Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar on Jer

BELL, Chief Judge. The issue this case presents involves the interpretation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) §§ 14-820 and 14-833 of the Tax-Property Article. 1 Section 14-833(c) defines the limitations period for filing an action to foreclose the right to redeem property sold at a tax sale in terms of “the date of the certificate of sale” and § 14-820(a)(8) reiterates that definition, albeit referring simply to “the date of the certificate,” in the context of prescribing the contents of that certificate of sale. The trial court, interpreting § 14—833(c), equated “the date of the certificate of sale” with “the date of the sale,” and thus dismissed the action to foreclose rights of redemption filed by the appellant, the Gordon Family Partnership. We ¹³² granted certiorari on our own motion to review this important issue.

I Each May, beginning on the second Monday and continuing over the course of three to five days, Prince George’s County, Maryland, the appellee, 2 sells thousands of parcels of real property situated in the County on which the payment of property taxes is delinquent. In 1993, the sale began on May 10 and continued for the next four and a half days. Three pamphlets or notices containing pertinent information concerning the tax sale, its procedures and consequences, were provided or made available in connection with the sale. Each pamphlet and each notice advised, inter alia, that a successful bidder/purchaser needed to initiate legal action to foreclose rights of redemption within two years of the date of the tax sale, otherwise the certificate of sale would be void.

The appellant participated in the sale and purchased over its course, 10 separate parcels of real property. It paid for its purchases on May 17,1993. The purchases were evidenced by 10 Certificates of Sale by the Director of Finance for Prince George’s County executed, upon information and belief, in the presence of a Notary. The certificates were not issued, or delivered to the appellant, however, until November 1, 1993, the date they were signed and notarized.

Copies of each certificate were filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. When all of the properties had not been redeemed by the various property owners, the appellant filed, on May 22, 1995, pursuant to § 14-833 3 in the Circuit Court for Prince ¹³³ George’s County, a Complaint to Foreclose Rights of Redemption. 4 The County moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that it came too late, more than two years from the date of the sale, the date it maintained was prescribed by § 14-833(c). That motion was denied and the County filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Following a hearing on that motion, the court issued its written opinion granting the appellee’s motion for reconsideration and, thus, dismissing the appellant’s complaint.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the date of the certificate and the date of the sale are different dates, accepting instead the appellee’s submission that “the date of the sale is effectively synonymous with the date of the certificate.” II The appellant’s argument is simple and straightforward, premised on the plain and ordinary meaning of § 14-833(c). It is that the date of the sale is a different and separate date from the date of the certificate. Moreover, by using the phrase, “date of the certificate of sale,” a phrase that is clear and unambiguous, and requiring no further construction, when given its plain and ordinary meaning, the Legislature made a clear choice between those two dates. Thus, the appellant asserts that the starting date for the running of the limitations period is the date of the certificate, ie.

November 1, 1993, rather than the date of the sale; to construe the phrase otherwise is to disregard the language the General Assembly used and avoid its clear meaning. ¹³⁴ On the other hand, the appellee’s argument is more involved and complex. It is also multifaceted. First, it maintains that: Since at least 1978, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals have consistently interpreted the aforementioned limitation provisions for filing a tax sale foreclosure suit [§§ 14-833(c) and 14-820(a)(8) ] to mean two years from the date of the tax sale, making the terms “date of the certificate” and “date of the certificate of sale” effectively synonymous with “date of the sale.” It cites, and discusses, as supportive of this proposition, Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A. Inc., et al., 337 Md. 1, 5 , 650 A.2d 705, 707 (1994); Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md. 363, 365 , 614 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1992); Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 324 Md. 481, 482 , 597 A.2d 952, 954 (1991); Prince George’s Homes, Inc. v. Cahn, 283 Md. 76, 77 , 389 A.2d 853, 854 (1978); Slattery v. Friedman, 99 Md.App. 106, 112 , 636 A.2d 1, 4 , cert. denied 335 Md. 81 , 642 A.2d 192 (1994); Scott v. Seek Lane Venture, Inc., 91 Md.App. 668, 679 , 605 A.2d 942, 948 (1992). The appellee also takes solace in the fact that the pamphlets and notices all contained advice consistent with this interpretation.

This is, for appellee, further evidence that its construction is correct and that the appellate courts have indeed so construed the statutes. Second, the appellee argues that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, see, e.g., Workers’ Compensation Com’n v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 120-21 , 647 A.2d 96, 104 (1994); Macke Co. v. St. Dep’t of Assess. & Tax., 264 Md. 121, 132-133 , 285 A.2d 593 (1972); Smolin v. First Fidelity Sav. and Loan Ass’n., 238 Md. 386, 392-393 , 209 A.2d 546, 549-550 (1965), is applicable under the facts sub judice. In support of this argument, it points out: From the date of the Cahn decision in 1978 to the present, Subtitle 8 of the Tax-Property Article and its predecessor, Article 81, Section 70, et seq., pertaining to tax sales has been addressed, modified, and amended by the Legislature, under its various sections without fail at virtually each legislative session. In fact, the entire tax sale procedure was recodified from Article 81 to the Tax-Property Article ¹³⁵ in 1985.

