintiff who presents no evidence before a medical malpractice arbitration panel has not satisfied the condition precedent of submitting his claim to arbitration prior to instituting court action. The proper action for a circuit court to take when such a claim is filed is to dismiss the claim.” Bailey, 302 Md. at 45 , 485 A.2d at 268 . In so doing, we acknowledged that other states with similar compulsory arbitration statutes had reached contrary results.

Id. at 44 , 485 A.2d at 267-68 . Appellee would have us now carry this holding substantially further and require all medical malpractice plaintiffs to present a prima facie case of liability to the arbitration panel before appeal to the circuit court can be had. After a thorough examination of the Act and its supplemental rules and regulations, we find no authority for doing so. Such a requirement is simply not provided for in the statutory scheme.

Quite to the contrary, § 3-2A-06(a) permits a party to reject an award “for any reason” provided certain notice and filing requirements are timely fulfilled. The parties do not dispute that the appellants fulfilled the procedural requirements of § 3-2A-06(a). Here, the controversy centers around whether they were substantively entitled to further pursue their claim. Without independent review of the evidence presented to the arbitration panel, the trial court accepted the panel’s determination that a prima facie case of liability had not been presented.

Equating this evidentiary shortcoming to a failure to arbitrate, the trial judge dismissed the case. Bailey was cited as his authority for doing so. In our view, the trial judge misapplied the principles set forth in Bailey , and the dismissal denied plaintiffs their day in court as preserved by § 3-2A-06. It cannot be overemphasized that the Act does not abridge or preclude a medical malpractice claimant’s right to a common law tort action.

As Judge Digges stated in Attorney General v. ²⁷⁶ Johnson , “Nowhere does the Act preclude the parties in the trial of the case from presenting whatever evidence and making whatever arguments on the merits of the claim they might have made had there been no pretrial arbitration.” 282 Md. at 296 , 385 A.2d at 70 . The dismissal by the trial court did precisely that; on the basis of the panel’s determination, it prohibited the plaintiffs from presenting their arguments at trial. In effect, the trial court’s ruling imposed an additional condition precedent to the maintenance of the traditional court action. This requirement is not to be found in the Act and we are hesitant to apply such a rule in the absence of a legislative directive.

It is an established rule of statutory construction that “a court may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form.” City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283 , 477 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1984). Appellee asserts that by refusing to imply this additional condition precedent, the judiciary is thwarting the legislature’s goal of “screening out” non-meritorious claims. We do not question that the legislators had such a purpose in mind. However, as has been pointed out by Chief Judge Gilbert of the Court of Special Appeals, all