Hudson v. Housing Authority

HARRELL, J. By issuing a Writ of Certiorari, on the petition of Charles Hudson, to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, we implicitly expressed our desire to consider whether limited pretrial discovery is allowed, under the applicable Maryland Rules, in a “Breach of Lease” (Maryland Code (2003), Real Property Article, § 8-402.1) action brought in the District Court of Maryland. Before we may reach that issue, however, we must confront whether the Circuit Court appropriately entertained, under the common law collateral order doctrine, the interlocutory appeal taken by Hudson’s landlord, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, from the District Court’s ruling that limited discovery was permitted. Although we shall conclude that the collateral order doctrine does not justify that interlocutory appeal, as that doctrine is of extremely limited application in the resolution of discovery disputes, given the import of the merits of the certiorari question, we shall address the ²² substantive issue, albeit as considered dicta. It is our view that Maryland Rule 3-711 1 does not exclude in “Breach of Lease” actions brought in the District Court the limited discovery allowed under Maryland Rule 3-401(a). 2 I. The material facts are undisputed.

Petitioner, Charles Hudson, resides in the Latrobe Housing Development, a subsidized housing project in Baltimore City. On 30 September 2005, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC), Respondent, which owns and operates more than ten thousand dwelling units in Baltimore City, including the Latrobe Housing Development, received a copy of a police report implicating Hudson in the alleged commission of a crime in his rental unit. The point of departure for the police report was that a suspect (not Hudson) carrying drugs ran into Hudson’s dwelling. When police pursued the suspect, they reportedly observed in Hudson’s rental unit a large, clear jar of drugs being used as a leg to support a bed.

As a result, on 22 May 2006, HABC filed a form “Complaint and Summons Against Tenant in Breach of Lease,” under Maryland Code (2003), Real Property Article, § 8-402.1, in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City. The complaint alleged that the above facts constituted the breach of several lease covenants prohibiting illegal and drug-related activities in the dwelling unit. ²³ Trial was set for 12 June 2006. On 6 June 2006, Hudson, through counsel, served written interrogatories on HABC seeking the limited discovery afforded in District Court cases under Maryland Rule 3-401 (a). The next day, Hudson sought a continuance of the trial to allow time for HABC to respond to the discovery request.

A continuance of the trial date to after 18 August 2006 was granted on 12 June. 3 On the same day, HABC filed a motion to strike the interrogatories on the ground that Maryland Rule 3-711 prohibits discovery in summary ejectment actions in the District Court. The court denied HABC’s motion, ruling that Rule 3-711 does not apply to “Breach of Lease” cases. On 15 September 2006, the court also denied HABC’s effort seeking reconsideration of its ruling having the effect of allowing the discovery initiative by Hudson. HABC appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on 25 September 2006 the District Court’s interlocutory ruling as to discovery, ostensibly in accordance with Maryland Code, Real Property Article, § 8-402.1(b)(2). 4 , 5 Specifically, HABC ²⁴ claimed that the District Court’s discovery ruling was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and incorrect as a matter of law.

The Circuit Court considered the matter on the record made in the District Court. After oral argument, the Circuit Court ruled that the appeal was taken properly under the collateral order doctrine. The Court further held that Rule 3-711 prohibited discovery in “Breach of Lease” cases in the District Court and, thus, reversed the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Hudson successfully petitioned us for a Writ of Certiorari.

We shall consider de novo the Circuit Court’s allowance of the interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine and its denial of discovery in a “Breach of Lease” case brought in the District Court, both purely legal determinations. Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 365 Md. 67, 77 , 775 A.2d 1218, 1223 (2001).

II

A. We address, first, whether the District Court’s allowance of limited discovery, over HABC’s protest, was immediately appealable to the Circuit Court under the common law collateral order doctrine. We hold that it whs not. The general proposition in Maryland is that “to be appealable an order or judgment ordinarily must be final.” Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 266 , 747 A.2d 1199, 1202 (2000). Appellate jurisdiction may not be exercised over a judgment considered interlocutory unless it falls within one of three delineated exceptions.

See Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615 , 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005). Appeals from certain types of ²⁵ interlocutory orders specifically are allowed by certain statute; immediate appeals are authorized from actions taken pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602; and, appeals from interlocutory rulings are allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine. Id. The first and second exceptions are not implicated in the present case.

