Smith v. State

GREENE, J. In this ease we are asked to determine whether the Petitioner’s (“Thomas Smith” or “Smith”) statement to police that the “[drugs are] all mine,” made during the execution of a search warrant at Smith’s residence, was a product of police interrogation. For purposes of this opinion, we shall assume, without deciding, that Smith was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), at the time he made the statement to the police. 1 Our focus is on the question of whether the lead investigator’s act of showing Smith the contraband that the officers recovered from Smith’s bedroom, coupled with the officer’s announcement to the other officers present in the residence that everyone was to be arrested, amounted to interrogation, within the meaning of Miranda , under the circumstances of this case. For reasons that we shall explain in this opinion, we ³⁶⁰ shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that there was no violation of Miranda . I. Smith’s trial was held in the Circuit Court for Carroll County on charges of manufacturing crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession of crack cocaine.

The Circuit Court judge denied Smith’s motion to suppress the evidence. After a trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and possession of crack cocaine. Smith was found not guilty of manufacturing crack cocaine. The court imposed a sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration and suspended all but five years, with three years of supervised probation.

Smith noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 549-50 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009). Subsequently, Smith filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, to consider the following questions: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the judgment based on a ground conceded by the State at trial and on appeal and not discussed by the Court or parties at oral argument? 2.

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Petitioner was not in custody for purposes of Miranda where a police SWAT team raided [Smithj’s apartment, handcuffed [Smith] and his guests, and blocked the entrance and exit while a search of [Smith]’s apartment was conducted? 3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [Smith] was not subject to. interrogation where a law enforcement official, knowing [Smith]’s desire to protect his girlfriend, confronted [Smith] with incriminating evidence and declared his intention to arrest [Smith]’s girlfriend? ³⁶¹ Because our answer to the third question is that Smith was not subjected to interrogation, we need not, and do not, answer questions numbered one and two.

II

We review the Circuit Court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and “consider only the facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing.” Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498 , 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007). “The factual findings of the suppression court and its conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted unless clearly erroneous.” Prioleau v. State, 411 Md. 629, 638 , 984 A.2d 851, 856 (2009) (quoting Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 82-83 , 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008)). The foregoing notwithstanding, we “undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Smith did not testify at the suppression hearing.

Corporal Scott Peter, who led the investigation, and Detective James Pullen testified. These two officers, along with two other law enforcement officers, participated in the execution of the search warrant at Smith’s residence, located at 16 Pennsylvania Avenue, Apartment 13, Westminster, Carroll County. Pri- or to the officers’ entry into the premises, according to the record of the suppression hearing, “a SWAT team had secured everyone” by placing the occupants, Smith, his girlfriend Kathy Magruder, Alan Magruder, and Heather Myers, in restraints. Smith was restrained with “flex cuffs” and initially detained in the “living room/dining area.” Kathy Magruder, Alan Magruder, and Heather Myers were restrained also with “flex cuffs,” but detained outside the apartment on the balcony.

During the search, Smith, while in handcuffs, was permitted to remain in the apartment, but was instructed to sit on the living room sofa. During the search of Smith’s apartment, his guests remained outside on the balcony. One of the law enforcement officers, Officer Angela Anderson, “posted” herself at the front door, apparently to control traffic in and out ³⁶² of the apartment while the other three officers conducted the search. Corporal Peter searched the kitchen and recovered what he suspected to be crack cocaine from a glass bowl inside the microwave.

Corporal Peter and Detective Pullen recovered from inside a sock drawer, in the only bedroom in the apartment, a plastic bag containing what they suspected to be an ounce of crack cocaine. During direct examination by the prosecutor, Corporal Peter explained his actions upon viewing the plastic bag of suspected crack cocaine recovered from the bedroom drawer: I secured it. I took it. At that time, I had walked by Smith and showed Mr. Smith what it was and basically told—made an announcement to the other officer that we were going to arrest [sic] that was in the premise at that time and people who was [sic] seen going in and out of the premise also.

Further, on cross-examination, Corporal Peter pointed to additional details surrounding his interaction with Smith. The corporal testified: Q Demonstration [sic] if you could, sir, with this baggie that I have. If you would, show me how you demonstrated or how you showed this to Mr. Smith? Mr. Smith was seated on the sofa?

A He was standing in the hallway when it happened. Q He was standing? A I believe so, yes. Q He was not seated at the sofa?

A No, he wasn’t. He was standing in the hallway between the bedroom and the living room. Q Okay but previously he was seated on the edge of the sofa. A He had been on the sofa yes.

Q In fact on the arm of the sofa? A I don’t know if it was the arm of the sofa, but he was sitting on the little sofa there. ³⁶³ Q So, your testimony is he is standing at some point. Could you show me, if you would, demonstrate to me how you showed the baggie to him? A I had it in my hand, I walked by, showed it to him (indicating) found this in your room, kept going and advised other officers there everyone is under arrest.

