Attorney Grievance v. Neverdon

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Russell A. Neverdon, Sr., Misc. Docket AG No. 12, September Term, 2020 ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – SIX-MONTH SUSPENSION – Court of Appeals suspended from practice of law in Maryland for six months Russell A. Neverdon, Sr., Respondent, with condition that upon reinstatement Respondent engage attorney monitor for period of one year. Respondent, among other things, failed to properly supervise work of non-attorney assistant, failed to provide competent and diligent representation to clients in personal injury and estate matter, failed to adequately communicate with clients about matter, and failed to recognize and advise clients of conflict of interest and to attempt to obtain clients’ informed consent, confirmed in writing, to continue with representation. Such conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a)(2) and (b) (Communication), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest), 1.15(a) and (d) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 5.3(b) (Responsibilities Regarding Non-Attorney Assistants), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law), 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating MARPC).

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-20-002534 Argued: March 8, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 12 September Term, 2020 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. RUSSELL A. NEVERDON, SR. ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________ Filed: May 28, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-05-28 10:10-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This attorney discipline proceeding involves an attorney who mainly, among other things, failed to properly supervise the work of a non-attorney assistant, failed to provide competent and diligent representation to clients in a personal injury and estate matter, failed to adequately communicate with the clients about the matter, and failed to recognize and advise clients of a conflict of interest and to attempt to obtain the clients’ informed consent, confirmed in writing, to continue with the representation. Russell A. Neverdon, Sr., Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland, was retained by relatives of a person who was struck and killed by a motor vehicle to handle a personal injury (survival action) and an estate matter that arose as a result of the individual’s death. One of Neverdon’s clients filed a complaint against him with Bar Counsel.

On May 19, 2020, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, Petitioner, Bar Counsel filed in this Court a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Neverdon, charging him with violating Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)1 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(b) and (c) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest), 1.8(b) (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients), 1.15(a), (d), and (e) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 5.3(b) and (c) (Responsibilities Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1 (“MLRPC”) were renamed the MARPC and relocated to Title 19 of the Maryland Rules, without substantive change. Regarding Non-Attorney Assistants), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law), 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MARPC). On May 22, 2020, this Court designated the Honorable Anthony F. Vittoria (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hear this attorney discipline proceeding. On September 28, 29, 30, and October 5, 2020, the hearing judge conducted a hearing.

On November 23, 2020, the hearing judge filed in this Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, determining that Neverdon had violated MARPC 1.1, 1.2(a)2, 1.3, 1.4,3 1.5,4 1.7, 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.16(a), 1.16(d),5 3.3(a)(1), 5.3(b), 5.5(a), 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(a), but had not violated MARPC 1.15(e), 5.3(c), or 8.4(d).6 On March 8, 2021, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, based on the rule violations and the aggravating factors found herein, we suspend Neverdon from the 2 Although the hearing judge did not specify a subsection, the hearing judge quoted MARPC 1.2(a). 3 The hearing judge did not specify which subsection of MARPC 1.4 that Neverdon had violated. 4 In his conclusions of law, the hearing judge quoted MARPC 1.5(a) and, without specifying a subsection, concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC “1.5 by taking his full fee before his work had been completed.” Later, in the conclusion of the opinion, when summarizing the violations, the hearing judge stated that Neverdon had violated MARPC 1.5(a). Bar Counsel, however, charged Neverdon with violating MARPC 1.5(b) and (c), not MARPC 1.5(a). 5 In the petition, Bar Counsel charged Neverdon with violating MARPC 1.16(a)(1). In the opinion, the hearing judge stated that Bar Counsel had charged Neverdon with violating MARPC 1.16(a) but had argued at the hearing that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.16(d). 6 At the hearing, Bar Counsel withdrew the allegation that Neverdon had violated MARPC 1.8(b). -2- practice of law in Maryland for six months, with the condition that, upon reinstatement to the practice of law in Maryland, Neverdon engage an attorney monitor for a period of one year, with the attorney monitor to be approved by Bar Counsel and paid for by Neverdon.

BACKGROUND The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize. On June 24, 1999, this Court admitted Neverdon to the Bar of Maryland. At the time of the disciplinary hearing, Neverdon had been practicing law in Baltimore City for twenty-one years. From April 2015 to March 2018, Neverdon worked full time as the Director of Special Services in the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”).

While holding the position, Neverdon maintained a law practice limited to handling civil cases and already existing criminal cases. While working for DPSCS, Neverdon handled approximately sixteen to twenty cases per month in his law practice, the Law Office of Russell A. Neverdon, Sr., LLC. During that time, Neverdon maintained an office for his law practice and worked in the office approximately eight hours per week, usually outside of normal business hours during the week and on weekends. Neverdon employed Mr. Scherron J. Lee as a paralegal in his law office.

Lee is not licensed to practice law in Maryland. When Neverdon worked in the office during non- business hours, he would leave notes for Lee with tasks for Lee to perform and he would leave drafts of pleadings, letters, and other documents for Lee to finalize during the next business day. During workdays, Neverdon and Lee communicated by e-mail and text -3- messages and occasionally by telephone.7 Initiation of Representation On January 8, 2017, Rodney C. Chase, who was working as a traffic flagger at a road construction site, was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by Jason Disney. Disney had been travelling at a high rate of speed and there were at least three witnesses to the accident.

Chase had no immediate family and died intestate. Prior to his death, Chase had received treatment for drug dependency that had been paid for by the Maryland Department of Health (“MDH”). Chase was survived by four cousins: Marjorie Purvey, Michael Willingham, Russell Willingham,8 and Julia Chance (collectively, “the Clients”). Michael arranged for a funeral director to claim Chase’s body and funeral expenses were paid for by Chesapeake Employers’ Insurance Company (“CEICO”), Chase’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer.

On or about January 26, 2017, Neverdon met with Purvey, Michael, and Russell to discuss possibly representing them. Chance, who lived in New York, participated in the meeting by telephone. Prior to the meeting, Neverdon learned that Michael had retained, or at least spoken to, another attorney. During the meeting, Neverdon told the Clients that they could hire separate attorneys, but Neverdon did not explain, either at that time or any other time, about the possibility of a conflict of interest between the Clients and he never 7 Although the hearing judge found that the communication occurred, the hearing judge noted that, during discovery, Neverdon did not produce records of any text messages or telephone calls that he had with Lee. 8 Because they have the same surname, we refer to Michael Willingham and Russell Willingham by their first names. -4- explained what he would need to do should such a conflict of interest arise.

During the meeting, Neverdon explained that, if retained, he would “handle the case,” which, according to the hearing judge, included filing the necessary documents to open an estate for Chase (“the Estate”). Neverdon did not tell the Clients during the meeting, however, that he had a full-time job with DPSCS. At the end of the meeting, the Clients agreed to retain Neverdon in connection with Chase’s death. After the meeting, Neverdon instructed Lee to prepare engagement agreements for the Clients.

The engagement agreements were identical, with the exception of the name of the Client to whom a particular agreement pertained. The agreements described the scope of the representation as follows: “You have requested the Law Office of Russell A. Neverdon, Sr., LLC to represent you in connection with an Estate matter in conjunction with a wrongful death and survivorship cause of action regarding [] Chase.” The agreements provided that the Clients were responsible for reimbursing Neverdon for any out-of-pocket expenses and included a breakdown of the potential expenses. The agreements did not require the Clients to provide a retainer or escrow payment to cover such possible expenses. The agreements detailed that Neverdon’s hourly fee was $400 but indicated that the Clients would be responsible for the fee only if the Clients terminated the representation and engaged other counsel or settled the matter on their own.9 9 The engagement agreements, which were admitted into evidence at the disciplinary hearing, provided that they were “contingent fee” contracts, and that if the matter were resolved by way of settlement prior to the filing of a lawsuit, Neverdon’s compensation would be 33 1/3% of the settlement amount, and if resolved after the filing of a lawsuit, Neverdon’s compensation would be 40% of any proceeds recovered or awarded.

