Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Anderson

HOLLANDER, J. In this case of first impression, we must determine whether a police department is entitled to judicial review of a “not guilty” finding rendered by a hearing board convened pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”), Md.Code (2003), Title 3, Subtitle 1 of the Public Safety Article (“P.S.”). 1 The appeal arises from an alleged unauthorized vehicular pursuit conducted by Kathleen Anderson, appellee, an officer with the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the “Commission”), appellant. As a result of Anderson’s conduct, appellant initiated disciplinary proceedings under LEOBR. After an “Administrative Hearing Board” (the “Board”) found appellee not guilty of engaging in an unauthorized vehicular pursuit, the Commission filed a “Petition for Appeal” with the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Concluding that the Commission ⁵⁴⁵ was not entitled to judicial review, the circuit court granted Anderson’s motion to dismiss.

On appeal, the Commission presents two issues, which we quote: I. Whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law in granting appellee’s Motion to Dismiss and, in so doing, finding that appellant Commission is not entitled to judicial review of the final decision of an administrative hearing board pursuant to [§ ] 3-109 of the LEOBR.

II

Whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law in granting appellee’s Motion to Dismiss and, in so doing, finding that appellant Commission is not entitled to judicial review of the final decision of an administrative hearing board pursuant to [§ ] 10-222 of the Administrative Procedures Act. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Commission is a body corporate and an agency of the State. See Md.Code Ann. (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 28, § 1-101.

Recently, in Boyle v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 385 Md. 142, 146 , 867 A.2d 1050 (2005), the Court of Appeals outlined the rights and responsibilities of the Commission: The Commission is a bi-county agency created by the General Assembly to develop both general and functional plans of proposed land development for the Washington Metropolitan District, which consists of most of Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. See Maryland Code, Art. 28, § 7-108. That is the main “planning” function. In carrying out the general plan, the Commission is authorized to acquire property within the District for roads, parks, forests, and other recreation facilities, and to improve and control such property for those purposes.

See id. § 5-101. That is the main “park” function. ⁵⁴⁶ Pursuant to Art. 28, § 5-114(a), the Commission “may appoint whatever park police officers as may be necessary to provide protection for the Commission’s activities and property.” These officers “are responsible to and are under the supervision of the Commission.” Boyle, 385 Md. at 146 , 867 A.2d 1050 . The park police also “have concurrent general police jurisdiction with the Montgomery and Prince George’s County police within the parks and other areas ... under the jurisdiction of the Commission....” Art. 28, § 5-114(a). Regarding park police officers, the Boyle Court explained, 385 Md. at 146-47 , 867 A.2d 1050 (emphasis added): [S]ome functions of the Commission are handled by the central Commission staff while others are implemented by geographically-based Divisions of the Commission within each of the two counties.

Among the functions handled centrally are human resources, finance, and general counsel, and included within the finance department is general procurement for the Commission. Among the functions handled by Divisions within the respective counties is the police function. There is a separate Park Police Division, headed by a Chief and having its own command and administrative structure, in each of the two counties. Since 1998, appellee has served as a Park Police Officer.

On September 8, 2001, she was assigned to the midnight shift for the Prince George’s County Park Police Division (“the Division”), 2 operating a marked police cruiser equipped with an in-car computer and camera. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on that date, while appellee was on a two-lane residential road in Prince George’s County (the “County”), she activated the emergency lights on her patrol car, intending to stop a vehicle bearing license plates that had been reported as stolen. When the vehicle did not stop, appellee activated the siren on her patrol car, and remained in contact with the Division’s ⁵⁴⁷ “communications” by means of her police radio. At that point, the suspect vehicle exceeded the posted speed limit, crossed the center line, and may have struck another vehicle.

As the vehicle was moving, the occupants jumped out. Their vehicle continued to move, without a driver, and struck a telephone pole. The Commission’s policy as to vehicular pursuits is codified in Bi-County Directive 414 (“BCD 414”), effective January 1, 1979, as amended on May 9, 2001. In accordance with the 2001 Amendment, “fresh pursuit” is permitted only when an officer has probable cause to believe that the fleeing suspect has committed or is attempting to commit the following: • Any felony involving the use of force or threat of physical force or violence against a person. • A hit and run traffic accident resulting in death or serious injury!.] Notably, “[a]ny other pursuits are prohibited.” By “Memorandum” dated October 4, 2002, appellee was notified that she was charged as follows: Charge # 1.

