Taylor v. State

WILNER, J. On what was labeled an Agreed Statement of Facts, petitioner, Shanquon Taylor, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of second degree rape and second degree assault and sentenced to an aggregate of seven years in prison, all but three years of which was suspended. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, and we granted certiorari to consider three issues: (1) whether the trial court acted properly in rendering a verdict on what was actually a statement of stipulated evidence that contained a significant dispute of material fact requiring, for its resolution, credibility determinations; (2) whether a statement made by Taylor to the police that was referenced in the statement of stipulated evidence was involuntary under Maryland common law and should have been suppressed; and (3) whether that statement to the police was also inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). It will not be necessary for us to reach the third issue, which was neither raised nor decided in the Circuit Court. BACKGROUND The Incident and Arrest On June 1, 2002, just a few weeks after they first met, Taylor and Ms. Carter made a date to go to a movie at Iverson Mall.

When it turned out that Taylor did not have sufficient funds to purchase two tickets, they opted to go instead to Taylor’s apartment and watch a movie on video. At the time, Taylor, 19 years old, was under the care and custody of the Department of Social Services and was living in a group home as part of his participation in a counseling program known as Take Charge. 1 While at the apartment, petitioner ³⁸⁸ and Ms. Carter engaged in sexual intercourse. The circumstances under which that occurred were in dispute — Taylor claimed that it was, eventually, consensual, whereas Ms. Carter claimed that she was raped. Upon leaving the apartment, Ms. Carter called 911 and reported that she had been raped.

Presumably in response to that report, Detective Schreiber, several days later, went to Taylor’s apartment to investigate, but Taylor apparently refused to speak with him or accompany him to the police station. 2 About a week after that incident, Taylor left the group home (and the Take Charge Program) and went to live with an uncle in North Carolina. On June 16, 2002, a warrant was issued for his arrest. At some point in late July, Taylor was arrested in North Carolina — apparently for an incident that occurred there — and, on August 3, 2002, upon discovery of the Maryland warrant, he was transported by car from North Carolina to the police station in Prince George’s County, a trip that took between seven and eight hours, during which he was given nothing to eat or drink. The Interview and Statement Upon arrival, around 5:30 p.m., Taylor was given food and drink and then was interviewed by Detective Schreiber.

The four-hour interview was videotaped. The backdrop of the interview and the arrest warrant that triggered it was Ms. Carter’s complaint that the sexual intercourse was not consen ³⁸⁹ sual but was committed against her will and upon Taylor’s threat that he had a weapon, coupled with Taylor’s alleged acknowledgment to three of his counselors that he had engaged in “sex” with a woman and had forcibly prevented her from leaving his apartment. After some preliminary questions, Schreiber gave Taylor the Miranda advice and warnings. The first warning was the right to remain silent.

In that regard, Schreiber said: “If you choose to give up that right anything you say can be used against you in court. Now, this sort of has I think bad wording, okay, but it says it can be used against you in court, but anything you say also can be used for you in court because I don’t really try to take sides. Okay? (Emphasis added).

After completion of the advice of rights, Taylor acknowledged that he had not been promised anything or threatened in any way and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Following a short break, Taylor inquired when his “court date” would be. Schreiber responded that he did not know, but advised that “after we speak or don’t speak or whatever goes I’ll walk you back over to the commissioner’s office. You’ll have a hearing in front of the commissioner in reference to the charges, and then the commissioner will look at your record.” Schreiber explained that the commissioner would decide whether Taylor would be released on his own personal recognizance, have to post bond, or be denied bond and that, if he had to post bond, he would be transferred to the county jail, at which point he could contact friends or relatives to come and post bond.

Schreiber informed Taylor that, if he was not released, he would appear before a judge on Monday (the interview took place on Saturday) for a bail review. When asked by Taylor what he thought would happen — whether the commissioner might release petitioner until his trial date — Schreiber said that he did not know, that there were lots of commissioners and they reach different decisions. He added: “Okay. But there’s nothing that — you know, we speak and you’re pretty forthright and you’re pretty truthful to me I ³⁹⁰ can always make a recommendation to the commissioner; you know, say Mr. Taylor was pretty cooperative with me this evening, you know, he didn’t give me any trouble, and then that can assist them in making whatever decisions they make.

Okay? So, you know, I mean, if you — and I don’t have any problem doing that, okay, but if you get in here and you jerk me around and you pull my leg and I know you’re lying to me, you know what I mean, then I’m not going to — I wouldn’t say anything to him at all. Okay?” (Emphasis added). At that point, Schreiber began asking Taylor about what occurred.

