Taylor v. Mandel

¹¹³ BATTAGLIA, J. The case sub judice presents us with the issue of whether a grandparent seeking custody or visitation rights of a minor grandchild may be assessed guardian ad litem 1 2 fees in the litigation she initiated. Denise Taylor, the grandmother against whom such fees were assessed, presents us with the following four questions: 1) Did the Court Err in assessing Guardian Ad Litem’s Counsel Fees against Petitioner, the maternal grandmother of the children? 2) Did the Court Err in assessing the costs of the Respondent’s appendix against Petitioner when Respondent failed to comply with Md. Rule 8—501(d)? 3) Did the application of Md. Family Law Code Ann. Section 1-202 to Petitioner and the procedure used to establish Petitioner’s liability violate the due process clause and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights? 4) Did the Court Err in finding that the GAL’s[ 2 ] bill was reasonable under all the circumstances of the case? Because we hold that the circuit court erred in assessing guardian ad litem fees against Taylor, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals. 3 ¹¹⁴ I. Introduction On March 23, 2004, Denise Taylor, Petitioner, and Diane Miskimon, 4 filed a complaint against Kristi and William Biedenback in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, seeking custody of, or in the alternative visitation with, Taylor’s grandchildren, Tristian and Memorie Biedenback. Taylor, the maternal grandmother, alleged that the children, while in the physical custody of the Biedenbacks, had been physically and sexually abused and neglected.

The Biedenbacks filed an answer to the complaint denying the allegations of physical and sexual abuse, asking the court to dismiss Ms. Miskimon as a plaintiff, and requesting the court to order that the minor children remain in the custody and care of the Biedenbacks and to deny Taylor visitation. The Biedenbacks also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to which Taylor filed a memorandum in opposition seeking denial of the Biedenbacks’ motion and requesting pendente lite custody of the children, a home study, a guardian ad litem for the children, and an emergency hearing. When the Biedenbacks failed to answer Taylor’s requests for pendente lite custody of the children, a home study, a guardian ad litem for the children, and an emergency hearing, Taylor filed a request for an order of default iterating her request for a guardian ad litem and a home study. Taylor also filed a motion for an order compelling discovery, asking the court to order the Biedenbacks to file answers to interrogatories that had been served earlier.

Without a hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted Taylor’s motion to compel discovery, entered an order of default, appointed Marc E. Mandel, Esquire, Respondent, as guardian ad litem for the children, and ordered that a home study be completed; subsequently, Mandel, himself, submitted an amended order containing information regarding the fees ¹¹⁵ of the guardian ad litem, which was signed by the circuit court: THE ORDER OF THIS COURT dated September 15, 2004 appointing Marc E. Mandel, Esquire, Guardian Ad Litem for the minor children is this 18th day of October, 2004 amended as follows: 1. To consent or not to the release of privileged medical and/or psychiatric/psychological information regarding the minor children pursuant to Nagel v. Hooks; and, 2. To represent the best interests of the minor children as their guardian ad litem regarding the issues of custody and visitation, and in that regard to participate fully in pre-trial discovery, hearings and trial on the merits; and it is further, ORDERED that Marc E. Mandel, Esquire, as attorney for the minor children, shall have access to copies of the case file and all records regarding this action including, but not limited to, access to the records and/or evaluations of any therapist, psychiatrist, psychologist, or mental health professional as well as any Department of Social Services records regarding the minor children; and it is further, ORDERED that the Court hereby reserves for future determination the award of reasonable counsel fees to Marc E. Mandel, Esquire, upon the filing of a Petition for Counsel Fees by said counsel; and it is further, ORDERED that each party shall advance to her or his counsel of record the sum of $1,000.00, which said sum shall be held in escrow subject to further Order of this Court regarding apportionment between the parties of their respective obligations to pay the reasonable counsel fees of the attorney for the minor children. Taylor did not file an objection to the amended order, request a hearing, or file a motion to reconsider, but rather complied and deposited $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account. ¹¹⁶ Taylor and the Biedenbacks eventually reached an agreement, putting the settlement on the record in April of 2005.

Mandel subsequently filed his petition for guardian ad litem fees, 5 and filed an amended petition for guardian ad litem fees two days later, seeking $9,041.73. Taylor filed an Opposition to Guardian Ad Litem’s Amended Motion for Counsel Fees in which she challenged the hourly rate charged, the amount of time billed and the proposed apportionment of the bill. Primarily, though, she asserted that Mandel could not recover guardian ad litem fees from her because she was not a “parent” within the purview of Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1999, 2004 Repl.Vol.). 6 Additionally, Taylor contended that guardian ad ¹¹⁷ litem fees could not be awarded under Section 12-103 of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1999, 2004 Repl.Vol.), 7 because that Section refers to “counsel fees.” The circuit court granted Mandel’s motion for guardian ad litem fees without a hearing and awarded him $7,041.73: Taylor and Ms. Miskimon were ordered to pay $5,962.13, and the Biedenbacks were ordered to pay $1,079.60. Taylor filed a motion requesting that the court reconsider its Order Granting Guardian Ad Litem’s Amended Motion for Counsel Fees, or in the alternative, to hold a hearing to ascertain what fees were fair and reasonable and how the fees should have been apportioned; Taylor again argued that the circuit court did not have the authority to assess guardian ad litem fees against her.