Failure to comply with Bi-County Rule 2: Conformance to Law — Officers and employees of these divisions shall obey all laws of the United States, the State of Maryland, County ordinances!,] all rules and directives of these divisions, and the Commission where applicable. To wit: On September 8, 2001, you engaged in a vehicle pursuit in direct violation of the amendment (dated 5/9/01) to Bi-County Directive 414. Charge # 2. Bi-County Directive 414: Fresh Pursuit, Amendment (dated 5/9/01) — Fresh Pursuit is only allowed when an officer has probable cause to believe that the fleeing suspect has committed or is attempting to commit the following: Any felony involving the use of force or threat of physical force or violence against a person.

A hit-and-run traffic ⁵⁴⁸ accident resulting in death or serious injury. Any other pursuits are prohibited. To wit: On September 8, 2001, you engaged in a vehicle pursuit in direct violation of the Amendment (dated 5/9/01) to Bi-County Directive 414. Charge # 3.

Bi-County Rule 9: Integrity of Reporting System (A). No officer or employee shall make or cause to be made, any omission, false, inaccurate, or improper entries in any official record, form or report, nor shall they under any circumstances make any false official statement or intentional misrepresentation of fact. To wit: On September 8, 2001, you engaged in a vehicle pursuit and then provided a false statement to Sgt. Uhrig when he questioned you.

In light of the charges, the Division informed Anderson that it “intend[ed] to take the disciplinary measure of termination of employment----” Accordingly, appellee exercised her right to an administrative hearing, pursuant to P.S. § 3-107(a), which was held on March 13 and 14, 2003. Captain Robert Ashton testified that he proposed the 2001 amendment to BCD 414 so it would conform to the more restrictive vehicular pursuit policy adopted by the County. He explained that he wanted to avoid “extreme liability” for the agency. 3 On October 10, 2001, Ashton spoke with Diane RobertsonGriggs, who claimed she was the driver of a sport utility vehicle struck by the suspect vehicle on September 8, 2001. Following that conversation, Captain Ashton asked Sergeant Daren Uhrig to “retrieve the in-car videotape from Officer Anderson.” 4 He also “spoke with Officer Christopher Perry ⁵⁴⁹ regarding what he saw on the scene when he went to back up Officer Anderson.” Then, he “spoke with Lieutenant [Tom] Kane and made a verbal request for the radio transmission tapes regarding the incident.” On October 17, 2001, after having reviewed the requested items, Ashton “wrote a complaint against police practice for this matter to be investigated further.” On cross-examination, Captain Ashton conceded that the mere activation of emergency equipment “doesn’t mean you’re in pursuit[.]” He also acknowledged that there are “occasions when you follow a vehicle and it’s not a pursuitf.]” Sergeant Uhrig was appellee’s supervisor on the night of September 8, 2001.

He recalled that, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on September 8, 2001, he was “listening to the [police] radio” when he overheard that “Officer Anderson had called out with a license plate.” Uhrig testified: “I believe she asked for [a] registration check on [the] license plate. At some point the registration plate for the vehicle came back stolen.... I believe she said the vehicle wasn’t stopping....” According to Sergeant Uhrig, Lieutenant Tom Kane “wanted to know what occurred,” and if “there was a fast chase.” Uhrig questioned appellee about whether there was a chase, but she “said there wasn’t.” Uhrig testified: “[B]asically she described the incident. She had turned on the emergency equipment and the vehicle had failed to stop.

And then that she had later come upon the vehicle wrecked din [sic] the telephone pole.” After spealdng with Officer Anderson, Uhrig “didn’t think a fast chase had occurred.” He added: “From the information I had I felt that she handled it properly.” On the night of September 8, 2001, Lieutenant Kane was the “[operations duty officer for Prince George’s County patrol....” At approximately 10:30 p.m., while monitoring the radio, Kane received a radio transmission from appellee. He was “concerned enough that [he] made an inquiry whether a ⁵⁵⁰ pursuit had occurred.” He also “instructed Sergeant Uhrig to ensure that no chase had taken place, because if it had I would have to do a commander’s log before leaving.” Uhrig asked appellee to call with her “answer [to] that question.” Kane was in Sergeant Uhrig’s office when appellee responded. Kane testified that, following the conversation, Sergeant Uhrig “told [him] that there had been no [chase] and there was no need for a performance report.” Therefore, Kane took no “further actions” regarding the incident. Sergeant Harvey Baker interviewed appellee on January 9, 2002. 5 Anderson claimed that, while following the suspect vehicle, she saw “no cars ... on the road....