The -5- Purvey and Michael were selected to serve as personal representatives of the Estate. Neverdon learned through discussions with Purvey that her relationship with Michael was contentious.10 Neverdon learned that Purvey disapproved of the manner in which Michael handled claiming Chase’s body and the funeral and Purvey believed that Michael and Chase had used drugs together in the past. Neverdon learned that Purvey’s main goal for the representation was to ensure that Disney was held accountable for Chase’s death. Despite what Neverdon had learned from Purvey, the engagement agreements failed to provide any information about the possibility of conflicts of interest between the Clients or what steps would need to be taken if a conflict arose.

On January 26, 2017, Michael and Russell signed the engagement agreements. Sometime after January 30, 2017, Purvey signed an engagement agreement.11 The Survival Action Early in the representation, Neverdon concluded that there could not be a wrongful death claim because Chase did not have any dependents. Neverdon concluded that the only avenue for recovery would be a survival action brought on behalf of the Estate. Early on, agreements stated that it was understood that if no recovery were obtained, then no fee payment would be due to Neverdon. 10 Purvey also made Lee aware of her feelings about Michael.

In a telephone call on May 29, 2017, Purvey expressed to Lee her dislike of Michael as well as her desire to not have to deal with Michael. 11 The hearing judge noted that one of the exhibits consisted of an engagement agreement purportedly signed by Chance on January 30, 2017. According to the hearing judge, this was “curious” as, on January 30, 2017, Lee sent an e-mail to Neverdon indicating that Chance’s signature had not yet been obtained. -6- Neverdon met with Purvey at least two times at her home.12 During those meetings, Purvey indicated that she had heard Chase had been struck from behind by Disney and that Chase may have owned an automobile. Following the initial January 26, 2017 meeting, Neverdon instructed Lee to prepare documents, including a letter to the Anne Arundel County Police Department requesting a copy of the accident report and a letter to Chase’s employer seeking information. On February 23, 2017, Lee wrote a letter to the Anne Arundel County Police Department’s Accident Report Unit requesting the accident report.

At some point between February 23, 2017 and March 15, 2017, Neverdon received the accident report, which identified Disney as the driver of the vehicle that struck Chase and provided the name of the vehicle’s insurer, Nationwide Insurance (“Nationwide”), and a policy number. The accident report did not identify who owned the vehicle that Disney had been driving and Neverdon did not investigate the matter. On March 15, 2017, at Neverdon’s instruction, Lee sent two letters to Nationwide— one requesting that Nationwide identify any personal injury protection or “Med-Pay” coverage that was available for Chase and one requesting that Nationwide put its position as to liability in writing. Also on March 15, 2017, Lee sent two follow-up letters to the Anne Arundel County Police Department—one to Evidence Control requesting Chase’s personal effects and one to the Traffic Safety Division requesting an accident reconstruction report.

Neverdon began an investigation with respect to Disney by conducting online 12 Following the initial meeting, Neverdon did not meet with Michael and Russell again and Neverdon did not meet with Chance in person at all during the representation. -7- research. Through a “people search,” Neverdon determined that Disney was in his early thirties. Using Maryland Judiciary Case Search, Neverdon discovered that Disney had prior convictions for traffic and criminal offenses. Neverdon searched Maryland land records, which did not show any property registered in Disney’s name.

Using the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation’s website, Neverdon determined that Disney was not identified as the owner of the residence displayed on his driver’s license. Based on his investigation, Neverdon concluded that there was a strong likelihood that Disney did not have any assets. Neverdon spoke to the funeral director who told him that Chase’s body had significant injuries to the back, but only superficial injuries on the front. Neverdon also visited the accident scene.

From his investigation, as well as the information Purvey had provided, Neverdon concluded that Chase had been struck from the rear and did not see Disney coming before being hit. On March 20, 2017, CEICO sent a letter to Nationwide, on which Neverdon was copied, notifying Nationwide that it had a statutory lien in the amount of $7,000 against the Estate for funeral expenses. The following day, Nationwide sent a letter to Neverdon, stating that CEICO had paid $7,000 in funeral expenses and that Nationwide would reduce any payments made under the applicable policy by that amount if CEICO had not been reimbursed at the time of payment. In addition, Nationwide advised Neverdon that its insured was named Daryl Disney, not Jason Disney.

Lee received Nationwide’s letter on Neverdon’s behalf. Lee thought that the letter was a response to the letter he had sent demanding personal injury protection benefits on Chase’s behalf. Lee did not understand -8- the meaning of Nationwide’s letter and spoke with Neverdon, who instructed Lee to call Nationwide to determine the meaning of the letter. On March 23, 2017, Lee called Nationwide and spoke with Lisa Dugan, who informed him that Nationwide’s insured was Daryl Disney, not Jason Disney (the driver of the vehicle that struck Chase).

Dugan also advised Lee that personal injury protection benefits were not available in the case. Neither Neverdon nor Lee investigated who Daryl Disney was or what, if any, connection he had to Jason Disney or the vehicle Jason Disney had been driving, or the accident that killed Chase. On April 6, 2017, Lee faxed a demand letter to Nationwide under his signature demanding a settlement in the amount of the policy limits. Lee had e-mailed a draft of the demand letter to Neverdon before faxing it to Nationwide.

Neither Neverdon nor Lee knew what the policy limits were at the time that the demand letter was sent to Nationwide. In the demand letter, Lee made several legal assertions. Lee wrote that the “insured,” Jason Disney, had failed to operate the vehicle in a “safe and prudent” manner by failing to keep a safe look-out while driving, failing to avoid an accident, failing to keep control of the vehicle, and failing to obey traffic devices. Lee wrote that, due to Jason Disney’s “negligence,” Chase was fatally injured.

Lee made a demand for a settlement in the amount of the policy limits “to compensate for the loss of life of [] Chase, as well as the pain, suffering, inconvenience, and funeral costs incurred by his surviving family member.” On May 17, 2017, Lee sent a follow-up e-mail to Nationwide requesting a response to the demand letter. Lee made a legal assertion in the e-mail by stating that Chase “was fatally injured as a direct and proximate result of your insured’s negligence.” On May 22, -9- 2017, Neverdon received a letter from Nationwide in which Nationwide confirmed receipt of the demand letter, but again identified Daryl Disney as the policy holder. According to the hearing judge, on May 30, 2017, Lee spoke with Dugan, who advised Lee that Nationwide had made several attempts to speak with “Mr. Disney” but had been unable to reach him.13 On June 7, 2017, Lee again spoke with Dugan, who requested that he send her the Letters of Administration issued by the Orphans’ Court so that Nationwide could extend a settlement offer. The following day, Lee faxed the Letters of Administration to Dugan.

On June 22, 2017, Lee spoke with a representative of Chase’s employer, PDI Sheetz Construction Company. The representative advised that Chase did not have a pension, 401(k), or “retirement.” The representative did not know whether Chase owned a vehicle.14 On the same day, Dugan sent Neverdon a letter enclosing a “Release of All Claims” and a “Medicare Addendum” form. The release contained a settlement offer of $30,000 in exchange for the release of all claims against all possible tortfeasors. On or about July 11, 2017, the Anne Arundel County Police Department’s Traffic Safety Section released15 a thirty-two-page Motor Vehicle Collision Reconstruction Report 13 Respondent’s Exhibit 45 contains handwritten notes by Lee.

A notation for May 30, 2017, indicates that Dugan attempted to speak with the “insured,” who would be Daryl Disney. 14 The hearing judge noted that Neverdon and Lee spent time trying to determine whether Chase owned a vehicle. Neverdon indicated that the purpose of the search was to determine whether Chase had insurance on a vehicle which might enable the Estate to assert an underinsured motorist claim. Neverdon ultimately discovered that Chase did not own a vehicle. 15 The hearing Judge did not indicate to whom or how the Reconstruction Report had been released. - 10 - concerning the accident (“the Reconstruction Report”). The Reconstruction Report indicated the following.