The collateral order doctrine permits a reviewing appellate court to treat as final, without consideration of the procedural posture of a case, a “narrow” class of interlocutory orders in “extraordinary circumstances.” Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 561-62 , 914 A.2d 783, 791 (2007); In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634 , 820 A.2d 587, 591 (2003). We have applied gingerly this doctrine to review actions completely separate from the merits of the litigation based on a “perceived necessity” of immediate appellate review. Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 562 , 914 A.2d at 791 (quoting Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 64 , 827 A.2d 115, 121 (2003)). Of greatest import here, however, “ ‘[t]his Court has consistently held that discovery orders, being interlocutory in nature, are not ordinarily appealable prior to a final judgment terminating the case in the trial court.... ’ [Generally such orders do not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.” In re Foley, 373 Md. at 634 , 820 A.2d at 591 -92 (quoting Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 477 , 654 A.2d 877, 880 (1995)).

Only in the special circumstances where a litigant seeks to probe the individual thought process of a high level government official, acting in an administrative or investigatory decisional capacity, have we sanctioned immediate review of a trial court’s disposition of a discovery dispute under the collateral order doctrine. See Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 572 , 914 A.2d at 797 (“[A]n interlocutory appeal is appropriate under these extraordinary circumstances involving discovery orders directed to a high government official.”); Stevens, 337 Md. at 477-79 , 654 A.2d at 879-81 ; Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 210 , 477 A.2d 759, 764 (1984) (“We reiterate, however, that our holding is a narrow one.

Thus discovery orders, directed at other than high level government ²⁶ decision makers, are ordinarily not appealable in accordance with the general rule.”). The collateral order doctrine may apply when a decision of the lower court meets four conjunctive and strictly construed elements. Ehrlich, 396 Md. at 563 , 914 A.2d at 792 . If an interlocutory decision “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment,” then the collateral order doctrine applies.

Id., 914 A.2d at 791 . Even were we to assume, for the sake of argument, that the District Court’s decision to allow limited discovery in the present “Breach of Lease” case conclusively determined whether the interplay between Maryland Rules 3-401(a) and 3-711 permitted such discovery, and that such a determination resolved an important issue, we nevertheless would conclude that the District Court’s discovery ruling met neither the third nor the fourth criterion of an immediately appealable collateral order. Indeed, “[mjost discovery orders do not comply with the third requirement of the collateral order doctrine, as they generally are not completely separate from the merits of the lawsuit. Instead a typical discovery order is aimed at ascertaining critical facts upon which the outcome of the controversy might depend.” Addison v. State, 173 Md.App. 138, 156 , 917 A.2d 1200, 1211 (2007) (quoting St. Joseph Medical Center, Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Associates, P.A., 392 Md. 75, 87 , 896 A.2d 304, 311 (2006); In re Foley, 373 Md. at 635 , 820 A.2d at 587 ).

Obviously, interrogatories inquiring into the underlying factual grounding of HABC’s claim that Hudson breached his lease are critical to the ultimate determination of whether a breach occurred. Thus, the third requirement of an immediately appealable collateral order is not met in this case. Finally, “discovery orders fail to meet the collateral order doctrine’s fourth element as they are effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. A party aggrieved by a discovery order and aggrieved by the final judgment may ²⁷ challenge the discovery ruling on appeal from a final judgment.” Id.

(quoting St. Joseph Medical Center, Inc., 392 Md. at 87 , 896 A.2d at 311 (2006); In re Foley, 373 Md. at 635 , 820 A.2d at 587 ). “It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8-131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.” B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132-33 , 571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990); accord Stevens, 337 Md. at 476-77 , 654 A.2d at 879 (1995) (“Maryland Rule 8-131(d) provides that, on appeal from an order constituting a final judgment, other orders, even if interlocutory, are generally reviewable by the appellate court.”). The rare circumstances occurring in the “high-level, government official exception” explored in Ehrlich, Stevens, and Patuxent Valley , where requiring disclosure seriously could disrupt administrative governance, do not exist here. We thus hold that the Circuit Court incorrectly applied the collateral order doctrine to endorse its review of the District Court’s Order allowing discovery in the underlying “Breach of Lease” case. B. Despite the inappropriate path by which this case reaches us, we are persuaded that the merits are worthy of comment.