Saw everyone going out of the apartment, I am going to arrest everybody here. To clarify what he meant by “I am going to arrest everybody here,” Corporal Peter explained that he was referring to “the subjects ... that had been detained also, which would have been Kathy MacGruder [sic], Heather Myers and Alan MacGruder [sic], [who] were out on the front balcony of the apartment.” He further stated that he “had watched them go in and out of the apartment while ... doing pre-raid surveillance of the location.” While Corporal Peter explained that his reason for displaying the crack cocaine to Smith was to “show[ ] him what [had been] found and what [Smith] was going to be arrested for,” the corporal admitted that he did not show Smith all the evidentiary items found in the apartment. Corporal Peter’s testimony also revealed that because of his “familiarities” with Smith, he knew that Smith and Kathy Magruder were boyfriend and girlfriend. “[A]lmost instantaneously]” or “[s]econds” after Corporal Peter announced his intention to arrest Smith and his guests, according to Detective Pullen and Corporal Peter, respectively, Smith said, with regard to the drugs that had been displayed to him, “it is all mine.” Smith made that admission of ownership at least twice, and at the time that he uttered the statement he had not been read any Miranda warnings. At the suppression hearing, Corporal Peter was asked to give his impression as to why Smith acknowledged responsibility for the drugs found in his bedroom.

According to Corporal Peter, Smith made the admission because “he saw that [the police] were going to arrest his girlfriend ... [and] he wanted to protect [her].” ³⁶⁴ After Smith made his incriminating statement, he and his three guests were formally arrested and transported to the station for booking. Upon completing the search of Smith’s apartment, Corporal Peter left a copy of the search warrant and inventory of the seized items “on the table ... above the microwave” in the kitchen. He indicated on the search warrant return that the “location of [the] search warrant was unoccupied and [that a] copy [of the inventory was] left in [a] conspicuous location.” At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel argued their respective positions on whether Smith’s incriminating statement was the product of police interrogation. The State maintained that it was not, and the defense contended that it was.

The suppression judge denied Smith’s motion to suppress. The judge stated in relevant part: Well, no question, I think everyone concedes that at the time the statement was made, the defendant was in custody. The issue then was there any interrogation? And I find that based upon the facts as testified to, there is no evidence there was any interrogation.

Certainly showing someone evidence in and of itself, I don’t think there was any invitation to respond. I don’t think that there is anything here that would suggest, I didn’t hear anything, that would suggest that this was done in any type of taunting fashion. I think that just showing someone the evidence followed by the statement that everybody is going, I don’t think that that invites any response. I think that if defendant says anything at that point, it is certainly unsolicited and at his own [peril].

In affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Smith was not in custody under Miranda until after his formal arrest and that Corporal Peter’s announcement, which preceded his formal arrest, did not constitute interrogation. Smith, 186 Md.App. at 539 , 974 A.2d at 1020 . As pointed out at the beginning of this opinion, we need not, and do not, decide the issue of custody. On the record before us, it is clear that Corporal Peter’s announce ³⁶⁵ ment and actions in showing Smith the drugs recovered during the search of his apartment did not amount to interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation.

III

Smith maintains that the announcement that everyone present at the apartment would be arrested, in conjunction with the presentment of some of the incriminating evidence found, constituted interrogation. Borrowing language from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1980) (footnotes omitted), Smith contends that “any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” amounts to interrogation, and that Smith’s response, it’s “all mine,” should have been suppressed. Smith offers as further support for his position the cases of Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331 , 793 A.2d 567 (2002), and Commonwealth v. Rubio, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 506 , 540 N.E.2d 189 (1989). The State counters that, even assuming that Smith was in custody for purposes of Miranda, Corporal Peter’s act of showing Smith what he had recovered during the search and his statement to fellow officers that everyone was to be arrested did not constitute interrogation.

According to the State, Smith’s statement claiming ownership of the drugs was a classic “blurt,” and not a product of interrogation. Further, the State contends that in order for Corporal Peter’s action and statement to be interrogation, relying on Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 , 100 S.Ct. at 1690 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 308 , they “must reflect a measured compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” In other words, the State asserts that, without more, no reasonable law enforcement officer would believe that by announcing that everyone on the premises will be arrested and showing the suspect the evidence recovered would likely elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Thus, the State concludes that Drury, 368 Md. 331 , 793 A.2d 567 , is factually distinguishable because, unlike the defendant in Drury , Smith was not removed from his home for the ³⁶⁶ express purpose of questioning, no evidence of drugs was used in the questioning of Smith, and Corporal Peter did not reveal to Smith that what was recovered during the search was shown to Smith for the purpose of questioning him. In addition, according to the State, Rubio is distinguishable because, unlike the defendant in Rubio , Smith was not subject to police confrontation, implicit questioning, or “a purposeful technique calculated to obtain incriminating evidence.” Recently this Court pointed out that not every question posed to a suspect in custody or in a defendant’s presence by a law enforcement officer constitutes interrogation.

Prioleau, 411 Md. at 639 , 984 A.2d at 857 . In Prioleau, 411 Md. at 651 , 984 A.2d at 864 , we held that the statement “What’s up, Maurice?,” made by a law enforcement officer to the suspect, did not constitute actual interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation under the circumstances of that case, regardless of whether the statement was a question or a greeting. We explained that every meeting between a law enforcement officer and a suspect should not be considered an interrogation.