State v. Smith

BLACKWELL, Judge. The issue, here is whether the 180 day speedy trial provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) applies to a detainer based simply upon a felony arrest warrant and an accompanying statement of charges. We hold that it does. I. Respondent Smith was serving a sentence in the District of Columbia when the District Court of Maryland issued a warrant for his arrest.

To obtain the warrant, Detective R. J. Sheehan filed a sworn application for a statement of charges. See Md.Rule 4-211(b)(1) (describing procedure for ²²⁵ filing a statement of charges before arrest). 1 That application alleged in detail the facts relating to Mr. Smith’s proposed arrest. 2 A District Court commissioner agreed that probable cause existed and issued a statement of charges along with an arrest warrant on the same piece of paper. See Md.Rule 4-212(d)(l). The document was entitled “Arrest Warrant on Charging Document.” On March 28, 1986, the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County lodged that document as a detainer against Smith.

On June 17, 1986, the Prince George’s County State’s Attorney’s Office received Smith’s request that all “untried indictments, informations or complaints” against him be disposed of within 180 days pursuant to the IAD. Smith was indicted on January 21, 1987—218 days after the State’s Attorney’s office received his request for disposition. The defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the warrant based on the statement of charges was an untried complaint, which had not been brought to trial ²²⁶ promptly under the IAD. Judge Chasanow granted the motion to dismiss, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

State v. Smith, 73 Md.App. 378 , 534 A.2d 371 (1987). We granted certiorari to consider the matter.

II

Under the IAD, a prisoner in one state may, through written request, compel the disposition of “any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner” by another state within 180 days after the state prosecutor’s office has received that request. Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616D(a) (codifying Article III of the IAD). 3 In this case, the State’s Attorney’s office failed to act within 180 days after Smith’s request for disposition. If the felony “Arrest Warrant on Charging Document” involved here invoked the IAD, the charges against Smith were properly dismissed with prejudice.

We therefore consider whether this document was an “untried complaint” ²²⁷ under the IAD. See Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 307 , 455 A.2d 973, 975 (1983) (“[I]t is clear that for the Agreement to become activated, there must be an untried indictment, information or complaint lodged against the prisoner evidenced by a detainer.”). A. “[T]he Detainer Agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact the interpretation of which presents a question of federal law.” Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 , 101 S.Ct. 703, 708-09 , 66 L.Ed.2d 641, 650 (1981). “The most natural interpretation of the words ‘indictment/ ‘information/ and ‘complaint’ is that they refer to documents charging an individual with having committed a criminal offense.” Carchman v. Nash, 478 U.S. 716, 724 , 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3405 , 87 L.Ed.2d 516, 523 (1985). 4 In addition, we have noted that “complaint” “simply is a general term intended to refer to a charge that will require the prisoner to go to trial.” Clipper, 295 Md. at 308 , 455 A.2d at 976 . 5 The term “complaint” is not found in the “Criminal Causes” section of the Maryland Rules. However our rules do contain the term “Charging Document,” which is defined as “a written accusation alleging that a defendant has committed an offense.” Md.Rule 4-102(a).

There are four ²²⁸ types of charging documents: citations, statements of charges, informations, and indictments. The arrest warrant here was predicated on a statement of charges, which is defined as a “charging document, other than a citation filed in the District Court by a peace officer or by a judicial officer.” Md.Rule 4-102(i). 6 As is true of all charging documents, a statement of charges “shall contain a concise and definite statement of the essential facts of the offense with which the defendant is charged____” Md.Rule 4-202(a). And “[a] statement of charges shall be signed by a peace officer or by a judicial officer.” Md.Rule 4-202(b). Here, the application for the statement of charges required the complainant to swear to his account of the facts before a commissioner or judge.

