Knight v. State

⁵²² HARRELL, J. These two otherwise unconnected cases, Sirbaugh v. State, No. 94, September Term 2003, and Knight v. State, No. 93, September Term 2003, each present the question of whether an interrogating officer’s assumedly truthful promise to a criminal suspect to report to the prosecuting authority that the suspect cooperated with an investigation is an improper inducement that renders a subsequent statement by that suspect involuntary under Maryland non-constitutional law and, therefore, inadmissible at trial. Petitioner Steven Daniel Sirbaugh was told by police officers that if he cooperated during a custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers would inform the State’s Attorney “that when we asked a question he answered it.” Sirbaugh then confessed to driving the getaway car in a 29 October 2000 robbery of a convenience store in Owings Mills, Maryland. Although he sought to exclude this confession from coming into evidence at his trial, he failed. Based in large measure on his confession, Sirbaugh was convicted of robbery.

Petitioner Ricky Lee Knight, after being arrested in an unrelated robbery case, provided police with information regarding an unresolved murder in Baltimore City. He was brought to the Homicide Division, where he was asked to repeat his statement regarding the murder so that it could be recorded. During the course of the custodial interrogation leading up to the second statement, he was told that his cooperation “would be helpful” and that the State’s Attorney would be informed of his cooperation. Knight was also told “down the line, after this case comes to an end, we’ll see what the State’s Attorney can do for you, with your case, with your charges.” Knight’s second statement, which, unlike his first statement, was recorded, was essentially identical in content to the first.

Knight, like Sirbaugh, also sought unsuccessfully to suppress these inculpatory statements. Those statements led eventually to his conviction for the murder. Sirbaugh and Knight each argue that their statements were given in reliance on improper inducements, and were therefore ⁵²³ involuntary. Because an interrogating officer’s truthful promise to inform a prosecutor of a suspect’s cooperation during a custodial interrogation is not an improper inducement, we affirm Sirbaugh’s conviction.

While the same holds for the similar statements interrogating officers made to Knight, the interrogating officers’ further promise to “see what the State’s Attorney can do for you” was an improper inducement. That promise, however, could not have caused Knight to make his statement because it was made after Knight’s initial statement to the police. The content of the two statements was identical. We affirm Knight’s conviction.

I. A. Sirbaugh While sitting in a pickup truck parked in a convenience store parking lot in Owings Mills waiting for her husband to make purchases, Patricia Ann McConville saw a red car drive up Tollgate Road, the street next to the store. The time was approximately 4:00 p.m on 29 October 2000. The red car proceeded past the entrance to the store’s parking lot and then backed down the street, where it pulled over to the shoulder across the street from the store. Its driver kept the engine running.

A passenger got out of the red car and walked to the store. The passenger stood in front of the convenience store without entering for “quite a while.” Only when McConville’s husband left the store and returned to his truck did the man enter the store. Once inside, the man asked Brooke Presser, the sole employee in the store, for change for a dollar. When Presser opened the drawer of the cash register, the man reached over and grabbed all of the money out of the register.

He did not display a weapon, but told Presser to get down on the ground or he was going to kill her. Shaking and crying, Presser complied. According to Presser, the man left -with between $130 and $150 from the register. As McConville and her husband drove away, they saw the man sprint out of the store toward the red car.

When he ⁵²⁴ reached the red car, it began to move and continued to roll slowly as he entered it. The car sped away, running a stop sign in the process. On 7 November 2000, Baltimore County Police officers arrested Erland Edward Roessler, III. Roessler confessed to committing a series of robberies, including the 29 October 2000 robbery of the convenience store in Owings Mills.

Roessler told police that he had usually been the “inside man,” and that a man named “Steve” usually drove the automobile they used in the robberies. When shown a photograph of Sirbaugh, Roessler confirmed that Sirbaugh was the accomplice named “Steve” with whom he committed the robberies. He gave police officers sufficient information with which to locate Sirbaugh’s residence. Sirbaugh was located by police in Carroll County on 11 November 2000.

He was arrested and brought to the Maryland State Police barracks in Westminster. There he was interrogated by Maryland State Police Corporal Christina Becker and Hampstead Police Officer Clint Thom. According to the unreported Court of Special Appeals’s opinion in Sirbaugh’s case: “Becker advised Sirbaugh of his rights, and Sirbaugh said that he understood them. He initialed and signed a waiver of rights form.