There was no traffic, no pedestrians.” According to appellee, she was “one or two” car lengths behind the suspect vehicle when it struck the telephone pole; the entire incident lasted “between seven and [ten] minutes”; and it extended “maybe two and a half’ miles. Officer Anderson denied that she ignored “any traffic control devices in trying to get the vehicle to stop[.]” Moreover, appellee estimated that her top speed was “between 35 and 40 [m.p.h.],” in contrast to the posted speed limit of “25 to 30.” Officer Anderson denied that her actions violated BCD 414. When asked by Sergeant Baker whether she pursued the vehicle, appellee responded: “Did I try to get it to stop? Yes.

Did I pursue it? I was behind it. — . It happened so quick.” Appellee was the sole witness for the defense. She explained that, as a patrol officer, her duties included observing “vehicles on or about park property.” Anderson recalled that she began to follow the suspect vehicle after a registration check revealed that the license plates had been reported as stolen.

She indicated that she intended to stop the suspect vehicle along the side of Dupont Heights park property. Appellee insisted that “it wasn’t” her “intent to initiate a pursuit,” and she denied that a vehicular pursuit ensued. ⁵⁵¹ Indeed, Anderson claimed that, while following the vehicle, she decided not to pursue it because it had passed another vehicle, “and went over the double yellow line” into the lane designated for oncoming traffic. She also claimed that she informed communications of her decision. According to appellee, as she prepared to deactivate the emergency equipment, the suspects “turned ... and then they bailed out while the car was still moving.” On cross-examination, appellee admitted that, while following the suspect vehicle, she crossed over the center line on the roadway, and into the lane for oncoming traffic, in order to pass a civilian motorist.

Officer Anderson also admitted that, while following the suspect vehicle, she “was a little over the speed limit.” Although appellee insisted that her speed “wasn’t excessive,” she acknowledged that there were pedestrians “in the road.” Officer Anderson also testified that, on the day following the incident, she “received a telephone call about property damage,” which she included in her report of the incident. She maintained, however, that, prior to that call, she was unaware of any property damage. At the close of the hearing, the Board rendered an oral ruling, in which it found appellee not guilty of all of the charges. Thereafter, on June 30, 2003, the Board issued its written “Decision of Hearing Board Relative to PO Kathleen Anderson” (the “Decision”), reciting its findings of fact and the basis for its ruling.

Noting that it had “carefully scrutinized all of the testimony and the circumstances under which it was given,” the Board made clear that its ruling was “based in part upon its view of the credibility of the witnesses.” It also said: The Board also considered, among other factors, the state of mind and demeanor of each witness while testifying, his or her opportunity to observe and accurately relate to the matters discussed, whether the testimony has been contradicted, any bias or prejudices of the witnesses, the manner in which the witness may be affected by a decision in the case, and the extent to which the testimony of the witness is supported or contradicted by other evidence. The Board also considered the documentary evidence presented to it ⁵⁵² and how that evidence interfaced with the testimony of the various witnesses. In that regard, the Board had copies of the interviews of Officer Anderson. The Board also had available to it an audio tape and video tape of the alleged pursuit of September 8, 2001.

The Board was able to hear and view for itself the circumstances and the events of September 8, 2001. With these considerations in mind, the Board reasoned that BCD 414 does “not set forth precise guidelines under which an officer may or may not follow a vehicle in an attempt to have said vehicle stop.” In the Board’s view, “the policies afford the officer some reasonable discretion with respect to making a determination that a vehicle will not stop and that, accordingly, there should not be any continued effort to stop the vehicle.” Recognizing that its determination was “a close call” the Board nonetheless concluded that appellee had not violated BCD 414. In reaching that conclusion, the Board noted that “the audio tape clearly reinforces Officer Anderson’s testimony that she had determined to break off any pursuit of the vehicle....” It stated: “The fact that Officer Anderson continued in the direction of the suspect vehicle and approached after the vehicle was abandoned and wrecked did not transform her conduct into a violation of Bi-County Directive 414.” Of import here, quoting P.S. § 3-108(a)(3), the Board stated: “ ‘A finding of Not Guilty terminates the action.’ ” The Commission subsequently sought judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Appellee responded with a motion to dismiss.

