Blake v. State

RAKER, J. This case is an interlocutory appeal filed by the State 1 from an Order in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ²²² granting Leeander Jerome Blake’s motion to suppress his incriminating statements on the grounds that the police elicited his statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court, and in an unreported opinion, reversed. This Court granted Blake’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider the single question of whether the police actions in question constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation following petitioner’s invocation of his Miranda rights, thereby violating petitioner’s right against compelled self-incrimination. Blake v. State, 378 Md. 176 , 835 A.2d 1103 (2003).

We shah hold that the police actions constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation, thereby violating petitioner’s rights, and, under the circumstances presented herein, the trial court properly suppressed petitioner’s statements. I. Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Anne Arundel County for the offenses of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter, in violation of former Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Article 27 § 407, § 411, and § 387. 2 Straughan Lee Griffin, a resident of Annapolis, was shot and killed in front of his home on September 19, 2002. His assailant[s] shot him in the head, stole his automobile, and ran over his body as they fled from the scene. Petitioner filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence seized by the State.

We focus here on his motion to suppress his incriminating statements. The Circuit Court ²²³ held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion to suppress. We set forth the facts as developed at the suppression hearing. On October 25, 2002, Terrence Tolbert was arrested in connection with the murder of Straughan Lee Griffin.

Tolbert implicated petitioner in the crime. Between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on the following day, the Anne Arundel County police arrested petitioner at his home. Petitioner was wearing boxer shorts and a tank top and no shoes. He was handcuffed and transported by uniformed officers to the Annapolis Police Department.

The police took petitioner to a room identified as an “intake room” or “booking room.” Detective William Johns, the lead detective, advised petitioner of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. Petitioner invoked his right to counsel, indicating he did not wish to speak with the police officers without an attorney, and after signing the police advice of rights form, he then was placed in a holding cell at approximately 5:25 a.m. At 6:00 a.m., Detective Johns, accompanied by uniformed Officer Curtis Reese, went to petitioner’s cell and gave him a copy of the arrest warrant and statement of charges. 3 Detective Johns explained the charges to petitioner and told him that they were serious charges, and that he needed to read the document carefully and make sure he understood it. The statement of charges that Detective Johns gave to petitioner was a District Court of Maryland computer printout listing the charges.

The statement of charges indicated that petitioner was charged with first degree murder, second degree murder, armed robbery, armed carjacking, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. The penalty stated on the ²²⁴ document for the offense of first degree murder was, in all capital letters, “DEATH.” Petitioner’s date of birth, reflected on the statement of charges, was June 1, 1985; he was seventeen years of age. As a person under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offense, petitioner was not eligible for the death penalty. See Md.Code (2002, 2003 Cum.Supp.) § 2—202(b)(2)(i) (to be death eligible in Maryland, a person must be eighteen years of age or older).

Detective Johns testified that after he handed petitioner the charging document and turned to leave, Officer Reese, apparently having followed Detective Johns to the cell block area, appeared and said, in a tone Detective Johns characterized as loud and confrontational, “I bet you want to talk now, huh!” Detective Johns said that he was surprised by Officer Reese’s statement, that it was unexpected, and that Detective Johns said, very loudly within petitioner’s hearing, “No, he doesn’t want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now.” Detective Johns testified that he was concerned that “Officer Reese’s outburst would violate Mr. Blake’s request for counsel prior to being questioned” and, as a result, he told Officer Reese that petitioner had asked for an attorney and they could not reinitiate any kind of conversation with him. Petitioner remained in the cell block, wearing only his boxer shorts and t-shirt.

Approximately one-half hour after the earlier contact, Detective Johns went back to petitioner’s cell to give petitioner his clothing which had been brought to the station by another police officer. Detective Johns opened the exterior door, walked in front of petitioner’s cell, and handed him the clothing. Petitioner then said, “I can still talk to you?” Detective Johns responded: “Are you saying that you want to talk to me now?” Petitioner responded “yes.” Detective Johns left the cell area and returned after a few minutes. He told petitioner that he would have to read him his rights again' and that he would be back in a few minutes.

Petitioner then was taken back to the intake room, was re-advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived, and agreed to provide a statement in the absence of an attorney. ²²⁵ Petitioner made certain incriminating statements to Detective Johns as he explained his involvement in the events of September 19, 2002. Detective Johns asked him if he would be willing to take a polygraph exam and petitioner agreed. He was transported to Maryland State Police Barracks J in Annapolis, where Corporal Lloyd E. White again advised petitioner of his Miranda rights. After the test was administered, petitioner made further statements.

Petitioner testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He testified that he was at home watching television in the early morning hours of October 26, 2002, when he was arrested at approximately 4:30 a.m. Wearing only a tank top, boxer shorts, and no shoes, he was handcuffed and taken outside, where it was cold and wet, and transported to the police station. He was placed in a room and was told by an officer that Terrence Tolbert had identified him as the shooter of Mr. Griffin.