In particular, Section 14-833 ..., and its predecessor, Article 81, Section 100, have gone through at least two repeals and reenactments, and Section 14-820 ... and its predecessor Article 81 Section 83, have gone through numerous repeals and reenactments, without the Legislature responding in opposition to, or in any way changing, the interpretation placed on these sections by the Courts pertaining to the two year statute of limitations period running from the date of the sale.(Footnotes omitted). Continuing from the perspective of the legislative history of the legislation, the appellee further asserts that such history reflects an intention on the part of the Legislature “to accord a two year tax sale statute of limitations for post-1943 tax sales, running from the date of the sale, as the Courts have so interpreted.” That history indicates, it states, that the Legislature intended that there be a uniform procedure applicable to the conduct of tax sales and the commencement of tax sale foreclosure actions. That intended uniformity would be significantly undermined, the appellee suggests, if the date of the certificate were the appropriate date. According to the appel-lee, [t]aken to it logical conclusion, if the date of the administrative signing of the certificate or the notary’s acknowledgment were to govern the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations under Section 14-833(c), the State would have at least as many varying time periods for filing tax sale foreclosure suits as there were political subdivisions conducting tax sales for delinquent taxes.

Finally, the appellee maintains that adoption of the appellant’s argument would result in an illegal delegation of authority in contravention of separation of powers, see Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 5 and the “Delegation ¹³⁶ Doctrine established by the Courts,” citing Christ v. Maryland Dept. of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427 , 644 A.2d 34 (1994); Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74 , 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987); Sullivan v. Bd. of License Comm’rs, 293 Md. 113, 123 , 442 A.2d 558, 563 (1982). It argues: Such a limitations period as argued by the appellant Partnership would, in effect, be no limitations period, at all. Worse yet, such a local, administratively driven limitations period, which subjects the statute of limitations to the vagaries of each local tax collector’s administrative practice for issuing tax sale certificates would, in effect, constitute an illegal delegation of the General Assembly’s legislative authority in violation of Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution and the Delegation Doctrine established by the Courts. By way of explaining its position, the appellee reasons: If the signing of the tax sale certificate by the Collector of Taxes or the notarizing of said signature is the trigger for starting the two-year limitations period for filing a foreclosure action, as the Partnership contends, then the discretion that is supposed to be vested solely within the province of the legislature is in reality, placed in the hands of various local officials, without any guidance or restrictions from the General Assembly.

This would shift the fundamental decision making authority for the imposition of the statute of limitations away from the Legislature---- III The statute whose meaning is at issue on this appeal is § 14-833(c). It provides: (c) The certificate is void unless a proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption is filed: (1) within 2 years of the date of the certificate of sale; or (2) in Baltimore City, with respect to any property which was cited as vacant and abandoned on a housing or building ¹³⁷ violation notice outstanding on the date of the tax sale, vdthin 1 year of the date of the certifícate of sale. Section 14-820 pertaining to the contents of a certificate of sale is also instructive, particularly subsection (a)(8), which provides: (a) The collector shall deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale under the collector’s hand and seal, or by the collector’s authorized facsimile signature, acknowledged by the collector as a conveyance of land, which certificate shall set forth: H: $ $ H: $ H: (8) that the certificate will be void unless foreclosure proceedings are brought within 2 years from the date of the certificate or in Baltimore City, with respect to any property which was cited as vacant and abandoned on a housing or building violation notice outstanding on the date of tax sale, within 1 year from the date of the certificate. In particular, the question to be answered is “what does ‘date of the certificate of sale’ mean?” Determining the answer to that question is a matter of statutory construction.

The principles pursuant to which that task is performed are clear and well settled in this State. Prince George’s County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658 , 667 A.2d 898, 901 (1995). The object of statutory construction is to effectuate, after discerning, the real intention of the Legislature. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93 , 656 A.2d 757, 760 (1995); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435 , 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994); Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Seidel Chevrolet, Inc., 326 Md. 237, 248 , 604 A.2d 473, 479 (1992); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991).

The search for legislative intent begins, and ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute under review. Cassidy, 338 Md. at 93 , 656 A.2d at 760 ; Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). Where, giving the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning, see Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171 , 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991); Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182 , ¹³⁸ 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989), the statute is clear and unambiguous, both in meaning and application, see C & P Telephone v. Director of Finance, 343 Md. 567, 578 , 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996), it usually is unnecessary to go further. State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7 , 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991).

Because it is part of the context, related statutes or a