Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission

Mason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Charles Hopkins, an inmate at the Maryland Penitentiary, was found guilty by the Adjustment Team 1 of attempted escape and possession of contraband, i.e., hacksaw blades. He was sentenced to one year in isolated confinement for the attempted escape conviction and a term of nine months for the possession of contraband conviction. Pursuant to procedures set out in Maryland Annotated Code, Article 41, Section 204F (d), Hopkins filed a complaint with the Inmate Grievance Commission (the Commission) alleging, among other things, that he did not have a hearing before the Adjustment Team within 72 hours of the alleged institutional infractions as mandated by Division of Correction Rule 105-2 (c) (1): “The inmate shall be furnished a written statement of the major infraction with which he is charged.

The written statement shall be served to the inmate not later than forty-eight (48) hours after the alleged violation, and the inmate will appear before the Adjustment Team within seventy-two (72) hours of the alleged violation unless prevented by exceptional circumstances. The stipulated time excludes Saturdays, Sunday, and holidays.” (Emphasis added). The alleged violations occurred on Wednesday, September 8, 1976. Excluding Saturday, Sunday and Monday, a holiday (Defender’s Day) the 72 hour period ended on Tuesday, ³³¹ September 14, 1976.

The hearing was held on Wednesday, September 15, 1976. After holding a hearing on this matter, the Commission concluded: " . . [T]hat the decision of the Adjustment Team was proper and just, and that the procedural delay was occasioned by exceptional circumstances and not prejudicial to Mr. Hopkins.” In affirming the Order of the Commission, the Judge of the Baltimore City Court, in his oral opinion, stated: “ ... True, the regulation calls for hearing within seventy-two hours and the inmate is entitled to rely upon that and entitled to expect a hearing within that period, I do not consider it to be a denial of due process to have the hearing in five days rather than in three days. I think we are dealing with something that is perhaps analogous to our constitutional provision for a speedy trial; [ 2 ] and I think in dealing with whether or not the failure to accord a seventy-two hour hearing amounts to a denial of due process, you have to weigh the applicable factors.

One of those factors obviously is the length of the delay. You can reduce the inmate’s position here to absurdity by holding the hearing one second beyond the seventy-two hour period. Obviously that is so short a period of time that the law would not take cognizance of the two seconds, three seconds and work it up to two days. But in a situation in which the case load is such — and the uncontradicted testimony before the ICC is that because of the present case load in this institution we are unable to reach our cases within seventy-two hours but we are reaching them within five days — I find no denial of due process.” ³³² Hopkins’ application for leave to appeal to this court was granted and the case was placed on the regular docket.

Hopkins, in essence, argues: (1) That the ordinary backlog of cases does not constitute “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of the Division of Correction Rule 105-2 (c) (1). (2) That the 72 hour time requirement of the Division of Correction Rule 105-2 (c) (1) is mandatory. (3) That the Division of Correction’s failure to comply with its own rule is a violation of the due process clause. . I. The only evidence in the record before the Commission for the one day’s delay in bringing Hopkins to trial before the Adjustment Team was the testimony of James Carrington, a member of the Adjustment Team.

The relevant parts of his testimony are as follows: “CARRINGTON: Charles Hopkins was charged on the 8th of September with possession of contraband, destruction of state property and attempted escape, .... He received a Notice of Infraction on the 10th, which was a Friday. His hearing was held on the following Wednesday, the 15th, and based on the volume of cases at the Maryland Penitentiary, that was a quick hearing. That was less time for his hearing than some others that I have knowledge of....” “JONES: Okay.

Now, as to Mr. Hopkins, what exceptional circumstances, if any, were there for delaying his hearing? “CARRINGTON: Just the regular volume of cases at this institution. “JONES: So there were in effect no exceptional circumstances? “CARRINGTON: Yeah, these were exceptional. This was a constant exception. We cannot hear cases within the 72 hour limit. ³³³ “JONES: So they’re common, they’re routinely exceptional circumstances. “CARRINGTON: They’re common. We cannot hear cases normally within the 72 hours, based on the volume of adjustment reports we have----It is very seldom that we are able to hear an adjustment case at this institution within that 72 hours, based on the volume of the cases. “JONES: So the only exceptional circumstances you’re alleging is the volume of cases? “CARRINGTON: Right.” A reading of Carrington’s testimony clearly shows that the single reason for the one day’s delay was the regular volume of cases the institution was required to hear.

The word “regular” implies continuity and consistency and excludes the idea of incidental and occasional. Obviously there is nothing uncommon or exceptional about a regular volume of cases. If we were to hold that the institution’s normal case loads or backlogs justify violation of the rule, it would seriously undermine the purpose and effectiveness of the rule and thrust the inmates back to the same conditions which existed prior to the adoption of the rule. 3 II. Having determined that there were no exceptional circumstances to toll the 72 hour rule, we must now determine whether the rule is mandatory.

The rule declares in unequivocal language that: “[T]he written statement shall be served to the inmate not later than forty eight (48) hours after the alleged violation, and the inmate will appear before the ³³⁴ Adjustment Team within seventy two (72) hours of the alleged violation unless prevented by exceptional circumstances.” (Emphasis added). The term “will” is “an auxiliary verb commonly having the mandatory sense of ‘shall’ or ‘must’. It is a word of certainty, while the word ‘may’ is one of speculation and uncertainty.” Black’s Law Dictionary; 1771, (4th rev. ed. 1968). In Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-565 (1977), the Court of Appeals stated “it is now a familiar principle of statutory construction in this state that the use of the word ‘shall’ is presumed mandatory unless its context would indicate otherwise.” We find nothing in the context of this rule or the rationale giving rise to its promulgation that suggests it is directory.

Nor do we think the absence of sanctions for failure to comply with the 72 hour limitation makes the rule directory. In Moss, supra, the Court, in speaking to this issue, stated: “We also note that although the absence of a penalty provision may be one indication that language is directory,... it is not dispositive. We have only recently determined that the ninety-day time period of Article 27, Section 264 (c), Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) for the filing of forfeiture petitions is mandatory, even though there is no penalty provision contained in that statute.” Id., at 566 .

Furthermore, we do not think the rule requires Hopkins to show that he was prejudiced by the one day’s delay or that he was denied due process. Regarding this point the Moss Court said: “We are, however, unable to agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that, notwithstanding the Section 8 (a) violation, Moss is entitled to no relief since he could not show any due process deprivation. Given the fact that Section 8 (a) is mandatory and the further fact that its command was not obeyed, we hold that the proceedings by the State to have Moss committed to Patuxent must be dismissed, regardless of whether his due process rights were denied.” Id., at 568 . Similarly, in Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314 (1978), the Court ³³⁵ of Appeals held that Maryland District Rule 723 (a), which requires that a defendant shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay, is mandatory, and that the defendant did not have to