Dorf v. Skolnik

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We shall here give the reasons for the per curiam order we filed in this matter on January 28, 1977. We there affirmed ¹⁰⁴ the determination of a trial judge (Proctor, J.) that one of the appellants, Jayme Dorf (Miss Dorf), is no longer a member of the Democratic State Central Committee for the 42nd Legislative District and, as a consequence, that the Governor of Maryland might not appoint the nominee of that committee, as such nominee, to fill a then existing vacancy in the Maryland House of Delegates. The scenario begins with the death of Murray Abramson, a longtime member of the House of Delegates from the 42nd Legislative District, a district entirely within Baltimore City.

See Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1976 Cum. Supp.) Art. 40, § 47 (pp) and In Re Legislative Districting, 271 Md. 320, 333 , 317 A. 2d 477 (1974), as to the boundaries of that district. Maryland Constitution Art. Ill, § 13 (a) provides in pertinent part: “In case of death ... of any person who shall have been chosen as a Delegate . .. the Governor shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy from a person [sic] whose name shall be submitted to him in writing, within thirty days after the occurrence of the vacancy, by the State Central Committee of the political party with which the Delegate ..., so vacating, had been affiliated in the . ..

District from which he or she was elected, provided that the appointee shall be of the same political party as the person whose office is to be filled; and it shall be the duty of the Governor to make said appointment within fifteen days after the submission thereof to him. If a name is not submitted by the State Central Committee within thirty days after the occurrence of the vacancy, the Governor within another period of fifteen days shall appoint a person, who shall be of the same political party as the person whose office is to be filled, and who is otherwise properly qualified to hold the office of delegate ... in the District.. ..” At a meeting of the Democratic State Central Committee for the 42nd Legislative District the vote was two to one for the recommendation to the Governor of one individual, with ¹⁰⁵ Miss Dorf being one of the majority. Hence, if she were not properly a member of the committee, then no valid recommendation was made to the Governor and he was free, by reason of the expiration of time for the committee to make a recommendation, to appoint a person of his choice. Appellees, Sandra J. Skolnik et ah, as residents and registered voters of the 42nd Legislative District and also as Maryland taxpayers, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether Miss Dorf continued to be a member of the Democratic State Central Committee for the 42nd Legislative District and thus whether a valid nomination of a member of the House of Delegates had been made.

On January 19, 1977, the chancellor determined that she was no longer a resident of Baltimore City and therefore no longer a member of the committee. Accordingly, he enjoined the Governor from appointing the person nominated by the committee to the House of Delegates as the nominee of the committee. Of course, his order did not prevent the appointment of such person other than as the committee nominee. An immediate appeal was entered to the Court of Special Appeals.

We granted the writ of certiorari prior to a hearing in that court. We advanced the matter for argument and heard it on January 21. At that time the proceedings in the trial court had not been transcribed. We delayed issuing our per curiam order until a transcript of those proceedings had been delivered to us and each of us had had an opportunity to examine that transcript.

Our per curiam order of affirmance was issued on January 28. The parties entered into the following stipulation in the trial court: STIPULATION No. 1 - Jayme Dorf was elected in September, 1974, to the State Central Committee of the Democratic Party for the 42nd Legislative District. No. 2 - She read and signed under the penalties of perjury in 1974 Maryland return, joint exhibit ¹⁰⁶ No. 1, showing her residence as 2506 Shelleydale Drive. No. 3 - She read and signed under penalties of perjury in 1974 Federal return, exhibit No. 2, showing residence as 2506 Shelleydale Drive.

No. 4 - She read and signed under penalties of perjury in 1975 Maryland return, exhibit No. 3, showing residence as 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane and showing “residence on last day of taxable period” as Baltimore County, and further that she paid her piggy-back taxes to Baltimore County. No. 5 - She read and signed under penalties of perjury in 1975 Federal return, exhibit No. 4, showing residence as 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane, and the return further showed residence for purpose of revenue sharing as Baltimore City. No. 6 - Her residential lease was signed May 1,1975, for a year and renewed May 1, 1976, at 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane, exhibit No. 5. No. 7 - She had a tenant homeowners insurance policy with Aetna Insurance Company, effective June 28, 1976, and issued by James H. Pollack on 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane, which was not “business” insurance, exhibit No. 6.

