State of Maryland Central Collection Unit v. Jordan

BATTAGLIA, J. In the present case, the Respondent, Robert William Jordan, a resident of Glen Burnie, failed to maintain insurance on a truck registered to him in accordance with Section 17-103 of the Transportation Article, Maryland Code (1988, 2006 Repl. Vol.). 1 When the insurance lapsed, Jordan failed to renew or otherwise surrender evidence of the registration to the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) as required under Section 17-106 and, pursuant to the same Section, the State of Mary ⁴²² land Central Collection Unit 2 (“the State”), the Petitioner, obtained a judgment against Jordan in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County. Having noted an appeal to the Circuit Court, Jordan testified that he sold the truck for cash before cancelling the insurance and argued that “the vehicle was not being driven with those tags without insurance.” The Circuit Court Judge reversed the judgment of the District Court, stating that he found Jordan “to be extremely credible and his testimony compelling,” and that he “understood] [that] [Jordan] has these obligations under state law but it seems to me he didn’t knowingly fail to do anything, in fact, [he] thought he had done everything he was supposed to do.” The State petitioned for certiorari, which we granted, to answer the following question: Did the circuit court err as a matter of law in finding that because, as it believed, respondent did not intentionally fail to maintain insurance on his motor vehicle registered in the State of Maryland, the MVA could not impose statutory penalties for his failure to maintain insurance on his motor vehicle? Central Collection v. Jordan, 402 Md. 623 , 938 A.2d 825 (2008). 3 We shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and hold that Section 17-106 is a strict liability statute that does not require a showing of knowledge or intent to establish a violation thereof. ⁴²³ I. Introduction The facts recited in the State’s brief were as follows: 4 It is undisputed that during the period of November 30, 2003 through and including September 30, 2005, MVA official records indicated that Jordan was the registered owner of a 1986 GMC truck that was not covered by the required security, i.e., insurance.

Although all registered owners are instructed to surrender license tags to MVA upon cancellation of insurance, MVA records also indicate that evidence of the truck’s registration was never surrendered, a fact Jordan and his witness admitted. Nor did Jordan, after being requested to do so, ever respond to MVA’s requests for information concerning the insurance cancellation. Instead, he ignored MVA’s entreaties. The State filed suit against Jordan on September 18, 2006, alleging that he “incurred a debt in the amount of $4,630.00 with the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) for compulsory insurance violation penalties assessed during the period of November 30, 2003 through September 30, 2005.” The complaint further alleged that Jordan owed the State $4,655.00 as well as a 17% collection fee of $791.35, pursuant to Section 3-304 of the State Finance and Procurement Article, Maryland Code (1985, 2006 ReplVol.) 5 and COMAR 17.01.01.07 6 for a total amount due of $5,446.35, for which the State allegedly ⁴²⁴ repeatedly made demand.

After trial, the District Court judge entered judgment for the total amount, which the Circuit Court reversed.

II

Discussion Before us, the State argues that the Circuit Court erred in considering intent as an element of Section 17-106 with respect to failure to maintain insurance, because 17-106 is a strict liability statute. Jordan, not having filed a brief, relies on the ruling of the Circuit Court. ⁴²⁵ The issue presented in this case is simply whether Section 17-106 is a strict liability statute or one requiring proof of knowledge or intent for a violation thereof. Generally, a violation of a penal statute requires proof of intent, which has, “traditionally not been limited to the narrow, dictionary definition of purpose, aim, or design, but instead has often been viewed as encompassing much of what would ordinarily be described as knowledge,” while “the modern approach is to define separately the mental states of knowledge and intent,” so that intent is now defined as “purpose.” Wayne R. La-Fave, Criminal Law, Section 5.2(b) (4th ed.2003). A strict liability statute, conversely, “does not require the State to prove mens rea.” 7 Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 585 , 632 A.2d 797, 804 (1993).

In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always “to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 , 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352 , 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). See also Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20 , 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Barbre, 402 Md. at 172 , 935 A.2d at 708 ; Kelly, 397 Md. at 420 , 918 A.2d at 482 .

See also Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 167 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1073 (2005). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Barbre, 402 Md. at 173 , 935 A.2d at 708-09 ; Kelly, 397 Md. at 419 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427 , ⁴²⁶ 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05 , 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, or when the terms are ambiguous when it is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is ambiguous, and we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute.

Barbre, 402 Md. at 173 , 935 A.2d at 709 ; Kelly, 397 Md. at 419-20 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305 , 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003). When the statute is part of a larger, statutory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole considering the “purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body,” Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390 , 863 A.2d at 952, 962 (2004); Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327 , 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003), and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613-14 , 937 A.2d 242, 258 (2007); Magnetti v. Univ. of Md., 402 Md. 548, 565 , 937 A.2d 219, 229 (2007); Clipper Windpower, Inc. v. Sprenger, 399 Md. 539, 554 , 924 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2007).

Title 17 of the Transportation Article, the lynchpin of the present case, provides the statutory framework for the compulsory insurance law. Section 17-104(b) compels drivers to maintain security: “[t]he owner of a motor vehicle that is required to be registered in this State shall maintain the required security for the vehicle during the registration period,” the form of which is governed by Section 17-103, which states: (a) Required form; annual assessment.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the form of security required under this subtitle is a vehicle liability insurance policy written by an insurer authorized to write these policies in this State. (2) The Administration may accept another form of security in place of a vehicle liability insurance policy if it finds that ⁴²⁷ the other form of security adequately provides the benefits required by subsection (b) of this section. (3) The Administration shall, by regulation, assess each self-insurer an annual sum which may not exceed $750, and which shall be used for actuarial studies and audits to determine financial solvency.