See generally State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489 , 505 A.2d 511 (1986) (discussing role of a commissioner in issuing a statement of charges), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 , 106 S.Ct. 2925 , 91 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). Under the federal system, a “complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a magistrate.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 3; see generally Black’s Law Dictionary 258 (5th ed. 1979). Such a complaint may be used as a basis for the issuance of a warrant.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 4. Moreover, a federal criminal complaint activates, upon request for disposition, the timing requirement of Article III of the IAD. 18 U.S.C.App. (1982) (adopting Interstate Agreement on Detainers). The apparent similarity between a federal criminal complaint and a statement of charges suggests that the two be treated in a parallel fashion under the IAD—i.e. that they trigger the same time limitations. ²²⁹ B. In addition to this federal analogy, the policies behind the IAD support the notion that an arrest warrant based on a charging document be treated as a complaint under the IAD. As stated by the Supreme Court, “legislative history ... emphasizes that a primary purpose of the Agreement is to protect prisoners against whom detainers are outstanding.” Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 448-49 , 101 S.Ct. at 712 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 654 . 7 The agreement itself states that its goals are 1) “to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges” and 2) “to provide ... cooperative procedures” among the party jurisdictions to facilitate such disposition.

Md.Code Ann. (1947, 1984 Repl.Vol) Art. 27, § 616B (codifying Article I). Prompt disposition is needed for the following reasons: [A] prisoner who has had a detainer lodged against him is seriously disadvantaged by such action. He is in custody and therefore in no position to seek witnesses or to preserve Ms defense. He must often be kept in dose custody and is ineligible for desirable work assignments.

What is more, when detainers are filed against a prisoner he sometimes loses interest in institutional opportunities because he must serve Ms sentence without knowing what additional sentences may lie before Mm, or when, if ever, he will be in a position to employ the education and skills he may be developing. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 449 , 101 S.Ct. at 712 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 654 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); S.Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, p. 4864); see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379 , 89 S.Ct. 575, 577-78 , 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 612 (1969); see generally Clipper, 295 Md. at 305 , 455 A.2d at 974 (“The IAD was spawned by the extensive ²³⁰ criticism regarding the serious disadvantages the detainer system placed on prisoners.”).

These considerations are crucial in interpreting the IAD, given its mandate that it “be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.” Md.Code (1957, 1984 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 616J (codifying Article IX). The congressional concerns quoted above are present whether detainers are based on informations, indictments or felony arrest warrants predicated on statements of charges. The fact that, in the latter situation, the state’s attorney must sometimes get a subsequent indictment before trial does not eliminate these concerns. Thus prompt disposal of a warrant and statement of charges within 180 days of a prisoner’s request is an approach which advances the purpose of the agreement.

If we were to reject such an approach, the state could issue detainers based on warrants and accompanying statements of charges without incurring any obligation under Article III of the IAD to promptly dispose of those charges upon prisoners’ requests. Cf United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 , 98 S.Ct. 1834 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (articulating similar points in finding that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a “request” under Article IV, which invokes that provision’s time limitations). 8 ²³¹ C. The State contends that because it could not have prosecuted all of Smith’s alleged offenses on the basis of the statement of charges, that statement, in conjunction with Smith’s request for disposition, could not have activated his rights under Article III of the IAD. 9 The State refers to our recent determination that Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights do not commence until “a defendant is subject to be tried on [the charging] document.” State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 574 , 471 A.2d 712, 716 (1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 , 104 S.Ct. 3519 , 82 L.Ed.2d 827 (1984). We are unpersuaded by this argument. First, we note that Gee interpreted the term “accused” under the Sixth Amendment, rather than the meaning of “complaint” as it is used in the IAD.

Gee is therefore not binding as precedent in this case. We note that once the Commissioner issued the statement of charges here, those charges could only be disposed of by trial or by action of the State’s Attorney. 10 Thus the statement of charges here squarely placed the ²³² prisoner on the path toward trial, although formal prosecution had not yet technically begun for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. See Gee, 298 Md. at 574 , 471 A.2d at 716 . Second, under the federal system, a defendant cannot be tried on a complaint alone; instead the prosecutor must obtain an indictment or information.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(a); 11 see 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal § 121, at 338 (2d ed. 1982). Yet such a complaint would nevertheless activate the IAD upon