In her motion, appellee contended that the Board, composed of three law enforcement members, all appointed by the chief, “is a quasi-judicial body assembled by [the Commission] for the express purpose of hearing testimony and adjudicating the disciplinary charges against its own officer.” Moreover, she claimed that the Commission “ ‘is not a party to the proceeding before it or before an appellate body authorized to review its decision, and it has no judicially cognizable interest in what ⁵⁵³ happens to that decision.’ ” (Citation omitted). Anderson stated: “Absent some special statutory authorization, therefore, [the Board] does not have the right to appeal its own decision.” She added that “no provision in legislation establishing or regulating the [Commission] confers upon it the right to appeal its own decisions.” In its opposition, the Commission indicated that it did not seek review of “its own decision” because the “decision at issue is not the Commission’s decision; rather, it is the decision of an ad hoc administrative board mandated by the provisions of the LEOBR.” According to appellant, if the Commission were not allowed to obtain judicial review, the result would be to allow the Board to “nullify ... the police agency’s vehicle pursuit regulations without affording the agency or the court an avenue by which to correct the clearly erroneous and unsubstantiated decision.” The Commission also addressed the statutory provision in P.S. § 3-108(a)(3), which states: “A finding of ‘not guilty terminates the action.’ ” In its view, that provision simply expresses that the ruling “constitutes a final decision for purposes of appeal.” In this regard, the agency pointed to the absence of “language in the LEOBR limiting the right of appeal to the officer[.]” Appellant added: “The rights of both parties to appeal final LEOBR administrative decisions in no way infringes upon the procedural rights of police officers. 1 - 1 ” Moreover, the Commission contended that it “was a party to the administrative action, serving in a quasi-prosecutorial capacity.” Therefore, it insisted that it was entitled to judicial review of the Board’s Decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), codified in Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). 6 ⁵⁵⁴ At the motion hearing held on February 19, 2004, the circuit court questioned appellant’s counsel as to why the court should not dismiss the action pursuant to P.S. § 3 — 108(a)(3). Referring to the absence of express language in LEOBR granting a right of appeal to the Commission, the court stated: “[I]t doesn’t say the law enforcement agency has a right to appeal, does it?” The following exchange is relevant: [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]: ...

It is the Commission’s position that [P.S. § ] 3-108 read in conjunction with [P.S. § ] 3-109, which also references judicial review, would conclude that the termination of the action is a final decision by the Trial Board and authorizes the agency to petition for judicial review. THE COURT: Why didn’t the legislature then say that? Say this is a final judgment? [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]: In Section 3-108, the legislature sets forth the decisions that can be made by a trial board and the appellate procedures that can be taken from those decisions.... (Emphasis added).

The court also questioned the Commission’s counsel about how to reconcile a right of judicial review for the Commission with P.S. § 3-110, which allows for expungement of a police officer’s record in cases of acquittal, dismissal, or a finding of not guilty. The following colloquy is pertinent: THE COURT: Let me ask you this. If I agree with your argument and I then reverse the Trial Board, can the police officer have her record expunged three years from now? * * * [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]: I’m not sure that the officer could. It would depend on what the punishment was.

THE COURT: Suppose she’s fired. ⁵⁵⁵ * * * [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]: I don’t believe she has the right to expunge the action from her personnel file, Your Honor. THE COURT: Then what does this portion of the statute mean, [P.S. § ] 3-110? “On written request, a law enforcement officer may have expunge[d] from any file the record of a formal complaint made against the law enforcement officer if a hearing board acquitted the law enforcement officer, dismissed the action or made a finding of not guilty.” What does that mean? [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]:.... If this decision was reversed and a finding of guilty was made, then she could not have it expunged. If simply there was — if the finding of not guilty held firm, she could have that expunged from her record.