He said he wanted a lawyer and was placed in a cell. He said that when Detective Johns and Officer Reese gave him a copy of his charges and Officer Reese made the statement to him, he had just seen that he was facing the death penalty and he was scared. The two officers left, Detective Johns brought him his clothing and then left, and then Detective Johns returned. Petitioner’s description of what ensued next differed from that of Detective Johns. 4 Petitioner’s version is that the detective initiated the conversation again, stating: “Mr. Blake, do you wish to still talk to me?” In response, petitioner said, “May I still talk to you?” The detective allegedly responded, “Yes.” Petitioner denied first asking Detective Johns if he could talk to him.

In response to a question asking petitioner what caused him to speak to Detective Johns after he had invoked his Miranda rights, petitioner stated: “First, it was what Officer Reese said to me, T bet you want to talk now, huh!’ I was scared, cold. Never went through ²²⁶ nothing like this. And I saw my charges and I saw I was facing death.” The Circuit Court granted petitioner’s motion to suppress his statements. Judge Pamela North began by noting that petitioner had invoked his right to counsel and that pursuant to Miranda , no further interrogation could ensue.

Judge North found the following: “The Defendant was still in underwear with no shoes on. During this time, the Defendant made no statements and asked no questions. There was, as of this point, no indication the Defendant would change his mind. At approximately 6:00 a.m., Detective Johns and Officer Reese, and Officer Reese, by the way, was the same officer who had previously transported the Defendant to the Annapolis Police Department.

They both walked back to his cell. As in Edwards , Defendant did not request or suggest that the officers should come back to his cell. Defendant was awake. Johns took the statement of charges back to the Defendant, handed them to him, and read the charges to him.

Johns testified, and this is a quote, “I said to him, they are serious charges. He needs to read it carefully and make sure he understood it.” As Johns turned to walk out, Reese said, in a confrontational loud voice, “I bet you want to talk now, huh!” Johns testified he was surprised by this. *** [Detective Johns] also erroneously served him with a document which stated that the penalty for count one murder was death. The word death being written in all capital letters. Defendant was, in fact, not eligible for the death penalty.

This was either done intentionally or by mistake .... No matter who was responsible for death being typed in capital letters on the penalty section for murder, it was still State action. So the next question is was there interrogation? Was there a statement made by the police which the police knew or ²²⁷ should have known would be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response?

That answer has to be yes. *** I believe the State’s argument misses the mark when it focuses on what Johns intended or did not intend. Reese is also a police officer. He constitutes State action. And he clearly intended that the Defendant make a statement. *** So the question is how do we know what Reese intended.

Well, let’s analyze the remark he made. Defendant is handed a statement of charges indicating to him, a seventeen-year-old, indicating to him for the first time that he is being charged with murder and he can get the death penalty. Reese’s statement was, “I bet you want to talk now, huh!” This is not a vague appeal to Defendant’s conscience like the remarks were in Brewer versus Williams. First, the statement, itself, suggests he should want to talk.

And the word, “now,” that is, “I bet you want to talk now” clearly refers Defendant to what has just been handed to him. In other words, look at those charges, look at that penalty, and I’ll bet you will want to talk. *** It is a statement made specifically for the purpose of getting Mr. Blake to talk. In fact, Mr. Blake’s question is in direct response to Reese’s previous statement. The police left the cellblock area immediately after Reese made that statement.

So, until 6:28 when they came back there had been no opportunity for the Defendant to ask if he could talk to them. Since twenty-eight minutes had passed, he asked, “I can still talk to you?” Even though that period of time had passed. Is there any possible interpretation of that statement that it is, as the State has urged the Court to find, simply an innocent offhanded comment not meant or expected to elicit an incriminating response? I don’t think so.

Examples of innocent offhanded comments not likely to elicit an incrimi ²²⁸ nating response would be, quote, “Here are some clothing for you.” Or, “Please move away from the door so I can unlock it.” Or, “Do you need a drink of water?” United States v. Walker instructs courts to look at the context in which the statement is made. Once again, the context is the statement was made to a seventeen-year-old with no Miranda or interrogation experience, who was still in a chilly cell in his underwear with no shoes on, without a parent present or available, just as he is being handed papers advising him he is charged with murder and can get death.... That statement, under these circumstances, was enough to make an adult repeat offender squirm, not alone a seventeen-year-old. *** Here, Defendant is still in custody, still at the Annapolis police department. Only twenty-eight minutes has gone by since the illegal interrogation.

Enough time for him to read the charging document and only one hour and seventeen minutes since he invoked his right to counsel. He is still seventeen years old. Still undressed.. Still in a cold cell, where he is facing death.

And an officer had made a case for him to speak now through that officer’s coercive statement. He has no parent present. The Defendant testified that he was scared and cold and thought he was facing death. *** Once Defendant made certain incriminating statements, he was then asked by Detective Johns if he wanted to take a polygraph. This is all one continuous stream of events.