Sirbaugh did not make a written statement, but agreed to sign the notes that Becker had taken during the hour-long interview, which occurred between 1:35 and 2:35 a.m. Becker did not know when Sirbaugh last had eaten or slept, but said that the police normally offer a person being interviewed a soda. Becker testified that she did not threaten Sirbaugh or make any promises to him. “Thorn testified that he was present for the entire interview with Sirbaugh, and that neither he nor anyone in his presence promised Sirbaugh anything or threatened him to get him to make a statement. Sirbaugh appeared to understand his rights and did not ask for an attorney.” The following exchange concerning Sirbaugh’s post-arrest interrogation took place during cross-examination of Officer ⁵²⁵ Thorn at the motion to suppress hearing that preceded Sirbaugh’s trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County: “[Defense Counsel]: Now, during the process, particularly during the Miranda, [1] you told him that if he cooperated you would let the State’s Attorney know that he was cooperating? “[Officer Thorn]: Sure. “[Defense Counsel]: Did he understand that, that you would let the State’s Attorney know he was cooperating if, in fact, he did cooperate? “[Officer Thorn]: I believe he was under the impression that if he cooperated with us in answering questions that we asked, that we would relay that information to the State’s Attorney that when we asked a question he answered it. “[Defense Counsel]: Did you tell him that it might go easier on him, that it could affect his sentencing if he cooperated with you as opposed to not cooperating with you? “[Officer Thorn]: No, I did not.” Sirbaugh confessed to Corporal Becker and Officer Thorn that he drove the getaway car in the 29 October 2000 convenience store robbery.

According to Corporal Becker’s trial testimony: “Mr. Sirbaugh stated his participation in the robbery of the High’s Store, that he had driven to the High’s, which is located on Reisterstown Road near the area of Tollgate Road. He said that he had driven his ex-boss’s car, which is a red Dodge Neon. “He had parked approximately a half a mile away from the store where he remained in his vehicle. He said after the robbery that he had gone to the Baltimore City area.” Sirbaugh was charged with robbery. 2 Prior to the trial and as previously alluded to, the trial court held a hearing on ⁵²⁶ Sirbaugh’s motion to suppress the confession. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial judge ruled in favor of the State and ultimately allowed the confession to be admitted as evidence at the trial. 3 The primary evidence used by the State at the 24 January 2002 jury trial to connect Sirbaugh to the robbery was Sirbaugh’s confession.

Sirbaugh was convicted of robbery. Because it was his third conviction for a crime of violence, he was sentenced to the mandatory term of twenty-five years in prison. 4 B. Knight According to the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in Knight’s case: “On the evening of January 25, 2000, Wiley ‘Iceberg’ McCroery, a drug dealer, was shot and killed at the comer of North Carey Street and Harlem Avenue in Baltimore. Police investigators learned that the victim was shot by someone known as ‘Little Ralph,’ who was later identified as Ralph Williams. The police also learned that someone named ‘Ricky,’ later identified as appellant, often hung out with Williams and that ‘Ralph and Ricky’ were known to be ⁵²⁷ ‘stickup boys’ in the Western District, where the killing occurred. “On June 8, 2000, Williams and appellant were arrested on an unrelated robbery charge.

Shortly after their arrest, appellant was interviewed by Detective Sergeant Darryl Massey, who was assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division in the Western District. During the interview, [which was held in the Criminal Investigations Division Office,] appellant revealed information about the murder, so he was taken to the Homicide Office to meet with Detective Kevin Buie, who was in charge of the murder investigation. There, the detectives conducted a tape-recorded interview of appellant concerning the murder. The tape recording and a transcript made from it were later admitted into evidence at appellant’s trial.

In that interview, appellant told the following story. “On the day of the murder, Williams and appellant caught a ‘hack’ [5] and went to McCulloh Street to pick up a third man, [Antonio Jones,] who had a gun, and then proceeded to drive elsewhere to commit robberies. Appellant rode along ‘to make sure that the hack wouldn’t leave.’ When they saw the victim, they drove down the street about three or four houses from the corner. Williams and [Jones] jumped out of the car and walked up the street to where the victim was, to rob him. Some time later, [Jones] returned to the car, and appellant ‘heard some shooting.’ Then Williams arrived and announced that he ‘had to kill’ the victim.

Williams pulled out $100 in cash, and [Jones] pulled out $150 worth of heroin.” Police officers, seeking to corroborate Knight’s story, attempted to track down the alleged third member of the scheme, Antonio Jones. They discovered that Jones had been in jail at the time of the murder and could not have been involved in the crime. Despite this apparent untruth, certain details of Knight’s version of events matched particular facts of the murder case not made public. Knight ultimately was ⁵²⁸ indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the murder.

Knight filed a motion to suppress his statement to the police. During the hearing on the motion, Detective Sergeant Massey, who conducted the initial interview in the Criminal Investigations Division Office, testified that he made no promises to Knight before Knight made his initial statement. 6 Detective Buie, who led the second interview recorded at the Homicide Division, testified as follows: “[Defense Counsel]: Now, did you indicate to him on that first night, on June 8th, when you were at the Homicide Unit, that you could take care of some of these robberies, the robbery charge if he helped you out with Ralph Williams? “[Detective Buie]: No, it’s not my position to make any deals if that’s what you’re saying. He was advised of his rights, and a statement was taken. Anything that would be done for Mr. Knight — I didn’t communicate any offers to him.