THE COURT: I’ve reversed — I’ve now reversed the Trial Board and I’ve entered a finding of guilty. [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]: And I believe what an officer for the court [would have to do] would be to remand that to the Board. THE COURT: Why doesn’t [P.S. § ] 110 say that? [COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT]: Well, I think it doesn’t have to because it simply goes to a finding of guilty or not guilty. If it was remanded to — before the Trial Board and the Trial Board came to the conclusion that was — that the proper decision should have been guilty, well then clearly she couldn’t have it expunged. If the same decision was rendered [i.e., not guilty], then she could have it expunged.

I don’t think the legislature needed to get into the detail on that. Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the purpose of LEOBR “is to protect the procedural rights of law enforcement officers with respect to disciplinary action from a law enforcement agency,” but claimed the protections apply “during the investigatory stage and during the hearing stage[J” On the subject of due process, the court asked: “[I]f you’re ⁵⁵⁶ allowed to appeal a finding of not guilty, which is precluded from the state in a criminal case, aren’t you in effect violating some due process rights ... ?” The court also asked: “[0]ne of the due process elements is a double jeopardy argument, isn’t it?” Counsel for appellant responded: “[TJhis is not a criminal ease. This is an administrative action.” When the court observed that the title of the statute is “the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights,” and not “the Law Enforcement Agency’s Bill of Rights,” appellant responded: “I think the right of the agency for judicial review of an arbitrary [and] capricious decision does not negatively impact the loss of law enforcement officer’s procedural rights.” At the close of the hearing, the court granted Anderson’s motion to dismiss. The court reasoned: [T]he titling of this statute is the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights.

It is not the Law Enforcement Agency’s Bill of Rights. ... [T]he prior case law interpreting the statute has identified the purpose of the statute to guarantee procedural safeguards and due process right[s] to the law enforcement officer during any investigation or hearing in which the law enforcement officer faces disciplinary proceedings. In reviewing the language of the statute.... I think the intent of the legislature has previously been identified by our appellate courts in identifying the purpose, being to set procedural safeguards and to guarantee due process rights to the law enforcement officer.... In attempting to harmonize the entire statute, I look at [P.S. § ] 3-110(2)(ii)[,] which deals with the expungement of the record of a formal complaint.

And it states that, “On written request a law enforcement officer may have expunged from any file the record of a formal complaint made against the law enforcement officer if a hearing board acquitted the law enforcement officer, dismissed the action or made a finding of not guilty.” That would indicate to me the finding of not guilty terminates the action and is not a final judgment that makes ⁵⁵⁷ the action of the Trial Board ripe for appeal by the law enforcement agency. To find otherwise would make that language inconsistent if I were to accept the appeal and then reverse the finding of the Trial Board. ... I decline to interpret the Administrative Procedure Act in light of [P.S. § ] 3-102 of the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights which states, “This subtitle supersedes any other law of the state, a county or municipal corporation that conflicts with this subtitle.” Thereafter, on February 24, 2004, the court entered a “Judgment” reflecting its oral ruling. This appeal followed.

II

DISCUSSION A. Because the statutory scheme of the LEOBR is central to our disposition, we begin with a review of its salient provisions. LEOBR is contained in Title 3 (entitled “Law Enforcement”), Subtitle 1 (entitled “Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights ”) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code (2003). P.S. § 3-107 provides the procedural framework that governs a police officer’s right to a hearing under LEOBR. § 3-107. Hearing by hearing board.

(a) Right to hearing. — (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and § 3-111 of this subtitle, if the investigation or interrogation of a law enforcement officer results in a recommendation of demotion, dismissal, transfer, loss of pay, reassignment, or similar action that is considered punitive, the law enforcement officer is entitled to a hearing on the issues by a hearing board before the law enforcement agency takes that action. • (2) A law enforcement officer who has been convicted of a felony is not entitled to a hearing under this section. ⁵⁵⁸ (b) Notice of hearing. — (1) The law enforcement agency shall give notice to the law enforcement officer of the right to a hearing by a hearing board under this section. (2) The notice required under this subsection shall state the time and place of hearing and the issues involved. (c) Membership of hearing board. — (1) ... [T]he hearing board authorized under this section shall consist of at least three members who: (1) are appointed by the chief and chosen from law enforcement officers within that law enforcement agency, or from law enforcement officers of another law enforcement agency with the approval of the chief of the other agency; and (ii) have had no part in the investigation or interrogation of the law enforcement officer. (2) At least one member of the hearing board shall be of the same rank as the law enforcement officer against whom the complaint is filed. * * * (d) Subpoenas.— [ 7 ] * * * (4) In case of disobedience or refusal to obey a subpoena served under this subsection, the chief or hearing board may apply without cost to the circuit court of a county where the subpoenaed party resides or conducts business, for an order to compel the attendance and testimony of the witness or the production of the books, papers, records, and documents. ⁵⁵⁹ * * * (e) Conduct of hearing. — { 1) The hearing shall be conducted by a hearing board.