The Biedenbacks filed a similar motion for reconsideration, seeking the same relief as Taylor had requested. Ms. Miskimon subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the parties had agreed to a stipulation of ¹¹⁸ dismissal of Ms. Miskimon as a plaintiff, and therefore, she should not have been assessed guardian ad litem fees. On July 18, 2005, the circuit court struck the May 26th order granting guardian ad litem fees and scheduled a hearing. At the hearing, Taylor argued that the guardian ad litem fees were excessive and also contended that the guardian ad litem did not have the ability to recover fees from Taylor because she was not a “parent” under Section 1-202, and because Section 12-103 did not pertain to guardian ad litem fees.

Nevertheless, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion, awarding guardian ad litem fees to Mandel and rejecting Taylor’s argument that there was no statutory authority allowing a guardian ad litem to collect fees from Taylor because this argument had been waived when Taylor requested the appointment of the guardian ad litem without objecting to the payment of fees: The Court’s authority to award attorneys fees to a Guardian Ad Litem is not limited to awards against “parents” under Md.Code Ann., Family Law Art., Sec. 12-103 or 1.202, particularly in circumstances where the party advancing that argument is the party who asked for the appointment of the GAL in the first place without registering any objection to paying the GAL’s fees in connection with the order appointing the GAL. To the extent that there is some argument to be advanced here, it has plainly been waived by the Plaintiff. The court also concluded that “according to the Family Division Guidelines,” the Biedenbacks were “exempt from having to pay GAL’s legal fees” 8 and even if that was not the ¹¹⁹ case, given the financial circumstances of the parties, “it is clear that the GAL’s fees should be borne by [Taylor].” A judgment in favor of Mandel against Taylor in the amount of $6,821.73 was filed and docketed. Subsequently, Taylor filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment or in the Alternative Amend and Stay Judgment Pending Appeal requesting that the court either vacate the judgment against her, vacate the judgment and order her to pay the guardian ad litem fees, or stay the judgment pending the appeal.

Mandel then filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the court award him the full amount of his guardian ad litem bill, $9,041.73, as well as prejudgment and post-judgment interest. The circuit court granted Taylor’s Motion to Vacate or in the Alternative Amend and Stay Judgment Pending Appeal. The court vacated the judgment against Taylor but ordered that she pay Mandel $6,821.73. 9 Taylor noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, before which she argued that the circuit court erred in assessing guardian ad litem fees against her because she was not a “parent” within the purview of Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article, and because Section 12-103 only involves “counsel fees.” In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the imposition of guardian ad litem fees against Taylor and concluded that although neither Section 1-202 nor Section 12-103 of the Family Law Article áuthorized the lower court to impose guardian ad litem fees against Taylor, Taylor had “impliedly consented to the court’s action” ¹²⁰ because of her request to appoint a guardian ad litem and deposit of $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account: The court did not expressly state the basis for its order requiring appellant to pay appellee’s attorney’s fees. Appellant correctly observes, however, that the only possible bases are the statutes contained in Md.Code (2006), § 1-202 and § 12-103 of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”).

Appellant contends that neither authorizes a court to order the grandmother of minor children, involved in a custody dispute with the parents, to pay the fees of counsel appointed to represent the minor children. Appellant also contends, because the issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction, the issue cannot be waived. Section 1-201 of the Family Law Article provides that an equity court has jurisdiction over the custody, visitation, guardianship, and support of a child. Section 1-202 provides that [i]n an action in which custody, visitation rights, or the amount of support of a minor child is contested, the court may: (1) appoint to represent the minor child counsel who may not represent any party to the action; and (2) impose against either or both parents counsel fees.

We agree with appellant that the statute does not authorize the court to impose fees against appellant. The plain language is that the court can impose fees against parents, not grandparents. See In re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482 [, 505 A.2d 507 ] (1986) (grandparent does not come within the term “parents” as used in Md.Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) § 3-829 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article pertaining to restitution on behalf of children involved in certain delinquent acts). Section 12-103 of the Family Law Article provides that a court “may award to either party the costs and counsel fees that are just and proper under all the circumstances” in a custody proceeding.