There were at least three witnesses to the accident, each of whom had given a statement. Jason Disney provided minimal information to law enforcement at the scene of the accident and invoked his right to counsel. Disney saw Chase approximately 100 feet before impact and applied the brakes and began to skid approximately twenty-seven feet before impact. The vehicle that Disney drove was equipped with an Ignition Interlock system because Disney’s driver’s license was “alcohol restricted.” Disney may have been distracted by the Ignition Interlock system requesting a “rolling retest” just prior to the accident.16 Neverdon never obtained a copy of the Reconstruction Report and never attempted to speak with the witnesses or Disney.

Opening the Estate At the meeting of January 26, 2017 described above, the Clients agreed that Purvey and Michael would serve as personal representatives of the Estate. After the meeting, Neverdon instructed Lee to search online for the forms needed to open an estate and to “populate” the forms with the required information. Lee had never previously worked on opening an estate. Lee prepared a Petition for Administration of a Small Estate to request the appointment of Purvey and Michael as personal representatives and a Schedule B to identify the assets and debts of the decedent.

Lee also prepared a “Consent to Appointment 16 The Reconstruction Report explains that, during a rolling retest, the Ignition Interlock device would have given an audible command for the operator to provide a breath sample. The Reconstruction Report indicates that the Ignition Interlock device asked Disney to perform a rolling retest at 12:46:33 p.m. on the day of the accident and that the first call reporting the collision to the police department’s 911 service occurred at 12:47:28 p.m., approximately a minute later. - 11 - of Personal Representative” identifying Purvey and Michael as personal representatives for both Russell and Chance as interested parties. At some point, Michael and Russell signed estate-related documents at a meeting with Lee; and, Purvey separately signed similar documents at a meeting with Lee. On February 14, 2017, six documents were filed in the Orphans’ Court.

First, the Small Estate Petition for Administration signed by Purvey and Michael was filed. The petition included a line for counsel to sign under oath. Lee signed the petition to look like Neverdon’s signature and did so with Neverdon’s knowledge and consent. Second, Schedule B, which was signed by Purvey and Michael, was filed.

Like the petition, Schedule B included a line for counsel to sign under oath and Lee signed Neverdon’s signature with Neverdon’s consent. Third, a Consent to Appointment signed by Russell was filed. Again, Lee signed the document with Neverdon’s signature with Neverdon’s consent. Fourth, a Consent to Appointment “purportedly signed by” Chance was filed.

Yet again, Lee signed the document for Neverdon with consent. Fifth, a second Consent to Appointment “purportedly signed by” Chance17 was filed, with Lee having signed for Neverdon, again with Neverdon’s consent. Sixth, a “List of Interested Persons,” containing the names of the four beneficiaries (the Clients), their relationship to Chase, and their last known addresses was filed. The list contained the purported signatures of each of the The hearing judge observed that “Chance’s signature and handwritten name on the 17 second Consent to Appointment [are] visibly different than her signature and handwritten name on the first Consent to Appointment.” - 12 - Clients.18 Although there was a place for counsel to sign under oath, Neverdon did not sign the list prior to its filing.

On May 15, 2017, the Register of Wills for Baltimore City sent Neverdon a “Delinquent Notice” concerning the failure to timely file a required “Information Report.”19 The personal representatives were copied. On June 6, 2017, the Orphans’ Court issued a show cause order to the personal representatives for the failure to file the Information Report. On June 7, 2017, the show cause order was mailed to Neverdon, Purvey, and Michael. After Purvey received the show cause order, she called Neverdon’s office and spoke with Lee.

Purvey eventually spoke with Neverdon, too, about the show cause order. On June 14, 2017, Lee spoke with Michael. After the conversation, Lee sent Michael a draft Information Report for his signature. Lee did not send Purvey a draft Information Report for her signature.

On June 22, 2017, Lee received the signed Information Report from Michael. At 1:38 p.m. that day, Lee sent an e-mail to Neverdon with the subject line “Chase (Response to Show Cause Order) URGENT URGENT URGENT” and the e-mail contained a draft of the response to the show cause order for Neverdon’s review. (Capitalization in original). The following day, the response was filed in the Orphans’ Court.

The response that was filed was identical to the draft that Lee sent to Neverdon, including typographical errors, 18 The hearing judge noted that “each signature on the List appears to be different than the signatures contained in the other five documents filed in the Orphans’ Court.” 19 According to Petitioner’s Exhibits 34 and 42, the Information Report was due on May 14, 2017. The Information Report is a document that would contain information about the decedent’s ownership, transfer, or interest in real or leasehold property in or outside of Maryland. - 13 - such as Chase’s middle name being misspelled and the word “response” in the title of the document being misspelled as “Respone.” The response included the following statement: The address given to this office for Mr. Willingham was his brother’s address. Unbeknownst to us, he no longer resides there. Also, the only phone number we had for him had changed.

Therefore, we had to wait for him to contact this office to update our records and make arrangements to get his signature on the Information Report. Lee signed the response to look like Neverdon’s signature and did so with Neverdon’s consent. On the same day, Lee filed the Information Report with the Register of Wills. The Information Report contained the purported signatures of the personal representatives, Purvey and Michael.

Michael’s signature was valid. Lee, however, falsified Purvey’s signature without her consent. With Neverdon’s consent, Lee signed the Information Report to look like Neverdon’s signature. Lee did not send copies of the Information Report to Purvey or Michael.

Settlement Dispute and Emergency Petition On July 11, 2017, Lee sent letters that he had originally drafted on June 22, 2017, to each of the Clients advising them of the $30,000 settlement offer. As to the settlement offer, Lee stated in the letters that “it is the maximum payout given the circumstances.” Lee also stated that the “office’s fees and expenses” and the funeral expenses would need to be reimbursed from the settlement proceeds and that the remainder would go into the Estate. Lee suggested that the Clients discuss the settlement offer. On July 14, 2017, MDH filed a claim against the Estate for $19,124.78 for medical expenses incurred by Chase from September 1, 2013 to January 31, 2017. - 14 - On July 19, 2017, Lee spoke with Michael and Chance about the settlement offer.

During the conversation, Lee indicated that he was attempting to arrange a meeting so that the personal representatives could sign the release. Lee had a similar telephone conversation with Purvey a couple of days later. During that conversation, Purvey indicated to Lee that she was not concerned with the money, but rather wanted to make sure that Disney was held accountable for Chase’s death. On July 26, 2017, Lee sent nearly identical letters to the Clients.

In the letters, Lee reiterated that Nationwide had made a $30,000 settlement offer. Lee stated that the amount was not much “consolation for the loss of your cousin’s life; however, it is all that is available at this time.” Lee incorrectly stated that, to the extent that a judgment was obtained against Disney and he had assets, “a lien can be placed against his property; however, the lien can only be enforced when and if [] Disney decides to sell the property. The court cannot force the sale of his personal or real property.” Lee informed the Clients of the $19,123.78 MDH lien. Lee asserted that Neverdon would “negotiate a pay-off so that you and all the remaining persons of interest will be able to walk away with some semblance of settlement for your loss.” Lee concluded the letters by stating that Neverdon had a greater chance of successfully negotiating the MDH lien if the Clients acted promptly to resolve the survival action.

On August 4, 2017, Lee sent a letter to the Anne Arundel County Police Department inquiring about the investigation into Chase’s death. On August 8, 2017, Lee sent a letter to the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney’s Office requesting an update on the possibility of criminal charges against Disney. On September 1, 2017, Lee met with the - 15 - Clients to obtain signatures on the release.20 During the meeting, Lee provided the release to Michael and Purvey and instructed them to read it and ask questions. Lee did not explain the content of the release.

Purvey again stated that she wanted Disney to be held responsible for Chase’s death. Lee tried to explain that Neverdon did not have control over whether the State brought charges against Disney. The meeting became contentious and Michael and Purvey refused to sign the release. Purvey pointed her finger at Lee and stated that “something just isn’t right.” Lee stepped out of the meeting to call Neverdon.

Neverdon instructed that Lee should end the meeting and return to the office21 and that all further communications with the Clients should be in writing. A few days later, on September 6, 2017, Lee sent nearly identical letters to each of the Clients. The letters contained much of the same information that had been included in the July 26, 2017 letters. In the letters, Lee stated that there appeared to be confusion about the scope of the representation.