(2) The hearing board shall give the law enforcement agency and law enforcement officer ample opportunity to present evidence and argument about the issues involved. (3) The law enforcement agency and law enforcement officer may be represented by counsel. (4) Each party has the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify and each party may submit rebuttal evidence .... (Italics in text added).

P.S. § 3-108 is of particular significance. It provides: § 3-108. Disposition of administrative action. (a) In general. — (1) A decision, order, or action taken as a result of a hearing under Section 3-107 of this subtitle shall be in wilting and accompanied by findings of fact.

(2) The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement on each issue in the case. (3) A finding of not guilty terminates the action. (4) If the hearing board makes a finding of guilt, the hearing board shall: (i) reconvene the hearing; (ii) receive evidence; and (iii) consider the law enforcement officer’s past job performance and other relevant information as factors before making recommendations to the chief. (5) A copy of the decision or order, findings of fact, conclusions, and written recommendations for action shall be delivered or mailed promptly to: (i) the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement officer’s counsel or representative of record; and (ii) the chief.

(b) Recommendation of penalty. — (1) After a disciplinary hearing and a finding of guilt, the hearing board may ⁵⁶⁰ recommend the penalty it considers appropriate under the circumstances, including demotion, dismissal, transfer, loss of pay, reassignment, or other similar action that is considered punitive. (2) The recommendation of a penalty shall be in writing. (c) Final decision of hearing board. — (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, the decision of the hearing board as to findings of fact and any penalty is final if: (1) a chief is an eyewitness to the incident under investigation; or (ii) a law enforcement agency or the agency’s superior governmental authority has agreed with an exclusive collective bargaining representative recognized or certified under applicable law that the decision is final. (2) The decision of the hearing board then may be appealed in accordance with § 3-109 of this subtitle.

(3) Paragraph (l)(ii) of this subsection is not subject to binding arbitration. (d) Review by chief and final order. — (1) Within 30 days after receipt of the recommendations of the hearing board, the chief shall: (1) review the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the hearing board; and (ii) issue a final order. (2) The final order and decision of the chief is binding and then may be appealed in accordance with § 3-109 of this subtitle. (3) The recommendation of a penalty by the hearing board is not binding on the chief.

(4) The chief shall consider the law enforcement officer’s past job performance as a factor before imposing a penalty. (5) The chief may increase the recommended penalty of the hearing board only if the chief personally: (i) reviews the entire record of the proceedings of the hearing board; ⁵⁶¹ (ii) meets with the law enforcement officer and allows the law enforcement officer to be heard on the record; (iii) discloses and provides in writing to the law enforcement officer, at least 10 days before the meeting, any oral or written communication not included in the record of the hearing board on which the decision to consider increasing the penalty is wholly or partly based; and (iv) states on the record the substantial evidence relied on to support the increase of the recommended penalty. (Boldface added). P.S. § 3-109 is also pertinent.

It states: Section 3-109. Judicial Review. (a) By circuit court. — An appeal from a decision made under § 3-108 of this subtitle shall be taken to the circuit court for the county in accordanqe with Maryland Rule 7-202. (b) By Court of Special Appeals. — A party aggrieved by a decision of a court under this subtitle may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

P.S. § 3-110 provides: Section 3-110. Expungement of record of formal complaint. On written request a law enforcement officer may have expunged from any file the record of a formal complaint made against the law enforcement officer if: (l)(i) the law enforcement agency that investigated the complaint: 1. exonerated the law enforcement officer of all charges in the complaint; or 2. determined that the charges were unsustained or unfounded; or (ii) a hearing board acquitted the law enforcement officer, dismissed the action, or made a finding of not guilty; and ⁵⁶² (2) at least 3 years have passed since the final disposition by the law enforcement agency or hearing board. (Italics added).

