Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.

GILBERT, Chief Judge. Donald Allen, an employee of Bethlehem Steel Corporation sued Bethlehem; James Moskos Jr., a Worker’s Compensation attorney employed by Bethlehem; and Vernon Green and Vernon Green Associates (Green), private investigators. The suit was grounded on a multitude of claims, namely: 1) invasion of privacy, 2) false imprisonment, 3) abuse of process, 4) malicious prosecution, 5) abusive discharge, 6) civil conspiracy, and 7) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all counts of the complaint.

Only the count concerned with intentional infliction of emotional distress is not before us on this appeal. FACTS From the record we learn that Allen was injured in February 1978 when he fell from a platform while working at Bethlehem. The Workers’ Compensation Commission, as a result of the injury sustained by Allen, awarded temporary total disability benefits to him. A supplemental award of temporary total disability benefits was made because of Allen’s continuing disability.

For reasons not apparent from the record, Bethlehem became suspicious of Allen’s representation of his physical condition. Bethlehem hired Green to conduct surveillance of Allen’s activities. Green observed the claimant and filmed some of Allen’s activity ⁶⁴⁷ during a period of time between March 25 and June 25, 1982. In June 1982 Allen applied for additional temporary total benefits.

At the hearing on the petition, Bethlehem called Green as a witness. Green testified concerning his observations of Allen’s activities, but Allen withdrew his claim for benefits before the film of his activities was shown. Allen contends he withdrew his claim for benefits under the Compensation Act because of a threat made by Moskos to prosecute Allen for insurance fraud. He also asserts that Moskos demanded that he resign from his employment with Bethlehem.

Allen, however, did not resign. Two months after the Workers’ Compensation Commission hearing, Bethlehem discharged Allen, alleging misrepresentation of his physical condition. During testimony Allen gave at the compensation hearing, Moskos and Bethlehem Steel apparently concluded that there was a serious discrepancy between Allen’s testimony concerning his condition and Green’s observations of Allen’s activities. The United Steel Workers of America filed a grievance relative to Allen’s discharge, averring an absence of just cause.

The grievance proceeding resulted in Allen’s reinstatement. In the meantime, Moskos reported to the State’s Attorney’s Office the alleged discrepancy between Allen’s testimony and Green’s observations. An investigation by that office was conducted. It resulted in Allen’s indictment and arrest on a charge of perjury.

Allen was incarcerated in the Baltimore City Jail. Twelve days after his arrest, the indictment was nolle prossed by the State’s Attorney. We turn now to consideration of the various counts asserted by Allen upon which the circuit court entered summary judgment against him. Invasion of Privacy (Count 5 of Complaint) Maryland currently recognizes four forms of invasion of privacy: ⁶⁴⁸ 1. an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; 2. an appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; 3. unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; and 4. publicity which unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.

Klipa v. Bd. of Educ. of A.A. Co., 54 Md.App. 644, 652 , 460 A.2d 601 (1983); Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 537 , 250 A.2d 878 (1969). Allen has alleged a false light invasion of privacy. That form of the tort requires a publication which unreasonably places the plaintiff in a false light before the public.

Klipa, 54 Md.App. at 656 , 460 A.2d 601 . The information published must be false or untrue, at least to the extent that it portrayed the plaintiff in an objectionable light. Gilbert, Maryland Tort Law Handbook, § 15.5 (1986). Allen maintains that Green, Moskos, and Bethlehem published information that placed him in a false light.

This, he asserts, is demonstrated by the inaccurate films of his activities, together with the film being made available to Allen’s union, the arbitrator, and to either the Baltimore City Grand Jury or the State’s Attorney. Moreover, Allen alleges that alterations were made to the films in order to portray inaccurately his physical condition. The allegation is flatly denied by all of the appellees. We think those disputed facts would render summary judgment inappropriate since they give rise to a genuine dispute of a material fact.

Although neither appellate court of this State has addressed the question of whether the “false light” action is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to defamation actions or to an invasion of privacy, the issue has been addressed in two United States District Court of Maryland cases. There in Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F.Supp. 967, 970 (1980), the Court said: “[Wjhere the underlying ‘false light’ relied upon arises out of an alleged ⁶⁴⁹ defamatory statement, the proper course of action is actually defamation and accordingly the case, whether stated in terms of defamation or invasion of privacy is governed by the one year statute of limitations.” The Court went on to state that “to hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff, in any defamation action where there has been a general publication, to avoid the otherwise applicable one year statute merely by phrasing the cause of action in terms of invasion of privacy.” See also Robinson v. Vitro Corp., 620 F.Supp. 1066 (1985). We disagree with Smith . What the district court judge said in Smith may be true, but the Maryland statute of limitations is vividly clear.

An action for libel and slander shall be filed within one year of the date it accrues. Courts Art. § 5-105. Other tort actions shall be filed within three years of the date they accrue. Courts Art. § 5-101.

Nowhere in § 5-101 does it provide an exception for “false light” cases. Even though we recognize the district court judge’s view as to how the statute of limitations will be avoided, that “loophole” must be plugged by the Legislature. Limitation statutes are generally strictly construed. Decker v. Fink, 47 Md.App. 202 , 422 A.2d 389 (1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 735 (1981).

Courts Art. § 5-101 means presumably what it says, and we decline to rewrite it so as to proscribe the bringing of a “false light” case after a period of one year. False Imprisonment (Count 3 of Complaint) An action for false imprisonment arises when one unlawfully causes a deprivation of another’s liberty against his will. Fine v. Kolodny, 263 Md. 647, 651 , 284 A.2d 409 (1971). It may also arise when one knowingly gives false information to a law enforcement officer which leads to another person’s arrest.

Newton v. Spence, 20 Md.App. 126, 136 , 316 A.2d 837 (1974). Nevertheless, a person is not liable for false imprisonment when in good faith he or she provides information, however mistaken, to law enforce ⁶⁵⁰ ment officers. Newton, 20 Md.App. at 135 , 316 A.2d 837 . Allen contends that the appellees provided false information to the State’s Attorney’s Office, and that formed the basis of the perjury charge.

The essence of Allen’s complaint is that the film had been altered. He supplied an affidavit by a former FBI document examiner who stated that the film was not the original film. We think that raised a genuine dispute of a material fact as to whether the appellees knowingly provided false information to the State’s Attorney. Were that all that was before us, we would reverse, but the Assistant State’s Attorney made affidavit that he conducted an “independent investigation” and concluded that Allen should be charged with perjury.

Because of the State’s Attorney’s independent investigation, we believe that the false imprisonment count must