Lee indicated that, per the retainer agreement, the law “office was retained to represent your family’s interest in two (2) matters and two (2) matters only, personal injury and Wills/Estate/& Trusts.” Lee also advised that Neverdon had obtained two outstanding payroll checks owed to Chase totaling $417.38. Lee discussed the possibility of filing suit against Disney personally and incorrectly stated that “a civil suit is very different than the personal injury matter we were retained to represent your family in.” Lee asserted that a contingency fee arrangement had been agreed on “because liability is clear and payment is, for the most part, assured.” Lee explained 20 Chance attended the meeting by telephone. 21 The meeting had occurred at Purvey’s home. - 16 - that attempting to secure payment of a judgment against a person “is not as simple and requires more time, up-front payment and potentially more expenses, including, but not limited to, private investigators.” Lee claimed that this was why a retainer payment would be required, explaining that a retainer payment could be between $2,500 and $10,000 depending on the circumstances. Lee explained that the office would deduct the hourly fee from the retainer payment until it was exhausted and that, once exhausted, “it is possible additional payment may be required. This office bills at $400 per hour.” Lee again asserted that it was difficult to collect a judgment against a person’s assets and incorrectly stated that a court could not “force him to sell any of it.” In the letters, Lee again discussed the liens against the Estate and that Neverdon could attempt to negotiate a reduction in the amount of the MDH lien.

Lee claimed, though, that it did “not make sense for us to begin negotiating a pay-off especially when we are unable to give them a time frame when they can expect payment for whatever the negotiated amount will be. After all, it appears that we are not getting cooperation from the Co-Personal Representatives.” Lee also discussed the concern that Disney had not been criminally charged. Lee explained that only the State’s Attorney’s Office, not Neverdon, had the ability to bring charges against Disney. Lee concluded the letters by stating that the law office had “done what it was retained to do” and stating that there was “nothing more for this office to do until we acquire the mandatory required signatures.” After receiving the letter, Michael felt pressure to settle the case, so on September 19, 2017, he went into Neverdon’s office and signed the release.

Lee was present at that - 17 - time; Neverdon was not. Around the same time, Lee told Michael that Neverdon intended to file a petition to remove Purvey as a personal representative due to her refusal to sign the release. On September 19, 2017, Lee drafted a letter to the Clients expressing frustration about Purvey’s refusal to sign the release and stating that Neverdon intended to file a petition to remove Purvey as a personal representative if she continued to refuse to sign the release. Although Lee e-mailed the draft letter to Neverdon for his review, the draft letter was never sent to the Clients.

On November 3, 2017, Neverdon filed in the Orphans’ Court an “Emergency Petition to Remove Marjorie Purvey as a Personal Representative.” In the emergency petition, Neverdon asserted that all other persons of interest agreed to remove Purvey as a personal representative “to proceed with resolving the outstanding asset.” Neverdon asserted that Purvey suffered from serious health conditions and had contacted his office more than once indicating that the stress related to the matter and the responsibilities of being a personal representative were not good for her health. Neverdon asserted that Purvey had stated that her physician recommended that she remove herself from serving as a personal representative. With Neverdon’s knowledge and consent, Lee signed the emergency petition and accompanying certificate of service to look like Neverdon’s signature. On November 15, 2017, the Orphans’ Court issued a show cause order requiring Purvey to respond in writing before December 15, 2017 as to why she should not be removed as a personal representative.

The Orphans’ Court instructed Neverdon to serve copies of the emergency petition on Purvey, or her attorney, by November 30, 2017. The - 18 - show cause order reduced Purvey’s role “to that of a special administrator,” which limited what she was able to do on behalf of the Estate. Neverdon did not serve the emergency petition and show cause order on Purvey until December 7, 2017 and did so by regular mail. On December 15, 2017, Purvey filed a response to the show cause order, requesting that the emergency petition be denied and that she remain a personal representative of the Estate.

The response was not sent to Neverdon. At some time between December 15, 2017 and January 10, 2018, Neverdon contacted the Orphans’ Court to request an update and learned that Purvey had filed a response to the show cause order. On January 10, 2018, Neverdon sent a letter to Purvey asserting that, during their last conversation, Purvey had clearly indicated that she was not happy with the co-personal representative relationship with Michael and that her family was not on the same page as she was, as they were concerned about money whereas she was seeking justice for Chase. Neverdon noted that the consent of all other interested persons, including Russell, Michael, and Chance, had been obtained22 and that Michael had signed the release.

Neverdon stated that, despite those circumstances, Purvey had remained “adamant” that she would not sign the release. Neverdon indicated that he had told Purvey that he would have no choice but to involve the Orphans’ Court because he “could not allow there to be competing positions to jeopardize the surviving heirs’ interests.” Neverdon imposed a deadline for Purvey to respond as to whether she would “cooperate” or whether he would “have no choice but to continue proceeding with trying to have [her] 22 Neverdon appeared to be indicating in his letter to Purvey that the consent to settle had been obtained from all interested persons. - 19 - removed as Personal Representative.” A few days later, on January 16, 2018, Lee had a telephone conference with Purvey and Clarice Brown, a person who had been assisting Purvey. Lee, Purvey, and Brown discussed Neverdon’s January 10, 2018 letter and Brown indicated that she would discuss the matter with Purvey and get back to Lee and Neverdon. Soon thereafter, Lee discovered that a grand jury in Anne Arundel County had approved charges against Disney.

Lee called Purvey to give her an update. On January 25, 2018, Lee sent a letter to Purvey advising that the State’s Attorney’s Office was bringing charges against Disney in connection with Chase’s death. Lee advised that, because Neverdon had not heard from Purvey about his earlier letter, Neverdon took the lack of response as an indication that Purvey would not sign the release and that he would “renew” the emergency petition to remove her as a personal representative. Lee sent similar letters to Michael, Russell, and Chance, stating that Neverdon intended to renew the emergency petition to remove Purvey as a personal representative.

Lee advised Michael, Russell, and Chance that if they did not contact Neverdon, their silence would be understood to mean that they agreed with seeking to remove Purvey. Sometime during the following week, Lee spoke with Brown by telephone and the two discussed making arrangements for Purvey to come to the office and sign the release. On February 5, 2018, Lee sent an e-mail to Brown confirming the details of the telephone call. The following day, accompanied by Brown and Brown’s husband, Purvey went into Neverdon’s office to sign the release.

Neverdon was not present. Lee did not explain the release and instead instructed Purvey to read it and ask any questions she might have. - 20 - Purvey signed the release. During the meeting, Lee told Purvey and Brown that a letter would be sent to MDH concerning its lien.23 On February 8, 2018, Nationwide sent a check in the amount of $30,000 to Neverdon’s office. On or before February 13, 2018, Lee received the check on Neverdon’s behalf.

On February 14, 2018, Lee sent letters to the Clients advising them that the settlement check had been received and that efforts were being made to have Purvey and Michael sign the check so that it could be deposited into escrow. In the letters, Lee advised the Clients that $7,000 of the settlement proceeds would be used to reimburse CEICO for funeral expenses and that $19,124.78 would be used to reimburse MDH. Lee also enclosed a copy of a document entitled “Claim Against the Estate” that Neverdon would be filing in the Orphans’ Court seeking $10,000 in attorney’s fees. Two days later, Michael went to the office and signed the settlement check.

Purvey was scheduled to go into the office the following day, but Brown called and told Lee that Purvey would not be able to make the appointment. On February 22, 2018, the Orphans’ Court sent a notice advising that a hearing on the emergency petition was scheduled for March 19, 2018. On or around March 18, 2018, Neverdon contacted the Orphans’ Court and asked the Court Administrator if it would be necessary for him to appear at the hearing on the emergency petition. Neverdon was advised that he did not need to appear.

On March 19, 2018, the Orphans’ Court held the scheduled hearing. Michael, Russell, and Purvey, who was accompanied by Brown, 23 On January 12, 2018, Lee sent a letter to MDH requesting that it waive or reduce its lien. - 21 - attended. Neverdon did not appear. During the hearing, the Orphans’ Court was advised that the release had been signed by Michael and Purvey, but that the recently received settlement check had not yet been signed by Purvey.