P.S. § 3-102(a) is also relevant. It provides that the LEOBR “supercedes any other law of the State, a county, or a municipal corporation that conflicts with” it. As noted, appellant also looks to the APA for a right of appeal. As codified in S.G. § 10-201 et seq., the APA generally confers on all parties the right of judicial review from administrative decisions.

S.G. § 10-201 provides: § 10-201. Declaration of policy. The purpose of this subtitle is to: (1) ensure the right of all persons to be treated in a fair and unbiased manner in their efforts to resolve disputes in administrative proceedings governed by this subtitle; and (2) promote prompt, effective, and efficient government. S.G. § 10-222(a) governs judicial review under the APA: § 10-222.

Judicial review. (a) Review of final decision. — (1) ... [A] party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section. (2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case to the Office [of Administrative Hearings], is entitled to judicial review of a decision as provided in this section if the agency was a party before the agency or the Office [of Administrative Proceedings]. Maryland Rule 7-201(a) is also pertinent.

It states, in part: “The rules in this Chapter govern actions for judicial review of (1) an order or action of an administrative agency, where judicial review is authorized by statute....” (Emphasis added). Further, Md. Rule 7-202 states: “A person seeking judicial review under this chapter shall file a petition for judicial review in a circuit court authorized to provide the review.” ⁵⁶³ B. The Commission contends that the circuit court erred in ruling that, whether under LEOBR or the APA, the Commission “is not entitled to judicial review of the final decision of an administrative hearing board.” Therefore, the agency “seeks [judicial] review of the palpably erroneous decision of the three-member board of lay subordinate park police officers who effectively nullified one of the most important of the Commission’s public safety regulations.” According to the Commission, “absent language in the LEOBR limiting the right of appeal solely to a law enforcement officer, the LEOBR should be read to permit the Commission’s appeal of the Board’s decision.” Appellant adds: “Had the Legislature intended to permit a law enforcement officer’s right to appeal and prohibit a law enforcement agency’s right to appeal, that restriction would be expressed in the text of [P.S.] Section 3-109(a).” Moreover, the Commission argues: “[T]he LEOBR does not evidence any affirmative decision or intention by the General Assembly to guarantee, vest or entitle an officer to the favorable decision of a hearing board if that decision was reached unlawfully.” Appellant adds: “Although the LEOBR certainly imbues officers with certain procedural rights, there is no language or intent embodied in the statute to shelter such palpable errors of law from all judicial scrutiny.” According to the Commission, the denial of the right of judicial review would shelter a flagrantly erroneous decision of the Board, and deprive a law enforcement agency of its “interest in receiving just and fair consideration during administrative hearings concerning intended employment actions .... ” The agency adds: “Precluding the Commission from appealing the Board’s decision ... would allow the lay ad hoc Board to rewrite or nullify the Department’s vehicle pursuit regulations without affording the agency, or the court, a means by which to correct such an erroneous legal decision.” It “can think of no reason why such autonomy, the likes of ⁵⁶⁴ which is not even entrusted to the judiciary, would be delegated to such an entity.” Appellant also maintains that, under P.S § 3-107, the “ ‘LEOBR hearings approximate a full-blown trial in circuit court,’ ” (citation omitted), in which “the charging agency and officer charged are properly viewed as party opponents,” with the attendant rights to counsel, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. Because “the hearing board process prescribed under the LEOBR ... is appropriately considered as an adversarial one,” argues appellant, “a decision by the board is not reasonably attributed to the Commission or the chief.” Further, appellant points out that, because P.S. § 3-108(a) “requires that all board decisions be ‘in writing and accompanied by findings of fact,’ it should follow that ‘not guilty’ decisions reduced to writing in such a manner are as appeal-able as ‘guilty’ decisions.” Otherwise, asks appellant rhetorically, “what would be the purpose of findings of fact if there existed no opportunity for judicial review?” The agency also challenges appellee’s contention that it has improperly sought judicial review of “its own” decision. According to the Commission, the trial board “essentially is an impartial tribunal vested with specified statutory authority that is independent of the authority of the chief and the agency.” Appellant insists that Board members “maintained no authoritative role within the Commission’s structure,” and their “decisions had no binding effect on the Commission.” In addition, appellant points out that, “because the statute contemplates that the chief may appoint hearing board members who do not belong to his or her agency, it is