Taylor said that when they got to his apartment, they went into his bedroom, sat on the bed, and engaged in “small talk.” At some point, he began rubbing her arm. After a bit, Ms. Carter got up, went to the mirror to fix her hair, and pulled up her skirt, exposing her “butt.” At petitioner’s request, she did that again and then got back on the bed. Taylor hugged her, and they laid down face to face and continued talking. Taylor told her that he wanted to have sex, but she declined and then asked if he was angry.

He said that he was not and that he wanted her to stay, so she got back on the bed. They gave each other back massages, but she again declined Taylor’s invitation to have sex. Taylor, believing that she was teasing him, was annoyed and sat up on the bed. At that point, according to Taylor, she changed her attitude.

She said “come on” and “pulled down her drawers, honest to God, pulled down her drawers, lifted up her skirt, lifted her legs over, laid on the bed like this (indicating). She was like hurry up. She like you got a condom. I was like yeah.

She like hurry up.” Taylor added: “I was like I ain’t going to have sex with you with that attitude. She was like come on, come on. I’m like all right. And then all of a sudden when I was having sex with her like — I’d say like a couple of minutes into it then she said— then she was looking at me and she was like boy, hurry up. ³⁹¹ I was like damn, why you got to be all aggressive, and then she looked at me and as soon as I finished 1 pulled out.

Even though I had a condom on I pulled out and then she looked at me and she said you know this is rape. I was like huh.” According to Taylor, Ms. Carter pulled up her drawers, pulled down her skirt, got her pocketbook, and left. Taylor got dressed and followed her, asserting that “I didn’t rape you.” He walked her to a bus stop and she finally said that everything was all right — “It’s all good. It’s cool.” Schreiber then wanted Taylor to put his statement in writing and, after some reluctance on Taylor’s part, he was able to persuade Taylor to do so.

Taylor asked to be taken to the commissioner on several occasions, but Schreiber stressed the importance of having the statement in writing. Before proceeding with a written statement, Taylor twice revisited the prospect of Schreiber’s assisting him with the commissioner. He first asked, “[i]f the commissioner does decide — if you put in a good word for me and the commissioner does decide to let me go will you take me to the metro station if he decided to let me go,” to which he did not get a clear reply. He then asked “[i]f I do this and everything be straight can you talk to him for me, man, for real,” to which Schreiber responded, “You know, like I say, so long as you’re straight for me, okay, then I’ll talk to the commissioner and just say — let the commissioner know that you cooperated and, you know, that’s the most the police can do.” He added, “I can’t say let him go.

I can’t — that’s not up to the police. Okay. So, you know, I know you want to go home. I can tell that.

Okay. You know, I just want to make sure you get the opportunity to ... tell your side of the story, okay, and, you know, we’ll go from there.” Taylor then gave a written statement which, after further questioning regarding it, he signed. Further Proceedings The record is not entirely clear with respect to the next succeeding events. There is some evidence that, upon being presented before the commissioner on August 3, Taylor was ³⁹² charged with first degree rape, denied bond, and committed to jail pending a trial on September 30, 2002.

On that day, the case was nol prossed and he was released. Detective Schreiber immediately filed a new Statement of Charges, however, and Taylor was promptly re-arrested. A seven-count indictment was returned on October 22, 2002, charging first and second degree rape, third and fourth degree sexual offense, first and second degree assault, and false imprisonment. Taylor moved to suppress the statement he had given.

Although the videotape of the four-hour interview was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing, it was not played in full and no transcript was then available, so Detective Schreiber was forced to rely on his memory. 3 He was questioned at some length about what he told Taylor regarding the commissioner, and, although conceding that he usually will tell the commissioner if a defendant is truthful and cooperative, he denied leading Taylor to believe that he would help him if Taylor told his side of the story. Taylor’s attack on the voluntariness of the statement was based primarily on his allegedly fragile mental state, coupled with the fact that the interview occurred on the heels of a seven or eight hour trip from North Carolina during which he had nothing to eat or drink. Only in passing did defense counsel complain as well that Schreiber said that he “may go to the commissioner and implied that there was a possibility, although we all know it wasn’t a possibility, that Mr. Taylor would go home from there and not go to the correctional center.” At no point did counsel complain about, or even mention, Schreiber’s statement, in reciting the Miranda warnings, that anything said by Taylor could be used for, as well as against, him in court. The court accepted Schreiber’s testimony that he merely explained the various options open to the commissioner, one of which, however unlikely, would be to release Taylor.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, ³⁹³ the court concluded that Taylor was properly advised of his rights, that he voluntarily waived those rights, and that the statement was admissible. Presumably because counsel never raised the issue, the court made no specific ruling on whether the Miranda warnings were compromised because of Schreiber’s statement that anything said by Taylor could be used for or against him. The lingering, and really predominant, issue raised by Taylor was whether he was competent to stand trial, and, when the court found that he was competent, the prosecutor and defense counsel signed a document entitled “Agreed Statement of Facts,” which, in fact, was not an agreed statement of facts. It was, instead, a recitation of Ms. Carter’s version of the event and a statement, captioned “Additional facts,” that contained some statements of fact, some statements of what Taylor had told three of his counselors, and some of what he had said in his written statement.