After the hearing, the Orphans’ Court issued an order in which it indicated that consideration of the emergency petition would be continued pending the filing of the signed release and settlement check by March 26, 2018. Between March 6 and 25, 2018, Neverdon, Lee, and Brown exchanged e-mails about rescheduling a time for Purvey to sign the settlement check. On March 26, 2018, Lee went to Purvey’s house and Purvey signed the settlement check. Sometime thereafter, the settlement check was deposited into Neverdon’s escrow account and Neverdon withdrew $10,000 from the escrow account as payment of his attorney’s fee.

On May 30, 2018, the Orphans’ Court issued a notice initially scheduling a hearing on the emergency petition for July 2, 2018; the court subsequently sent a notice rescheduling the hearing to July 30, 2018. Copies of the notices were sent to Neverdon, the Clients, and MDH. Sometime before July 30, 2018, the Orphans’ Court contacted Neverdon’s office inquiring as to whether Neverdon wanted to proceed with the hearing. Neverdon stated that he did not want to go forward, as Purvey had signed the release and settlement check.

As a result, the Orphans’ Court dismissed the emergency petition. Neither Neverdon nor Lee informed Purvey of the conversation with the Orphans’ Court or that the emergency petition had been dismissed. On July 30, 2018, Purvey and Brown appeared at the Orphans’ Court for the hearing and discovered that the emergency petition had been dismissed. Neverdon did not appear.

The following day, Brown e-mailed Neverdon and stated that Purvey had not heard from - 22 - him or Lee since March. Brown requested information about the purpose of the July 30, 2018 hearing and the status of MDH’s lien. Brown indicated that Purvey was “very fearful of contacting your office since her last phone call with [] Lee in which he released a tirade of yelling and screaming demeaning remarks.” Neverdon responded by e-mail the same day, informing Brown that he could not communicate with her and reminding her that if Purvey was not capable of performing the duties of personal representative, including communicating with counsel, then Purvey could file a motion to relieve herself of those duties. Neverdon did not discuss Lee’s behavior that Brown had mentioned.

On August 6, 2018, in another e-mail to Neverdon, Brown stated that Purvey believed herself capable of performing the duties of personal representative, including communicating with Neverdon. Neverdon responded by e-mail that day stating that all communications between him and Purvey should be in writing moving forward. Administration of the Estate As explained above, on March 20, 2017, CEICO provided notice of a lien against the Estate in the amount of $7,000 for funeral expenses for Chase. Lee was unaware that waiver or reduction of the lien was possible and Neverdon and Lee did not discuss the matter.

As such, no attempt was made to negotiate with CEICO about its lien. On July 14, 2017, MDH filed in the Orphans’ Court a notice of claim in the amount of $19,124.78 for medical expenses for Chase. During his representation of the Clients, Neverdon advised them several times that he would attempt to negotiate a waiver or reduction of MDH’s lien. To that end, on January 10, 2018, Lee sent a letter to MDH asking that it waive or reduce the lien.

On April 2, 2018, a representative from MDH e- - 23 - mailed Lee, advising that MDH was not able to waive or reduce the lien. The representative advised, though, that money spent on a headstone would qualify as an allowable deduction if the funeral expenses did not exceed $15,000. Sometime before June 20, 2018, Lee had telephone conversations with Michael, advising Michael of duties that he and Purvey were required to perform as personal representatives. The duties included opening a bank account for the Estate and depositing the settlement proceeds and two payroll checks into the account.

Sometime before September 1, 2018, Purvey and Michael picked up the paychecks from Lee, with the intent to open a bank account for the Estate and deposit the checks. At Purvey’s suggestion, she and Michael tried to open a bank account at a MECU Credit Union branch but were advised that the bank did not handle estate accounts. Purvey and Michael were not able to agree on a different bank for the Estate’s account. On October 5, 2018, Lee sent letters to Purvey and Michael concerning the administration of the Estate, reiterating information that he had previously given Michael concerning the responsibilities of the personal representatives, including the need to open a bank account for the Estate, deposit Chase’s payroll checks into the bank account, and disburse payments to lienholders.

Lee requested an update on the opening of a bank account and stated that Neverdon would not issue a check for the settlement proceeds until a bank account was opened. Lee indicated that, after the settlement proceeds were deposited, Purvey and Michael would be responsible for satisfying liens owed to CEICO and MDH. On December 28, 2018, Michael sent an affidavit to Neverdon advising that he no longer wanted to serve as a personal representative due to stress. - 24 - On December 31, 2018, Neverdon wrote a check for $20,000 payable to the Estate from his attorney trust account. Neverdon wrote “Settlement Proceeds minus atty fees” on the memo line of the check.

On January 3, 2019, Lee sent the check and a letter to Purvey. Lee requested an update on whether a bank account for the Estate had been opened and whether the personal representatives had deposited the paychecks into the account and contacted lienholders. Lee stated that MDH had rendered “free or reduced healthcare service to” Chase and that CEICO had paid Chase’s funeral expenses and, as such, both were “entitled to be reimbursed.” Lee also told Purvey of Michael’s desire to be removed as personal representative. At the conclusion of the letter, Lee stated: “As such, this will conclude the office’s services in this matter.” On the same day, Lee sent Michael a similar letter.

Lee acknowledged that Michael no longer wanted to serve as a personal representative but told Michael that he would remain a personal representative until the Orphans’ Court granted a motion.24 At the end of the letter, Lee wrote: “At this juncture, the office considers this matter now closed.” A few days later, on January 7, 2019, Lee sent letters to Russell and Chance advising of Michael’s request to be removed as a personal representative. On April 12, 2019, the Orphans’ Court sent notices to Neverdon, Purvey, and Michael advising them that they were required to file within thirty days a supplemental Schedule B identifying any additional assets obtained for the Estate, including automobile According to Lee’s letter to Michael, Neverdon had agreed to assist Michael 24 “gratis, as a friend of the court” in filing a petition requesting his removal as co-personal representative. - 25 - settlement proceeds. Over a year later, on September 17, 2020, Neverdon sent a letter to MDH requesting that MDH reduce its lien to $5,000 in light of a particular Maryland regulation.25 Neverdon learned of the regulation during the deposition of Bar Counsel’s expert in the disciplinary proceeding. On September 24, 2020, a representative from MDH e-mailed Neverdon advising that MDH would consider the regulation and the request to reduce its lien.

The hearing judge noted that, as of the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing, MDH had not responded to Neverdon’s request for a reduction of the lien. Additionally, the hearing judge found that the personal representatives had not opened a bank account for the Estate and that the $20,000 check that Lee sent to Purvey had not been cashed and that the funds remain in Neverdon’s escrow account. Bar Counsel’s Investigation On September 10, 2018, Purvey, with Brown’s assistance, filed a complaint against Neverdon with Bar Counsel. On September 19, 2018, Bar Counsel requested that Neverdon respond to the complaint by October 10, 2018.

In a letter dated October 10, 2018, Neverdon responded. In the response, among other things, Neverdon stated: “I was not formally retained to handle the Estate matter and 25 The regulation Neverdon referred to is Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 10.09.83.02F(1)(b), which concerns MDH’s recovery in subrogation claims and provides: (1) Except as provided in §§F(2)-(4) of this regulation, in satisfaction of the Department’s subrogation claim, the Department shall recover the lesser of: (a) The full amount of past medical costs paid by the Program; or (b) 50 percent of the judgment, award or settlement less attorney fees, litigation costs, and other deductions required by law. - 26 - act in the capacity of Personal Representative (PR), but rather, to help establish and open the estate.” Neverdon advised that he opened the Estate “as a courtesy” for the Clients. Neverdon also advised that, after being notified of the show cause order for failure to file an Information Report, his office prepared and submitted the report on behalf of the Clients “as a courtesy.” Additionally, in the response, Neverdon detailed telephone calls and a meeting he had with Purvey after the September 1, 2017 meeting (the meeting at which Michael and Purvey refused to sign the release). Neverdon asserted that, during those conversations, he informed Purvey that he would have “to seek the court’s guidance” after she refused to sign the release.