No. 8 - Her Maryland driver’s license which was issued December 10, 1975, is to the address 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane, exhibit No..7. No. 9 - Her personal checks on the Equitable Trust Company account are printed with the address 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane, and they are sent to that address. No. 10 - Her newspaper subscription is to the Baltimore Sunday Sun which is delivered to 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane. No. 11 - All charge accounts, utility bills and other bills are sent and addressed to 1809 Rambling Ridge ¹⁰⁷ Lane.

These are set forth in the Judge’s opinion. These are a combination of mixed personal and business accounts and include the following: American Express, BankAmericard, Master Charge, Amoco, Exxon, Shell, Lord & Taylor’s, Stewart’s, Field’s Pharmacy, Bloomingdale’s, Wanamaker’s, Hess Apparel, Washington, D. C. Shopper’s plate, Baltimore Shopper’s plate, and B. Altman. No. 12 - Her current telephone listing in the white pages of the metropolitan Baltimore phone book is 1809 Rambling Ridge Lane. She has no other listing in the white pages or yellow pages of the Baltimore metropolitan phone book or any other phone book.

No. 13 - Miss Dorf has signed a new lease effective February 1, 1977, on an apartment at 1131 University Boulevard, Silver Spring, Maryland. Exhibit 8. No. 14 - Her voter registration is at 2506 Shelleydale Drive, Baltimore, Maryland, and was effective March 8,1972. This was joint Exhibit No. 9.

No. 15 - She filed for candidacy for the Democratic National Convention in 1976 showing her address as 2506 Shelleydale Drive, Baltimore City, joint Exhibit No. 10. No. 16 - She has a joint account with Mrs. Paul A. Dorf for checking, saving and safe deposit box showing an address of 2506 Shelleydale Drive. No. 17 - The University of Maryland Alumni Office shows her address as 2506 Shelleydale Drive. No. 18 - There is an automobile, 1974 Buick, which is yellow, which is used by Miss Dorf, insured with a fleet policy registered to her father, Paul A. Dorf, 2506 Shelleydale Drive.

Miss Dorf testified in the trial court that: she has a lease for the apartment mentioned in Baltimore County; she keeps ¹⁰⁸ certain furniture, cooking utensils and cosmetics there; her automobile is kept there “[m]aybe a few times a week,” possibly as much as four times a week overnight, whenever she has need to be there, on which occasions she herself was at the apartment, unless she had left the vehicle there when out of town; she has had male friends pick her up at that address; she has invited friends socially to the apartment; she has a dog which she keeps at this address when present; she has spent less than half of the weekends for the previous year at the Baltimore County apartment; she had “renter’s insurance” at the apartment and was aware when she signed up for this insurance that there was a stipulation to the effect that such insurance was to be used only for residential units; she contemplates moving from the Baltimore County address to an address in Montgomery County; the furniture in question was furniture she had used when a student at the University of Maryland at College Park, from which institution she was graduated in May 1975; she kept clothing and cosmetics at the home of her parents and in the Montgomery County home of the woman with whom she was associated in business; that she herself is a manufacturer’s representative covering “a territory from Richmond to Philadelphia, selling [and] servicing accounts”; she took the lease at the apartment in Baltimore County because she “needed some place to keep [her] furniture” and “[i]t is also a custom of the trade to have an apartment, because of the fact that [one] need[s] a place for business correspondence, for office materials and live merchandise” as well as “a lot of forms and units, promotional materials, and it is convenient because of the hours that [she] do[es] work and the times that [she is] away”; she has a telephone answering service at the apartment which records all incoming calls; she is not registered to vote in any place except in Baltimore City; she has nevér had any “intention of being a resident of Baltimore County,” ñor was it ever her intention to move away from her family home in Baltimore City; her new address in Montgomery County will be for business purposes only; her place of worship is Greenspring Valley Synagogue located in Baltimore City, and she has never changed her synagogue or other place of worship. ¹⁰⁹ Testimony was presented from other tenants of the apartment complex, Miss Dorf s mother, and the woman associated with Miss Dorf in business, all of whose testimony was consistent with that which we have previously summarized from Miss Dorf herself. Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 33, § 11-1 (a) specifies that “[e]ach political party which is required to nominate its candidates for public office by means of a primary election ... shall adopt a permanent constitution and bylaws.” 1 Section 5-1 requires any political party “with which ten per centum or more of the registered voters of this State are affiliated ... [to] nominate (1) all its candidates for public office; and (2) all members of the State and local central committees in said political party” by primary election. Thus, the Democratic party is mandated to have a party constitution.