The first part of the document was captioned “According to Carter.” In that part, the document stated that Ms. Carter agreed to go to Taylor’s apartment to watch videos, that for about an hour they talked and watched videos, that during that time, Taylor began kissing Ms. Carter and slowly pushed her down onto the bed, that she asked him to stop but that he forcibly pushed her on the bed and continued to kiss and fondle her, and that she ran into the bathroom hoping to cool his ardor. When she returned from the bathroom, Taylor continued his attempt to have sexual intercourse, and again she demurred, telling him that she was menstruating and had not known him long enough to sleep with him. The statement continued that Taylor became angry, implied that Ms. Carter was a female impersonator, and said that she could not leave until she proved that she was not a man. According to Ms. Carter, Taylor went to his closet, reached in, and implied that he had a weapon by placing a towel over his hand and saying it was a gun.

She was in fear of immediate harm. He then forced her to have vaginal intercourse, against her will and without her consent, for about six ³⁹⁴ to seven minutes, during which time she continued to resist. They then got dressed and left the apartment together. Taylor told her that he was part of a “mob” and would hurt her and her son if she told anyone what had occurred.

In the “Additional facts” section, the document recited that Taylor had been living in a group home and that, on June 3, 2000 — two days after the incident — he told three of his counselors that he was not returning to the group home, that he had been with a woman who refused his advances, that she tried to leave, and that “he forcibly prevented her from leaving and that he had sex with her.” The document then recounted that, on August 3, 2002, Taylor was brought by North Carolina sheriffs to Prince George’s County, that the trip took seven to eight hours during which Taylor was given nothing to eat or drink but that he was given food and drink prior to his interrogation by Detective Schreiber. The statement continued, in relevant part: “Schreiber had Taylor sign and waive his Miranda rights, talk with him and write a statement where he wrote and said that he had consensual sexual intercourse with Carter. In his written statement, Taylor acknowledged that Carter had said she had been raped. He wrote T brought up the subject about sex she said no so I let it go and set up on the bed.

And she ask me was I mad at her I said no. So time went by and I brought It up again about sex, she said no again, so she ask was I mad. I said no, so she said boy come on and heary up [sic ]. So I went to get a condom and when I came back we did it, had sex.

And after sex she said boy you rape me.’ ” That document was the only evidence presented to the court. 4 Everyone recognized that the agreed statement went only to Counts 2 through 7 of the indictment and did not pertain to the first degree rape charge in Count 1, which was eventually nol prossed. During argument, defense counsel ³⁹⁵ conceded second degree assault. 5 The court recognized the unusual posture of the case — a supposed agreed statement of facts “where you have a complainant that says one thing and a defendant that says another thing” and that “[cjritical to that determination is obviously the fact-finder’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of that witness and obviously make a determination based on those observations; whether, one is more credible than the other.” It added that it was presented “remarkably, with a two-page statement that I’m supposed to glean from this two-page statement who might be telling the truth and who might not be telling the truth.” Nonetheless, the court concluded that Ms. Carter’s version, corroborated by Taylor’s admission that he did, indeed, have sexual intercourse with her, sufficed to establish both second degree rape and second degree assault. The second degree assault, founded on the forcible push to the bed, was based as well on counsel’s concession as to that charge. The court found Taylor not guilty of the other remaining charges — third and fourth degree sexual offense, first degree assault, and false imprisonment.

Taylor appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, complaining, among other things, that (1) the trial court erred in convicting him based on an agreed statement of facts that left material facts in dispute, and (2) his statement to Detective Schreiber should have been suppressed because (i) Schreiber’s advice that anything Taylor said could be used for, as well as against, him constituted a violation of Miranda ,, and (ii) Schreiber’s offer to make a recommendation to the commissioner if Taylor cooperated constituted an improper inducement that made the statement involuntary. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed. As to the alleged Agreed Statement of Facts, the court recognized that the document was actually in the form of stipulated evidence. Rather than focusing on the clear conflict as to whether the admitted sexual intercourse was consensual, ³⁹⁶ however, the court looked only to see if “the evidence presented” in the document “was adequate to support the court’s findings,” and concluded that it was