On March 29, 2019, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Neverdon requesting more information. Among other things, Bar Counsel requested documents concerning the receipt, maintenance, and disbursement of funds for the case. Bar Counsel requested information concerning whether Neverdon had advised Purvey to seek counsel when he determined he needed to file the emergency petition. In addition, Bar Counsel requested that Neverdon respond to the allegation that Purvey’s signature on the Information Report had been forged.

On April 11, 2019, Neverdon responded. As to the requested documentation, Neverdon provided Bar Counsel with copies of the $30,000 check received from Nationwide and the $20,000 check sent to Purvey. Neverdon did not provide, and has never provided, a copy of the check used to withdraw his attorney’s fee from his escrow account or a ledger for the case or his escrow account. As to whether Neverdon had advised Purvey to seek counsel, in the response, Neverdon mentioned conversations he supposedly - 27 - had with Purvey after the September 1, 2017 meeting.

Neverdon stated that he specifically informed Purvey that he was going to “seek removal o[f] your position as [personal representative] and if you believe that you don’t have an obligation to all of the other interested persons, you should seek the advice of counsel.” As to whether Purvey’s signature had been forged on the Information Report, Neverdon responded that Lee had obtained Purvey’s consent to sign her name. Neverdon attached to the response an affidavit from Lee to that effect. STANDARD OF REVIEW In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of law. See Md. R. 19-741(b)(2)(B); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Slate, 457 Md. 610, 626 , 180 A.3d 134, 144 (2018); Md. R. 19-741(b)(1).

This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a lawyer violated an MARPC. See Md. R. 19- 727(c). DISCUSSION (A) Findings of Fact Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Neverdon excepts to five of the hearing judge’s findings of fact.

For the following reasons, we overrule all of Neverdon’s exceptions. First, Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, while working at DPSCS, he worked in his law office approximately eight hours per week, “almost exclusively during the weekend and outside of normal business hours during the workweek.” Neverdon contends that his undisputed testimony - 28 - at the hearing was that he worked eight hours per week in his law office from Monday through Friday and that he worked additional hours in the law office on the weekends. In other words, it appears that Neverdon argues that the hearing judge erred in finding that he worked in his law office a total of approximately eight hours per week both outside of normal business hours during the week and on the weekend, i.e., Neverdon would like to be credited with having worked more hours in his law office. The hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Neverdon worked approximately eight hours in his law office during the weekend and outside of normal business hours during the week.

At the hearing, Neverdon testified extensively about his work hours at DPSCS and his law office. Neverdon repeatedly testified that he worked anywhere from five to eight hours per week, Monday through Friday, at his law office, and that he also worked in his law office additional hours on the weekend. Neverdon, however, never specified a number or an amount of hours that he worked in the law office on the weekend. For example, Neverdon testified: “And then over weekend when I could come in and put a few hours in on a Saturday or Sunday. . . .” Given that Neverdon testified that he worked five to eight hours in the office during the week and never indicated a total number of hours that he worked in the law office on weekends, it was not clearly erroneous for the hearing judge to find that Neverdon worked in the office for “approximately” 8 hours per week outside of normal business hours during the workweek and during the weekend.

Second, Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, in the demand letter to Nationwide, Lee made legal assertions and a policy limits demand. Neverdon contends - 29 - that his and Lee’s undisputed testimony at the hearing demonstrates that the demand letter—and all other letters—were narrated or dictated by Neverdon. Neverdon argues that the evidence shows that the recipients of letters knew that the correspondence was from him as the attorney and that the recipients were not confused as to who they were interacting with. Neverdon asserts that, in response to the demand letter, Nationwide acknowledged receiving his demand letter and Nationwide did not mention Lee at all.

We overrule Neverdon’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that Lee made legal assertions to Nationwide in a demand letter. It does not appear that Neverdon challenges that information in the demand letter constituted “legal assertions.” Rather, Neverdon’s complaint seems to be that he was responsible for drafting the letter, not Lee, and that the hearing judge erroneously attributed the content of the letter to Lee. Although the demand letter was written on the letterhead of “Law Office of Russell A. Neverdon, Sr., LLC,” the demand letter was signed only by Lee and the content of the letter in no way indicated that Lee was relaying information composed by Neverdon. Indeed, the hearing judge specifically found that Lee e-mailed Neverdon a draft of the demand letter before mailing it.

The hearing judge was not required to find based on Lee’s and Neverdon’s testimony that the demand letter was drafted by Neverdon. Nor does the circumstance that Nationwide responded in a form letter addressed to Neverdon indicate that Lee was not responsible for drafting the demand letter. The record demonstrates that Lee sent the demand letter under his signature and e-mailed Neverdon a draft of the demand letter before mailing it. As such, the hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Lee drafted the letter and made the legal assertions contained therein. - 30 - Third, Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that the Information Report admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 was the Information Report that was filed with the Register of Wills.

Rather, Neverdon contends that Respondent’s Exhibit 12A, which according to Neverdon is a “file-stamped copy of the same Information Report,” is the Information Report that was actually filed with the Register of Wills. We overrule Neverdon’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the Information Report admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 was the Information Report filed with the Register of Wills. The record reflects that, in various instances at the disciplinary hearing, both Bar Counsel and Neverdon’s counsel referred to Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 as the Information Report that was filed with the Register of Wills. During Bar Counsel’s direct examination of Purvey, the following exchange occurred: [BAR COUNSEL:] Okay, so let me show you Exhibit 42.

Now this is the Information Report that was ultimately filed. Did you meet with [] Neverdon in June of 2017? [PURVEY:] See it’s been quite a while, but I only met with [] Neverdon the first time and the second with the brothers, and then when he asked me the third time, did Michael give me $500. That’s coming to me too. He also asked me who did I think had the car or the truck, and I hesitated and I said I feel it could be Michael. [BAR COUNSEL:] Ma’am, did you ever authorize [] Neverdon or [] Lee to sign your name to a report to be filed with the Orphan[s’] Court? [PURVEY:] No, I would never do that.

This exchange reflects that Bar Counsel identified Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 as the document that was ultimately filed. There was no objection from Neverdon’s counsel. More importantly, in closing argument, Neverdon’s counsel specifically referenced Petitioner’s - 31 - Exhibit 42 as the document that was filed, stating: “And the document that he actually filed was the document that was signed in the beginning. That was the actual Information Report which is Exhibit No. 42.

That was the one that was signed by [] Purvey in the beginning.” At the disciplinary hearing, Neverdon’s counsel appeared to argue that Purvey’s signature was not forged on either Petitioner’s Exhibit 42, which had been filed with the Register of Wills, or Respondent’s Exhibit 12A. In the exceptions, though, Neverdon appears to argue that the hearing judge was clearly erroneous in finding that Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 was the document filed with the Register of Wills and that the document contains stray marks (which Respondent’s Exhibit 12A does not) that, according to Neverdon, led to the hearing judge erroneously determining that Purvey’s signature had been forged. Regardless of this contention, the record reflects that, at the hearing, Neverdon’s counsel did not object to Bar Counsel’s question to Purvey which included the assertion that Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 was the document that was filed with the Register of Wills and, in closing argument, Neverdon’s counsel stated that Petitioner’s Exhibit 42 had been filed with the Register of Wills. Under these circumstances, the hearing judge’s finding of fact was not clearly erroneous.

Fourth, Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, after receiving the September 6, 2017 letter, Michael felt pressured to settle the case. Neverdon contends that, at the hearing, Michael actually testified that he felt pressure to settle the case due to stress caused by Purvey and disparaging statements made by Purvey, not because Neverdon or the law office pressured him. We overrule Neverdon’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding, as the hearing - 32 - judge did not clearly err in finding that, after receiving the September 6, 2017 letter, Michael felt pressured to settle the case. A review of the record indicates that the September 6, 2017 letter sent to Michael was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 57C during the disciplinary hearing.