Art. V of the Constitution of the Democratic party is concerned with local central committees. A requirement of its § 2 is, “No one shall be elected a member of such committee who is not a bona fide resident and registered Democrat of said election jurisdiction.” Code Art. 33, § 11-2 (b) requires that party central committee members “shall be selected as provided in [that] Article.” The General Assembly by Chapter 905 of the Acts of 1976 amended subsections (b) and (e). Prior to the amendment subsection (e) provided that the tenure in office of any member of the committee should “begin at the time the canvass of the votes in [the] district is completed and ... sh[ould] be deemed to be continued to the extent of any extension in time between primary elections by reason of any change in the date of holding primary elections by political parties in this State.” The 1976 amendment added to subsection (b) the proviso, “Upon relinquishing his residency within that county or Baltimore City a member of a party central com ¹¹⁰ mittee shall be considered to have resigned.” The provisions in subsection (e) relative to tenure were amended by stating, “However, upon relinquishing his residency in the county or Baltimore City, as the case may be, a member of a party central committee shall be considered to have resigned.” Questions presented to this Court, in the order in which we shall deal with them, are: (1) whether this controversy is one cognizable by the Court or is, to use the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556 , 66 S. Ct. 1198 , 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946), a “political thicket” which we should not enter; (2) whether the action here is one which may be maintained in equity or whether the proper remedy is one at law by way of mandamus; (3) whether if Miss Dorf is no longer a resident of the 42nd Legislative District this vacates her office as a member of the party central committee for that district; and (4) whether the chancellor erred in his determination that Miss Dorf is in fact no longer domiciled in the 42nd Legislative District. 1. The “political thicket” Maryland courts crossed the Rubicon in this matter in Valle v. Pressman, 229 Md. 591 , 185 A. 2d 368 (1962).

In that instance the Democratic candidate for State’s Attorney of Baltimore City died subsequent to the primary election and before the general election. Before the Court was the validity of the selection by the Democratic State Central Committee of Baltimore City of a person as the nominee for that party at the ensuing general election. This Court affirmed a determination that the selection made was not valid. As Judge Hammond put it for the Court, “Each of the defendants demurred on the grounds that a court of equity had no power or right either to determine an election or political contest or to try title to office ....” In the process of holding that the complainants had “stated a cause of action of which equity had jurisdiction,” he said for the Court: “We think the demurrers were overruled, properly.

The general rule that a court of equity ¹¹¹ may not decide election contests or interfere in political controversies is not inflexible and lately has been considerably relaxed. See Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412 , following Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 7 L. Ed.2d 663 . Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643 , held that a court of equity had jurisdiction of a taxpayer’s suit to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying the name of a candidate because of his failure to comply with statutory requirements as to signature. Chief Judge Bond referred to the general rule that equity will not decide election cases and said for the Court: ‘But a contention that no controversy that affects elections may be heard and decided by the Court would be at odds with other decisions,’ and cited cases in equity in which jurisdiction had been entertained, such as Carr v. Hyattsville, 115 Md. 545 (a bill to invalidate a referendum election on a local act); Graf v. Hiser, 144 Md. 418 (a bill to declare a referendum election invalid as improperly held); and Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419 (a bill to restrain the holding of a referendum election because the signatures seeking it did not meet constitutional requirements).

Judge Bond went on to point out that in the Sun Cab case a distinction was drawn between ‘interferences by the courts with the political conduct of elections, and taking jurisdiction of a question whether persons assuming to avail themselves of the election machinery set up for private initiative are persons entitled under the law to do so.’ “In Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138 , a mandamus case, this Court said that administrative or official decisions and actions in regard to the elective process which are arbitrary or contrary to law