In Re John P.

⁷⁰³ ELDRIDGE, Judge. Maryland Rule 916 a provides that, in a juvenile proceeding, “[a]n order of the court may be modified or vacated if the court finds that action to be in the best interest of the child or the public____” This case presents the question of whether Rule 916 a authorizes a judge to reconsider an order dismissing a CINA case on the merits. 1 On November 29, 1985, two petitions were filed in the Juvenile Division of the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, asserting that two minors, John and Thomas P., were “children in need of assistance.” 2 The CINA petitions alleged that John P. had been physically abused by his mother and that, as a result of this alleged mistreatment, both John and Thomas P. were living in conditions dangerous to their physical and emotional well-being. Under Maryland Code (1957, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 8-801(q) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the individual parties to the action were John and Thomas P., and Mrs. P. (their mother).

At the hearing before the District Court, the State and the children presented evidence designed to establish that John P. had been physically abused by his mother and that, therefore, both John and Thomas P. were children in need of assistance. Mrs. P., in contrast, denied that she had caused John’s injuries. Mrs. P. testified at the hearing that she did not know how John’s injuries occurred. She speculated that perhaps they had been caused by a fall.

Follow ⁷⁰⁴ ing the presentation of evidence,, the court stated that it could not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mrs. P. had caused John’s injuries. As a result of this conclusion, the court decided that John and Thomas were not in need of assistance. The court dismissed the petitions on January 8, 1986. Eight days after the court’s dismissal, counsel for the children filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order, relying on Rule 916 a as authority.

Counsel for Mrs. P. filed an opposition to the motion, and subsequently a hearing was held before the District Court. At the hearing, the State joined with counsel for the children, supporting the motion for reconsideration. At the conclusion of the hearing on the reconsideration motion, the court held that it had no authority to reconsider its earlier dismissal of the case on the merits. The court expressed the view that Rule 916 a was limited in scope to reconsidering orders involving continuing court supervision {e.g., a custody order or a commitment to an institution) or orders involving dismissal for a technical reason {e.g., want of prosecution or a time constraint that had expired).

John and Thomas P. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before any proceedings began in that court, we issued a writ of certiorari. In this Court, John P. and Thomas P., joined by the State, argue that the plain language of Rule 916 a “mandate[s] the conclusion that the order dismissing the petitions was subject to reconsideration.” (Appellants’ brief p. 3). Appellants suggest that the trial judge’s contrary conclusion was based on the judge’s view that reconsideration of the evidence and decision would violate double jeopardy principles, and they contend that the double jeopardy prohibition is inapplicable here {id. at pp. 3-5).

The appellee Mrs. P., on the other hand, maintains that a CINA proceeding should be treated like a criminal proceeding for purposes of a dismissal on its merits and that double jeopardy principles do ⁷⁰⁵ preclude reconsideration of a dismissal for insufficient evidence. (Appellee’s brief pp. 7-11). The language of Rule 916 a is broad; a judge may modify or vacate a court order if it is in the best interest of the child. The order dismissing the CINA petitions was clearly a court “order” within the meaning of Rule 916 a.

Consequently, if the court determines that it would be in the child's best interest to reconsider and either vacate or modify its earlier dismissal of a CINA petition on the merits, the plain language of Rule 916 a would seem to authorize such action. In reaching this conclusion, we construe Rule 916 a liberally, in light of the overall legislative purposes set forth in the statute. These purposes focus on the best interests of child. See Code (1957, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 3-802(a)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 3 In In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477, 478 , 505 A.2d 504, 505 (1986), we construed Rule 916 a broadly to conclude that “a judge presiding over juvenile causes has the authority [under Rule 916 a] to vacate a prior order adjudicating a child to be delinquent after the successful completion of a period of probation.” 4 The Court went on to state ( 305 Md. at 481-482 , 505 A.2d at 507 ): ⁷⁰⁶ “We are persuaded that given the stated focus of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Title 3, Subtitle 8, Juvenile Causes, as set out in § 3-802(a)(2) and 3-802(b), our interpretation more faithfully adheres to the legislatively spelled out purposes of that subtitle____ To view Rule 916(a) in as restrictive a fashion as did the trial judge does not comport with a liberal statutory construction; rather, it runs counter to the express language of the statute.” Mrs. P. argues that giving Rule 916 a this broad construction in the present case violates double jeopardy principles.

She contends that Rule 916 a should not be construed to allow the State to attempt for a second time to prove its case. Mrs. P. relies on Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701 , 319 A.2d 542 (1974), which held that the double jeopardy prohibition bars further trial proceedings after an acquittal or equivalent adjudication on the merits in favor of the accused. In addition, see, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 , 106 S.Ct. 1745 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) ; Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 562-573 , 515 A.2d 1157, 1162-1167 (1986); Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146 , 472 A.2d 981 (1984); Block v. State, 286 Md. 266 , 407 A.2d 320 (1979) . This principle is applicable to a dismissal or other order terminating a trial on its merits, based upon a holding that the State’s evidence is insufficient, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

See In re Mark R, 294 Md. 244 , 449 A.2d 393 (1982), and cases there discussed. Generally, the double jeopardy prohibition only applies to bar criminal prosecutions. United States v. One ⁷⁰⁷ Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984); Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 535-536 , 325 A.2d 718, 722-723 (1974). See C. Torda, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 54, at 276-277 (14th ed. 1978); C. Whitebread, Constitutional Criminal Procedure 381-382 (1978).

Ordinarily, the initial proceeding must have subjected the individual to the risk of punishment before a subsequent proceeding involving criminal sanctions is barred by double jeopardy principles. See Parojinog v. State, 282 Md. 256 , 384 A.2d 86, 88 (1978). A CINA proceeding is essentially civil in nature. Code (1974, 1984 RepLVol.), § 3-824(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that the label of “civil” attached to a case by the Legislature will not preclude consideration of the actual nature of the proceeding, and that double jeopardy principles are sometimes applicable to civil juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 , 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1975); In re Mark R., supra, 294 Md. at 254-255 , 449 A.2d at 399 ; Parojinog v. State, supra, 282 Md. at 263-264 , 384 A.2d at 90 . See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558 (1967); Matter of Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 703 , 332 A.2d 246, 253 (1975). This case is not, however, like a delinquency proceeding or some CINS 5 proceedings where the State is prosecuting a child in a subsequent action based upon the conduct that was the basis of a prior action and which, if committed by an adult, would be criminal.

Such an attempt by the State may well be precluded by double jeopardy principles. See Breed v. Jones, supra, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 ; In re Mark R., supra, 294 Md. 244 , 449 A.2d 393 ; Parojinog v. State, supra, 282 Md. 256 , 384 A.2d 86 . Cf. Bowling v. State, 298 Md. 396 , 470 A.2d 797 (1984).

Here, it is the children who are seeking further proceed- ⁷⁰⁸ ings. Moreover, neither the first hearing nor the requested reconsideration proceedings involve allegations of misconduct by the children. Mrs. P. is also a party to this action. See § 3-801(q) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Because child abuse was alleged as the basis of the CINA petitions, the focus at the first hearing involved whether or not Mrs. P. committed the alleged child abuse. The judge could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the abuse occurred. While ordinarily a CINA