There was no break in time or place here. No attenuation. *** The polygraph process began at about 8:30 or 9:00 o’clock with Defendant’s mother present at the Maryland State Police Barracks. She signed a consent form but never saw or spoke to the Defendant. We now have a change of location and the re-Mirandaizing of the Defendant. ²²⁹ However, this is all one continuous course of conduct beginning with Officer Reese’s statement and other coercive circumstances.

Defendant had, as some cases talk about, already let the cat out of the bag. It is unlikely that an honest seventeen-year-old who is respectful of authority would realize he could turn back now. There was no lengthy period of time as we see in some cases to break the chain of events and to prove attenuation. In any event, viewing the evidence under the totality of the circumstances, the Defendant did invoke his right to counsel.

He was thereafter interrogated by police in violation of Miranda and Edwards . The State must prove his subsequent pro forma waiver was not the result of the previous coercive unlawful police conduct. And they have not met that heavy burden.” The trial court held that Officer Reese’s statement was interrogation and that it violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The court granted Blake’s motion to suppress as to any and all statements he made at the Annapolis police department and at the Maryland State Police Barracks.

The State noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. A divided intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, Bloom, J., dissenting, reversed the judgment. We granted petitioner’s writ of certiorari to answer the following question: “Did the police actions in question constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation?” 378 Md. 176 , 835 A.2d 1103 .

II

There is no dispute in this case that petitioner was in custody and had invoked his right to counsel. The first question is whether the statement of Officer Reese constituted “police-initiated custodial interrogation” in contravention of ²³⁰ Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Petitioner argues that Officer Reese’s comment, made in conjunction with Detective Johns’s passing to petitioner a copy of the statement of charges which incorrectly informed him he was facing the death penalty, was the functional equivalent of interrogation. He maintains that the comment was made specifically for the purpose of getting petitioner to talk and the officer knew or should have known that, under the circumstances, the comment was likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Petitioner argues that his subsequent statements were suppressed properly because they were a product of the unlawful police-initiated interrogation which violated Edwards . The State’s argument is that Officer Reese’s remark to petitioner was not interrogation — that petitioner initiated contact with the police after he read the charging documents and then voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making incriminating statements. The State contends that Officer Reese’s remark was not the functional equivalent of interrogation — that it was nothing more than a comment on the seriousness of the charges and, in a sense, a rhetorical question. Even if Officer Reese’s remark is viewed as interrogatory or as an invitation to talk, the State maintains that Detective Johns removed any alleged taint from the remark when he admonished Officer Reese immediately that they could not talk to petitioner because he had invoked his right to counsel.

III

Our review of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing. See White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 249 , 821 A.2d 459, 469 (2003). We accept the facts as found by the motions judge unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003). We “undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and ²³¹ applying it to the facts of the present case.” See White, 374 Md. at 249 , 821 A.2d at 469 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), dictates that when a suspect is taken into custody, the person is entitled to certain procedural safeguards before law enforcement officers may interrogate that person.

Those rights include the right to consult with an attorney. Id. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07 . Once a suspect asks to speak with an attorney, that person may not be interrogated further until either counsel has been made available or until the suspect validly waives the earlier request for an attorney. Id. at 444-45 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 707 .

See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1885 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 ; Radovsky v. State, 296 Md. 386, 392-93 , 464 A.2d 239, 242-43 (1983) (noting per se rule precluding police-initiated interrogation after an arrestee has expressed a desire for the assistance of counsel); Bryant v. State, 49 Md.App. 272, 279 , 431 A.2d 714, 718 (1981) (stating that “even at the expense of redundancy ... Miranda and Edwards mean exactly what they say: once the accused requests the presence of counsel at a custodial interrogation, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are ipso facto invoked, and all questioning must cease ”). Under the rule developed in Edwards , “an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1885 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 . The Supreme Court held that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, the police may not make a subsequent attempt to elicit a waiver and then a statement by re-advising him of his Miranda rights.

A constitutionally valid statement may be obtained by the police in two ways: if the suspect initiates further conversation with the police or if an attorney has been made avail ²³² able to the suspect. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95 , 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-93 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 493-94 (1984). Following a suspect’s request for counsel, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that the accused responded to further police-initiated interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 .

See Radovsky, 296 Md. at 398-99 , 464 A.2d at 246 (holding that after Radovsky had invoked his right to counsel, the police improperly initiated custodial interrogation in violation of Edwards). The burden is on the State to prove that, after invoking his or her right to counsel, the accused initiated further discussion with the police. See State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 141 (Minn.1999) (holding that “the state has the burden of proving that, after invoking his right to counsel, [defendant] initiated further discussion with the police”). If we find that petitioner did not initiate further discussions with the police, following Edwards , we do not consider whether he subsequently waived his right to counsel. 5 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 413 (1983) (stating that “[s]ince there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case,