On direct examination, Michael was shown Petitioner’s Exhibit 57C and responded that he recognized the letter. Immediately thereafter, Bar Counsel asked whether Michael felt “any pressure from [] Lee or [] Neverdon to settle the case[.]” Michael responded: “Yes, because they couldn’t get anywhere with [] Purvey.” Michael went on to describe the problems that he felt existed between Purvey and Lee and Neverdon. Later, during cross-examination, although Michael had previously indicated that he recognized Petitioner’s Exhibit 57C, he responded to a question from Neverdon’s counsel, who asked whether he recalled seeing the letter, that he did not remember seeing the letter. In response to an additional question from Neverdon’s counsel, however, Michael stated that he felt pressure from both Lee and Purvey to settle the matter.

Lee, of course, signed the September 6, 2017 letter. Given this testimony, it was not clearly erroneous for the hearing judge to find that Michael felt pressure to settle the case following receipt of the September 6, 2017 letter. In light of Michael’s testimony on direct examination that he recognized the letter and that he felt pressure from both Neverdon and Lee to settle the matter and his confirmation on cross-examination that he felt pressure from Lee to settle, the hearing judge’s finding is not clearly erroneous. Fifth, Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “no attempts were ever made to negotiate with CEICO on its lien.” Neverdon contends that, at the hearing, he “advised” the hearing judge that he had informed the Clients that he would negotiate a - 33 - reduction of the liens.

Neverdon points out that, after the hearing, CEICO agreed to reduce its lien from $7,000 to $2,500. At bottom, Neverdon does not claim that there is evidence supporting a finding that he attempted to negotiate with CEICO to reduce its lien. Neverdon simply states that he advised the hearing judge that he told the Clients that he would negotiate and that, after the disciplinary hearing, CEICO indeed reduced its lien. Nothing in Neverdon’s assertion conflicts with the hearing judge’s factual finding.

(B) Conclusions of Law Bar Counsel and Neverdon both have exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that we address below. MARPC 1.1 (Competence) and MARPC 1.3 (Diligence) The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon’s conduct violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 in several ways but concluded as well that some of his conduct did not violate MARPC 1.1 or 1.3. The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 in the manner in which he investigated and prosecuted the survival action. The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon failed to provide competent representation and to act with adequate diligence in investigating matters related to the survival action before recommending the settlement offer to the Clients.

Specifically, the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon failed to: (1) interview the witnesses to the accident; (2) investigate the viability of a claim for pre-impact fright; (3) conduct an adequate investigation into whether Jason Disney had assets or other means to pay a judgment; (4) - 34 - investigate the identity of Daryl Disney, the insured, to determine if there was a potential claim to be made against him; and (5) obtain and analyze the Reconstruction Report. The hearing judge noted that, although he accepted Neverdon’s testimony that he (Neverdon) conducted online research into whether Jason Disney owned real property, Neverdon’s “actions were simply insufficient for a case of this type and magnitude.” The hearing judge also concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 by sending the letters of July 26, 2017 and September 6, 2017 to the Clients that contained incorrect statements of law. Among other things, in the September 6, 2017 letter, Neverdon incorrectly stated that a civil lawsuit would be very different than the personal injury matter that he had already been retained to represent the Clients in and that a retainer fee would be required, despite the circumstance that the engagement agreements did not require such a fee. The hearing judge noted that, in both letters, Neverdon incorrectly stated that a court could not force Disney to sell any of his assets if a judgment were obtained against him.

The hearing judge determined that these incorrect statements were made “during a critical period” when the Clients were seeking Neverdon’s advice as to whether or not to execute the release provided by Nationwide. In addition, the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to recognize or inform the Clients of a conflict of interest with respect to their signing of the release and the filing of the emergency petition (to remove Purvey as a co- personal representative). The hearing judge concluded that, after Michael signed the release and Purvey refused to sign the release, Neverdon should have recognized that a conflict of interest existed and that he needed to advise the Clients of as much. The hearing - 35 - judge concluded that Neverdon failed to advise at least three of the Clients of their right to seek outside counsel, he failed to advise the Clients of his potential obligation to withdraw from the representation due to the conflict, and he failed to obtain the informed, written consent of the Clients to his continued representation.

The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 by failing to make any effort to negotiate a waiver or reduction of the CEICO lien, even though the lien was directly related to the survival action and fell within the scope of the representation. The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 by failing to appear at the March 19, 2018 and July 30, 2018 hearings in the Orphans’ Court on the emergency petition. The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to adequately advise the Clients as to management of the Estate. The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon failed to provide any guidance to Michael and Purvey “as to how they should handle two lienholders when the liens were greater than the assets available” and failed to instruct the Clients that they could attempt negotiations with the lienholders or take other legal steps to resolve the matter.

By contrast, the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon did not violate MARPC 1.1 or 1.3 with respect to negotiation of a reduction in the MDH lien. According to the hearing judge, Neverdon attempted to negotiate with MDH about its lien and “arguably, still continues to attempt to negotiate the lien.” The hearing judge stated that Bar Counsel had not provided authority that an attorney in a wrongful death or survival action is responsible for “negotiating every debt that the estate may have[.]” According to the hearing judge, Bar Counsel had “not proven that [Neverdon] was responsible for negotiating the MDH - 36 - lien.” The hearing judge also concluded that Neverdon did not violate MARPC 1.1 or 1.3 by filing the Information Report late. In so concluding, the hearing judge “accept[ed]” the testimony of Chief Judge Lewyn Scott Garrett of the Orphans’ Court, who testified that it is not unusual for an information report to be filed late, that a show cause order is sometimes sent as a reminder, and that no adverse action is taken unless a party fails to file the information report after a hearing on the show cause order. The Parties’ Exceptions Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Neverdon did not violate MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 with respect to failing to negotiate a reduction or waiver of the MDH lien.

Bar Counsel contends that, as the attorney for the Estate, Neverdon “was obligated to act competently and diligently to reduce the” MDH lien, “a task clearly within the scope of the representation.” Bar Counsel argues that, on July 14, 2017, MDH provided notice to Neverdon, as the attorney for the Estate, of its lien and, on July 26, 2017, Neverdon, through Lee, advised the Clients that he would negotiate a pay-off of the MDH lien. Bar Counsel asserts that, at the hearing, its expert witness testified that a competent and diligent attorney would have requested from MDH a detailed list of the services rendered, evaluated whether any statute of limitations barred any portion of the MDH lien, and demanded a reduction of the lien pursuant to Maryland Regulations. Bar Counsel maintains that Neverdon did none of these things and instead sent only one letter to MDH requesting a reduction or waiver of the lien and took no further action. For his part, Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to investigate matters relevant to the survival action.

Neverdon - 37 - contends that, although there may have been other or additional methods of investigation, his testimony demonstrated that he investigated, analyzed information he discovered, and considered options on behalf of the Clients and the Estate. Neverdon also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to attempt to negotiate the reduction or waiver of the CEICO lien. Neverdon argues that his undisputed testimony revealed he attempted to negotiate the reduction or waiver of the lien, continuing through the disciplinary hearing. Neverdon states that, as of the date of the exceptions, he has secured a reduction of the CEICO lien from $7,000 to $2,500.

Neverdon excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to appear at a hearing in the Orphans’ Court and asserts that his uncontroverted testimony demonstrated that he was excused by the Orphans’ Court from attending hearings. Neverdon maintains that his testimony is supported by testimony from the clerk of the Orphans’ Court and the Chief Judge of the Orphans’ Court, who testified that his presence was excused. Neverdon also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.3 and contends that he immediately opened the Estate and took steps to institute a claim against Disney’s insurance company and to determine what other insurances or monies existed. Neverdon argues that the late filing of the Information Report did not interfere with the administration of the Estate.

He also asserts that, even through the disciplinary proceedings, he has continued to work with Michael and Purvey to negotiate a reduction of the liens against the Estate. Discussion “An attorney shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent - 38 - representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” MARPC 1.1. “Incompetent representation occurs when an attorney fails to take necessary, fundamental steps in a client’s case[,]” and, among other things, may occur where “an attorney fails to appear in court on a client’s behalf[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 288 , 218 A.3d 757 , 767 (2019) (cleaned up). With respect to estate matters generally, this Court has stated that, once attorneys “choose to insert [themselves] into the estate administration process as counsel . . . , [they are] obligated to do so competently.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 462 Md. 209 , 198 A.3d 835 (2018) (cleaned up).