(b) Required minimum benefits.—The security required under this subtitle shall provide for at least: (1) The payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons, in addition to interest and costs; (2) The payment of claims for property of others damaged or destroyed in an accident of up to $15,000, in addition to interest and costs; (3) Unless waived, the benefits described under § 19-505 of the Insurance Article as to basic required primary coverage; and (4) The benefits required under § 19-509 of the Insurance Article as to required additional coverage. Section 17-106 8 provides penalties for failing to maintain the required form of insurance on a motor vehicle and states in part: ⁴²⁸ (d) Owner to surrender evidences of registration.—(1) Within 48 hours after an owner is notified by the Administration of the suspension of registration, the owner shall surrender all evidences of that registration to the Administration. (2) If the owner fails to surrender the evidences of registration within the 48-hour period, the Administration: (i) Shall attempt to recover from the owner the evidences of registration; and (ii) May suspend his license to drive until he returns to the Motor Vehicle Administration the evidences of registration. (3) The Administration may enter into contracts with private parties to procure the services of independent agents to assist in the recovery of the evidences of registration as authorized in paragraph (2) of this subsection. ⁴²⁹ (e) Penalties.—(l)(i) In addition to any other penalty provided for in the Maryland Vehicle Law, if the required security for a vehicle terminates or otherwise lapses during its registration year, the Administration may assess the owner of the vehicle with a penalty of $150 for each vehicle without the required security for a period of 1 to 30 days.

If a tine is assessed, beginning on the 31st day the fine shall increase by a rate of $7 for each day. (ii) Each period during which the required security for a vehicle terminates or otherwise lapses shall constitute a separate violation. (iii) The penalty imposed under this subsection may not exceed $2,500 for each violation in a 12-month period. 9 Section 17-107 follows the statute at issue and prohibits driving or allowing others to drive an uninsured vehicle: (a) Vehicles not covered by required security.—A person who knows or has reason to know that a motor vehicle is not covered by the required security may not: (1) Drive the vehicle; or (2) If he is an owner of the vehicle, knowingly permit another person to drive it. (b) Evidence of violation of subsection (a).—(1) In any prosecution under subsection (a) of this section the introduction of the official records of the Motor Vehicle Administration showing the absence of a record that the vehicle is covered by the security required under § 17-104 of this subtitle shall be prima facie evidence that a person knows or ⁴³⁰ has reason to know that a motor vehicle is not covered by the required security.

(2) The introduction of evidence of the records of the Administration may not limit the introduction of other evidence bearing upon whether the vehicle was covered by the required security. (c) Defense of sovereign immunity.—An owner or lessee of any motor vehicle registered under Title 13 of this article may not raise the defense of sovereign or governmental immunity as described under § 5-524 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In the present case, Section 17-106 is silent as to whether knowledge or intent is a required element for a violation thereof. The absence of such language in a statute, however, does not necessarily make it a strict liability offense.

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 , 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1804 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 624 (1994) (“Silence does not suggest that Congress dispensed with mens rea for the element of § 5861(d) at issue here.”); Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 42 , 641 A.2d 870, 881 (1994) (noting that in certain cases, “the Legislature, despite an omission, intended to provide a mens rea requirement”). In Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 20, 42 , 641 A.2d at 870 , we were called upon to determine whether Section 419A (c) of Article 27, Maryland Code (1957,1992 RepLVol.), which penalized photographing or filming a minor engaging in an obscene act or sexual conduct, was a strict liability statute or not. We determined that the statute did not require proof of knowledge or intent for its violation, after we reviewed its plain language, bulwarked by a review of its legislative history. Chief Judge Robert Murphy, writing for the Court, contrasted the Section under scrutiny, Section 419A (c), with Sections 419A (b) and (d) of Article 27, penalizing, respectively, soliciting, causing to induce, or permitting a minor to engage, as the subject, in the production of. any obscene matter, and promoting, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute any matter depicting a minor engaged, as a subject, in sexual ⁴³¹ conduct, which each contained knowingly requirements and concluded that the absence of such a scienter requirement reflected a “purposeful design.” Id. at 44 , 641 A.2d at 882 .

In support, he reflected upon the statutory Section’s legislative history, as explicated by the Court of Special Appeals, and concluded: It is therefore clear, both from the plain language of § 419A and from the statute’s legislative history, that knowledge as to the minor’s age is not an element of the offense under § 419A (c). Not so clear is whether the Legislature intended to make this offense a strict liability crime or whether it intended to provide a reasonable mistake of age defense. Id. at 45, 641 A.2d at 882-88 . See also Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 651 , 547 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1988) (concluding, based partly on the relevant statutory scheme, that knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of controlled paraphernalia, although not explicitly set forth in the statute); Garnett, 332 Md. at 585-88 , 632 A.2d at 804-05 (holding that silence as to mens rea for statutory rape stood in stark contrast to another crime codified in the same Section, that of having vaginal intercourse with an incapacitated or helpless person, which included a mens rea element, and concluding that such an absence, coupled with the drafting history of the statute, reflected an intent on the part of the Legislature to omit a mens rea requirement for statutory rape).

Significantly, Section 17-107 relates to the required security on a motor vehicle and explicitly prohibits a person who knows or has reason to know a motor vehicle is uninsured to drive the vehicle or