In Re Andrew A.

RODOWSKY, J. The State of Maryland, acting by and through the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services, 1 appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court. That court found that the respondent, Andrew A., was not a child in need of assistance (CINA) under the definition of that phrase that was enacted by Chapter 415 of the Acts of 2001, effective October 1, 2001, and that is codified as Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ). The sole issue before us is whether the juvenile court’s construction of CJ § 3-801(f) is correct. Andrew A. is the fourth child of Sarah A. She was born in Ghana, West Africa, live d in England, and was brought to this country at age twelve by her mother.

They lived in Boston where Sarah A.’s mother was her source of support, but her mother died sometime ago. Sarah A.’s oldest child, Margaret, born in 1988, and her next oldest child, Christina, bom in 1991, now reside in England. When Christina was three months old she was removed from Sarah A.’s care by Massachusetts authorities, and it is Sarah A.’s understanding that her parental rights as to Christina were judicially terminated. In 1993 Sarah A. married Ernest A., but the couple separated in 1996.

Sarah A.’s third child, Isaac, was born of that marriage in 1994. According to Ernest A., Sarah A. had many “mental problems” and that it was due to his presence in the home that Isaac was not removed from Sarah A.’s care. Sarah A. and Isaac moved to Maryland in February 2001. In May of that year, Child Welfare Services (CWS) received a ⁴¹⁵ report from the social services agency in Worcester, Massachusetts alleging neglect of Isaac by his mother.

Acting on the Massachusetts referral, CWS staff met with Sarah A. on May 21, 2001. She needed financial assistance and assistance in finding housing. Thereafter, Sarah A. has changed addresses a number of times. For several months in the summer of 2001 Sarah A. had a sexual relationship with Alhalji K. He is the biological father of Andrew A, the infant who is the subject of these proceedings.

In August 2001 the State of Maryland petitioned to have Isaac found CINA. By a Montgomery County Juvenile Court order of September 17, 2001, Isaac was so adjudicated and placed in foster care. Andrew A. was born May 14, 2002. He was placed in protective care at the hospital and in foster care on May 17, 2002.

The State petitioned that Andrew A. be found CINA on June 10, 2002. Thus, at the juvenile court hearing on June 12 and 13, 2002, the evidence dealt with Sarah A.’s prior conduct, particularly as it had affected Isaac. Under those circumstances the juvenile court concluded, based on its interpretation of CJ § 3—801(f), that Andrew A. was not CINA. That statute, enacted in 2001, sets forth the following definition applicable to Subtitle 8, “Juvenile Causes-Children In Need of Assistance.” “ ‘Child In Need of Assistance’ means a child who requires court intervention because: “(1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and “(2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs.” The juvenile court, focusing on the words, “[t]he'child ... has been neglected,” concluded that there was no evidence that Andrew A. had been neglected.

Specifically, the juvenile court rejected the petitioner’s argument based on In re Wil ⁴¹⁶ liam B., 73 Md.App. 68 , 533 A.2d 16 (1987), cert. denied, 311 Md. 719 , 537 A.2d 272 (1988), where this Court held that “the parents’ ability to care for the needs of one child is probative of their ability to care for other children in the family.” Id. at 77, 533 A.2d at 21 . The juvenile court presented the following rationale for its construction of CJ § 3—801(f): “The holding in William B. I think applies to the old statute. I think that the legislature changed the statute, and it says that there has to be a finding that the child has been neglected. “That is not here. Neglected is defined—and while people have been talking, I have been looking at this phrase, ‘has been neglected,’ meaning that this child has been neglected, and neglect means leaving a child under-attended, or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child, and that means the child that we are talking about in this case and not a prior child. “All the arguments about William B. I think are very apposite under the old definition of CIÑA.

The old definition of CINA just says child in need of assistance because the child’s parents, guardian or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention. “William B. said you don’t have to wait to find inability or unwillingness until a child is actually injured. Here it certainly looks like the legislature intended to say that you have to show that the child has been neglected. “There is not evidence that this child has been neglected. Now, unless I want to just torture the language and pretend that the legislature didn’t mean it, I can’t find that this child has been neglected. “I don’t know how I can find the child a child in need of assistance. Everything that the Department says, all their concerns, all of the arguments about risk are all well taken, except I come back to what the law is, and the law says ‘has been neglected,’ and it may well be that this is a very unfortunate result for this child, but I think the legislature ⁴¹⁷ intended ‘has been neglected’ means things have happened which show neglect. “Neglect is defined as leaving a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention, and it doesn’t say or a risk based upon prior actions with other children. “It doesn’t say that.

Believe me, I am not at all comfortable with this decision, but I didn’t change the law. They did.” In this Court Sarah A. submits that the definitional element that “the child has been ... neglected,” is unambiguous and that, under the rules of statutory construction as recently repeated by the Court of Appeals in Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490 , 784 A.2d 1086 (2001), this Court may not look beyond those words to determine the legislative intent. In Langston , the Court said: “Where the General Assembly has enacted an unambiguous statute, we cannot, and will not, divine a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or judicially insert language to impose exceptions, limitations or restrictions not set forth by the legislature. See Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Assn. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 204 , 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000)(“we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning”); Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546 , 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977).” Id. at 515-16, 784 A.2d at 1100 . In determining ambiguity, vel non, however, the statute must be considered as a whole. Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 175 , 783 A.2d 169, 179 (2001) (quoting Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997)).

See also Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989). Absence of ambiguity cannot be predicated on selecting a few words from the body of the entire statute. Here, the words, “has been ⁴¹⁸ neglected,” in § 3—801(f) must be read in light of the definition of “neglect” set forth in CJ § 3-801(s). That definition reads: “ ‘Neglect’ means the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or individual who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate: “(1) That the child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or “(2) That the child has suffered mental injury or been placed at substantial risk of mental injury.” (Emphasis added).

In the definition of “neglect” the class under consideration is children. Members of that class are individuals under the age of eighteen years. See CJ § 3-801(e) (defining “child”). The Revisor’s Manual of the Governor’s Commission to Revise the Annotated Code of Maryland (2d Ed.1973) at 51, establishes as a style guideline that “[ojnce the class has been defined, indicate a member of the class by use of ‘every’ or ‘a.’ ” Consequently, “neglect” in § 3-801(s) is an abstract concept, not limited to the child who is the subject of the CINA proceeding.

Proof of neglect of some child other than the child who is the subject of the proceeding raises a question of evidentiary relevance, dependent on the circumstances of the particular case, but § 3-801(s) does not create a statutory exclusion of evidence of neglect simply because the child directly affected by the neglect is not the subject of the CINA proceeding. Further, it is clear from § 3-801(s)(l) and (2) that there may be neglect of a child without actual harm to the child. A “substantial risk of harm” constitutes “neglect.” Thus, if there are two children involved in a parent’s act or omission, but only one child is harmed, there nevertheless may be neglect of the second child if, depending on the facts, the act or omission created a substantial risk of harm to the second child. ⁴¹⁹ When the definition of “neglect” is read into the definition of a “child in need of assistance” in § 3—801(f), it would seem to be clear that the child who is the