MARPC 1.3 provides that “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” In this case, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Neverdon did not violate MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 by failing to negotiate a reduction or waiver of the MDH lien. The record reflects that Neverdon undertook representation in the survival action, as well as the Estate matter on behalf of the Clients. Although the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon was not obligated to attempt to negotiate every debt in connection with his representation of the Clients, it appears that, in reaching this conclusion, the hearing judge did not take into account that Neverdon was responsible for representing the Clients with respect to the Estate matter as well as the survival action and that Neverdon had advised the Clients that he would attempt to negotiate a reduction of the MDH lien. Just as the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 with respect to the failure to attempt to negotiate the CEICO lien, and, in doing so, - 39 - recognized that it was Neverdon’s responsibility to negotiate the CEICO lien, the same rationale applies with respect to the MDH lien.

The record reflects that Neverdon was aware of the MDH lien against the Estate and made a very minimal attempt to negotiate the lien, after advising the Clients that he would attempt to do so. The sole action taken by Neverdon prior to learning from Bar Counsel’s expert of the existence of a potentially applicable COMAR regulation was to send the letter of January 10, 2018, requesting a reduction or waiver of the lien. In response to the letter, MDH notified Neverdon via an e- mail to Lee on April 2, 2018 that a waiver or reduction would not be possible, but an allowance could be made for the cost of a headstone if the total cost of the funeral permitted. Neverdon’s next contact with MDH came on September 17, 2020, over two and a half years later, as a result of his learning through Bar Counsel’s expert of a potentially applicable COMAR regulation.

In other words, after learning of the MDH lien and promising to attempt to negotiate a reduction or waiver, Neverdon’s sole action for over two and a half years was to send the letter of January 10, 2018. The existence of the MDH lien in the amount of $19,124.78 was critical because Nationwide had advised that the policy limit was $30,000 and after Neverdon’s fee of $10,000 was taken, only $20,000 would have remained of the settlement proceeds to satisfy both the MDH and CEICO liens. In other words, the combination of the liens and Neverdon’s fee exceeded the settlement amount. At a minimum, as Bar Counsel’s expert testified, Neverdon should have requested from MDH a list of the services comprising the lien amount and made greater efforts to seek a reduction in or waiver of the amount due.

For all of these reasons, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exception. - 40 - We overrule Neverdon’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions that he violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 by failing to adequately investigate the survival action and negotiate the CEICO lien.26 With respect to investigation of the survival action and negotiation of the CEICO lien, the hearing judge’s conclusions are supported by clear and convincing evidence. There is no indication in the record, and Neverdon does not claim in his exceptions, that he interviewed witnesses to the accident. Similarly, although Daryl Disney was identified as the person insured by Nationwide, there is no indication that Neverdon attempted to investigate any circumstances related to Daryl Disney. And, in his exceptions, Neverdon acknowledges that he did not review the Reconstruction Report.

As to the CEICO lien, when questioned about his opinion regarding Neverdon’s effort to negotiate a reduction of the lien, Bar Counsel’s expert witness, Paul Bekman, Esq., observed that he did not see any indication that Neverdon had ever written to CEICO. In his exceptions, Neverdon advises that, after the disciplinary hearing, CEICO has agreed to reduce its lien from $7,000 to $2,500. As such, Neverdon confirms in his exceptions that, at the time of the disciplinary hearing, the lien had not been reduced, and does not advise of any specific action on his part to achieve the result. The hearing judge was not obligated to accept Neverdon’s vague and uncorroborated testimony that he attempted to reduce the lien. 26 Also, in his exceptions, Neverdon advises that he opened the Estate immediately and he seemingly excepts to a conclusion that the Information Report was untimely filed.

Although Neverdon has raised these issues, a review of the hearing judge’s opinion does not reveal a determination that Neverdon violated either MARPC 1.1 or 1.3 by failing to timely open the Estate or by filing the Information Report late. - 41 - Overall, Neverdon failed to take necessary and basic steps during the course of the representation to pursue the Clients’ case and we overrule his exception with respect to MARPC 1.1 and 1.3.27 In addition, although Neverdon raised numerous arguments in his exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions as to MARPC 1.1 and 1.3, Neverdon did not challenge the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 by sending the letters of July 26, 2017 and September 6, 2017 to the Clients with incorrect information, a conclusion which is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Nor did Neverdon except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to recognize the conflict of interest. As explained below, the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest), and the conclusion is supported by clear and convincing evidence. As such, the hearing judge’s conclusion that Neverdon’s failure to recognize the conflict of interest constituted a violation of MARPC 1.1 is also supported by clear and convincing evidence. 27 We sustain Neverdon’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.1 by failing to appear at two hearings in the Orphans’ Court and conclude that there is not clear and convincing evidence supporting the hearing judge’s conclusions that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.3 in connection with the hearings.

In the findings of fact, the hearing judge expressly found that, as to the March 19, 2018 hearing, Neverdon was explicitly advised by an employee of the Orphans’ Court that he did not need to appear. As to the July 30, 2018 hearing, the hearing judge expressly found that Neverdon had been contacted by a representative of the Orphans’ Court and he advised the person that he did not want to proceed with the hearing given that Purvey had signed both the release and settlement check by that time. - 42 - MARPC 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney) The hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.2(a) 28 with respect to the signing of the release by “not abiding by the Clients’ desire to not settle the” survival action and the personal representatives’ refusal to sign the release, and instead “proceed[ing] on a course of action apparently designed to coerce the Clients into settling the matter.” Neverdon does not expressly except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.2(a) in the manner described above. Instead, unlike with other exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, where Neverdon expressly states that he “takes exception[,]” here, Neverdon references MARPC 1.2 without specifically mentioning the hearing judge’s conclusions or an exception thereto and provides his views about matters related to the settlement and his representation of the Clients. Among other things, Neverdon observes that Michael accepted the settlement offer after it was communicated to him (Michael) that an investigation of whether the insurance policy had a value of $100,000 was not fruitful.

To the extent that Neverdon’s remarks may be viewed as an exception, we overrule it. It is undisputed that Lee met with the Clients on September 1, 2017 regarding having 28 MARPC 1.2(a) provides in relevant part: [A]n attorney shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. An attorney may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. An attorney shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. - 43 - the personal representatives sign the release.

As the hearing judge pointed out, the facts are also undisputed that the personal representatives refused, at that time, to sign the release, and that the letter of September 6, 2017 was sent to the Clients containing inaccurate legal information in an attempt to persuade the Clients to settle. Indeed, the hearing judge determined that the letter “contained legal inaccuracies that likely misled the Clients as to how they should proceed and, thereby, exerted pressure on the Clients to settle.” We agree. Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.2(a). MARPC 1.4 (Communication) Without specifying a subsection, the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.4 by failing to provide information to the Clients “about what investigative steps had not yet been taken” at the time that he presented Nationwide’s settlement offer, as that information “was reasonably necessary for the Clients to make an informed decision regarding the settlement offer.” The hearing judge also concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.4 by providing incorrect legal information to the Clients in the July 26, 2017 and September 6, 2017 letters, which “prevented the Clients from making informed decisions regarding the settlement.” And, the hearing judge concluded that Neverdon violated MARPC 1.4 as to his communications with the Clients about how to handle the MDH and CEICO liens, as Neverdon provided “the Clients essentially zero guidance on how to handle the payment of the liens, other than to tell the Clients that the - 44 - lienholders were legally entitled to be paid.”29 Again, without indicating that he is excepting, Neverdon provides information that appears to contradict the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.4.

Among other things, Neverdon states that he “made great efforts in communicating with” the Clients by phone, e-mail, through letters, and, as to Purvey, by making house calls. Overall, Neverdon provides general information about actions he and Lee took to communicate with the Clients and particularly Purvey, such as providing their cell phone numbers and through other contact. In his remarks, Neverdon does not discuss the conclusion that he violated MARPC 1.4 by providing incorrect legal information in the letters of July 26, 2017 and September 6, 2017. To the extent that