Maryland Rule 8-131 provides that this Court “may decide ... an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense or delay of another appeal.” The record suggests that there is some division among some judges of Maryland’s District Court and various of its Circuit Courts concerning the proper application of Maryland Rules 3-401(a) and 3-711 in “Breach of Lease” actions. In addition, given that the HABC’s action here was stayed pending disposition of this appeal, our determination of the issue will enable that action to proceed more expeditiously than were we to wait for the issue to arrive at our doorstep after a trial and subsequent appeal. ²⁸ c. “Maryland’s discovery rules were deliberately designed to be broad and comprehensive in scope.” Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 560 , 914 A.2d 783, 790 (2007) (citing Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13 , 174 A.2d 768, 771 (1961)). Broad and comprehensive rules eliminate, “as far as possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that gave rise to litigation.” Grove, 396 Md. at 560 , 914 A.2d at 790 (quoting Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 229 , 411 A.2d 449, 453 (1980); Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55 , 395 A.2d 126, 137 (1978)). Civil procedure in the District Court of Maryland is governed by Title 3 of the Maryland Rules.

Chapter 400 of that Title governs discovery. Maryland Rule 3-401, entitled “General provisions regarding discovery,” provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Title, a party may obtain discovery by written interrogatories and, if a written stipulation is filed in the action, by deposition upon oral examination or written questions.” Maryland Rule 3-421(b) clarifies that, “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, a party may serve only one set of not more than 15 interrogatories____” Thus, the rules generally entitle a civil litigant in District Court to limited discovery through 15 interrogatories served upon his, her, or its opponent. Maryland Rule 3-711 provides in pertinent part, however, that “no pretrial discovery under Chapter 400 of this Title shall be permitted in ... an action for summary ejectment, wrongful detainer, or distress for rent, or an action involving tenants holding over” in District Court. A “Breach of Lease” action is not part of the itemized exclusions in Rule 3-711.

Therein lies the tension giving rise to the current dispute. Relevant defining provisions of the Maryland Code closely track the causes of action described in Maryland Rule 3-711. The Real Property Article, originally enacted by Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1974, consists of 15 Titles. Title 8 of the Article governs landlord-tenant relations.

Title 8 is organized into 6 Subtitles. Subtitles 3 and 4 of Title 8 address the actions ²⁹ mentioned in Maryland Rule 3-711. 6 Subtitle 3, “Distress for Rent,” covers the same as named in the Rule. The other actions in Rule 3-711 are covered by Subtitle 4, “Landlord’s Remedies Other Than Distraint.” 7 Section 8-402, “Holding over,” covers the action in Rule 3-711 described as “an action involving tenants holding over.” Section 8-402.3, entitled “Wrongful detainer,” covers the action in Rule 3-711 described as the same. Rule 3-711 also prohibits discovery in an “action for summary ejectment.” The Real Property Article, however, makes only one mention of this action, contained in § 8-401, “Failure to pay rent.” Thus, a summary ejectment action is linked to an action for failure to pay rent. 8 In contrast, Rule 3-711 makes no explicit reference to an action for a “Breach of Lease.” HABC contends that a plain meaning interpretation of Rule 3-711 demands inclusion of a “Breach of Lease” action within its purview.

We conclude the opposite. In applying the plain meaning rule to effectuate the will of the legislature (here, this Court 9 ), “we give effect to the statute as it is ³⁰ written.” Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (quoting Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576 , 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005)). The principles of applying a plain meaning approach include consideration of the doctrine of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius ” (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another).” Id. at 458 n. 17, 903 A.2d at 404 n. 17 (citing Comptroller of Treasury v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 537-38 , 890 A.2d 279, 285 (2006)). This fundamental principle of construction, long recognized in Maryland, when applied to the case at hand, results in our conclusion that Rule 3-711 includes several forms of actions between landlords and tenants, but necessarily excludes those brought under Md.Code, Real Property Article, § 8-402.1, “Breach of lease,” from its ambit.

Even were we to believe Maryland Rule 3-711 to be ambiguous in this regard, we do not reach the conclusion HABC desires because the “legislative” history of the Rule indicates that the Court clearly intended not to include a “Breach of Lease” action in the enumeration of actions for which