I’m sure that he knew with his cooperation in the trial that maybe down the line something could be done for him. But it’s not my purpose or point to make a deal that I can’t see through. “[Defense Counsel]: Well, by the time he was meeting with Mr. Urick, he would have had the opportunity to speak to the Assistant State’s Attorney about whether or not you could help him out. Is that correct? “[Detective Buie]: Sure. I had communications with Mr. Urick throughout the whole case. “[Defense Counsel]: And did you have communications with Mr. Knight about what his cooperation could do for him? ⁵²⁹ “[Detective Buie]: No. Other than the initial time that I met him, we writted him out and brought him over to Mr. Urick’s office to get some more information, that would probably be that last time that I actually saw him or spoke with him.

I didn’t have any communication with him while he was in jail. “[Defense Counsel]: But on the night that he gave this [the recorded] statement, there was some, it was somehow translated to him that his cooperation would be helpful. Is that correct? “[Detective Buie]: It’s always helpful. I think what we said to him, myself and Detective Sergeant Massey was, you have information in this case. We want the information in this case.

We can’t promise you anything, and on tape we said that to him several times. If down the line, after this case comes to an end, we’ll see what the State’s Attorney can do for you, with your case, with your charges, but no deal if you say this, we’ll do that. We can’t do that. And that’s the problem that we run into.” According to Detective Sergeant Massey, the content of the statement he and Detective Buie recorded at the Homicide Division office was identical to the statement Knight previously gave in the Western District Criminal Investigations Division Office. 7 ⁵³⁰ The suppression hearing judge determined that Knight’s statement was admissible: “I do not find the fact that the defendant was told that his cooperation would be brought to the attention of the State’s Attorney to be an inducement for his testimony, and as indicated, the defendant was properly Mirandized.

That he may have testified in the hopes of getting a reward down the line is not a sufficient basis for suppressing a voluntary statement. “Accordingly, the motion to suppress is denied.” The recorded statement was presented as evidence before the jury at Knight’s trial. Knight was convicted of second degree murder, use of a handgun in a crime of violence, robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery, conspiracy to rob with a deadly weapon, and conspiracy to rob. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison for second degree murder, twenty years for use of a handgun in a crime of violence, twenty years for robbery with a deadly weapon, and twenty years for conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon. Each of these sentences were to be served consecutively.

The remaining counts — robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery — were merged with robbery with a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, respectively. C. In their direct appeals, Sirbaugh and Knight challenged the denials of their suppression motions. The Court of Special Appeals, rejecting their arguments, separately affirmed in unreported opinions. In affirming each judgment, the intermediate appellate court relied on Boyer v. State, 102 Md.App. 648 , 651 A.2d 403 (1995).

In Boyer , the Court of Special Appeals held that a truthful promise by police to inform the ⁵³¹ State’s Attorney that the defendant cooperated is not an improper inducement even though it could give rise to the “perfectly reasonable assumption” that the defendant might gain some advantage from the prosecutor’s knowledge of his cooperation. 102 Md.App. at 654 , 651 A.2d at 406 . 8 We granted a petition for certiorari filed by Sirbaugh’s attorney, 878 Md. 613 , 837 A.2d 925 (2003), 9 to consider the following question: “Is an interrogating officer’s promise to inform the State’s Attorney of a suspect’s cooperation an improper inducement under Maryland common law, thereby rendering statements made by the suspect in reliance on that inducement involuntary?” Knight presented the same question in a petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Court. 378 Md. 613 , 837 A.2d 925 (2003).

II

Only voluntary confessions are admissible as evidence under Maryland law. 10 A confession is voluntary if it is ⁵³² “freely and voluntarily made” and the defendant making the confession “knew and understood what he [or she] was saying” at the time he or she said it. Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 480-81 , 536 A.2d 622, 625-26 (1988). In order to be deemed voluntary, a confession must satisfy the mandates of the U.S. Constitution, the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, and Maryland non-constitutional law. See Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 173-74 , 699 A.2d 1170, 1178 (1997).

Sirbaugh and Knight specifically argue that the promises made to them by the interrogating officers were improper inducements that rendered their confessions involuntary under Maryland non-constitutional common law. When a criminal defendant claims that his or her confession was involuntary because of a promise made to him or her by interrogating officers, the State must present evidence in order to refute the claim. See Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278, 283 , 208 A.2d 614, 616 (1965). 11 If the defense files a proper pre-trial suppression motion, the State bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the inculpatory statement was freely and voluntarily made and thus was the product of neither a promise nor a threat.” Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 306 , 765 A.2d 97, 113-14 (2001). When lack of voluntariness is generated as an issue at trial, the State must prove voluntariness beyond