Generally, this section applies when a party requests a court to order another party to pay the ¹²¹ party’s counsel fees. We must read F.L. §§ 1-202 and 12-103 as being consistent with each other, if at all possible. It is questionable whether § 12-103 encompasses the payment of fees incurred by counsel for minor children, see Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591 [, 810 A.2d 947 ] (2002), but assuming it does when a parent is ordered to pay, see Carroll County Department of Social Services v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150 [, 577 A.2d 14 ] (1990), it does not expressly authorize an order requiring a grandparent to pay such fees. § 1-202 expressly limits such orders to parents. Consequently, § 12-103 did not authorize the order requiring appellant to pay appellee’s fees.

Despite the above, we shall affirm the court’s order because appellant impliedly consented to the court’s action. Unquestionably, the court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine issues of custody and visitation, and it had personal jurisdiction over the parties and the children. The court had statutory authority to appoint counsel for the children and apportion fees, and while it did not have authority to award fees against appellant, appellant consented to apportionment of fees, between the parties, by the court. Appellant requested the court to appoint a guardian ad litem/counsel.

After the court entered an order reserving for future determination the appropriate apportionment of fees between the parties, appellant not only failed to object but complied with the order by depositing $1,000 into an escrow account. Appellant impliedly consented to the apportionment of appellee’s fees. See Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 90 Md.App. 725 [, 603 A.2d 908 ] (1992) (a party was held to have consented to appointment of counsel for a minor even though proceeding was uncontested). The intermediate appellate court also rejected Taylor’s arguments that the guardian ad litem bill was excessive, that the bill did not reflect services provided to the children, and that the circuit court failed to consider the circumstances of the parties mandated by statute.

Additionally, the panel concluded that Taylor “was not deprived of due process.” ¹²² We granted Taylor’s petition for writ of certiorari. Taylor v. Mandel, 398 Md. 314 , 920 A.2d 1059 (2007).

II

Discussion Taylor argues that the circuit court erred in assessing guardian ad litem fees against her because there is no statute or contractual understanding into which she entered to support such an assessment. Taylor contends that the plain language of Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article only permits the court to assess guardian ad litem fees against a parent, not a grandparent; Taylor also argues that Section 12-103 of the Family Law Article is inapplicable because it involves the payment of “counsel fees” for the benefit of an aggrieved party, and not payment of guardian ad litem fees. Taylor contends that she did not waive her right to object to the guardian ad litem fees by depositing $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account and by failing to contest the fees until Mandel filed his petition because she did not intend to waive her objection to the guardian ad litem fees and because she deposited the money into her attorney’s escrow account involuntarily pursuant to a court order. Conversely, Mandel argues that the circuit court did not err in imposing guardian ad litem fees against Taylor, contending that such authority exists under either Section 1-202 or Section 12-103 of the Family Law Article.

Mandel contends that the Legislature did not intend to limit the term “parent” in Section 1-202 to just a father and a mother, and that Taylor could be assessed fees as a “person acting as a parent.” Section 12-103, Mandel asserts, authorizes a court to assess guardian ad litem fees against any party, citing Carroll County Department of Social Services v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150 , 577 A.2d 14 (1990), for support. Mandel also argues that because Taylor impliedly consented to the appointment of the guardian ad litem and the payment of guardian ad litem fees by depositing $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account, she therefore waived her right to object to the fees, citing Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 90 Md.App. 725 , 603 A.2d 908 (1992), for support. Mandel further argues that in the trial court, ¹²³ Taylor did not preserve the statutory issue relating to the term “parent” under Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article because she did not object to the initial amended order of October 18, 2004 and did not argue that the court exceeded its statutory authority until Mandel had filed his petition for fees after the case had ended. 10 If we agreed with Mandel that Taylor did not adequately preserve her statutory argument, that decision could be initially dispositive. Although we do not agree with Mandel, we shall address the preservation issue first.

The general rule of preservation is that a party will only be permitted to raise on appeal an error to which he has interposed a seasonable objection. Maryland Rule 2-517(c) (“For purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court. The grounds for the objection need not be stated unless these rules expressly provide otherwise or the court so directs. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection at that time does not constitute a waiver of the objection.”).

See also Tierco Md., Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 416 , 849 A.2d 504, 527 (2004); J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71 , 106 n. 29, 792 A.2d 288 , 308 n. 29 (2002) ¹²⁴ (“[A] contemporaneous objection made at the time of the ruling ordinarily preserves the issue for appellate review.”). While it is apparent that Taylor, in both the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals, argued that she could not be held responsible for payment of the guardian ad litem fees because she was not a “parent” under Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article and because Section 12-103 only pertains to “counsel fees,” Mandel argues, nevertheless, that Taylor’s objection to the guardian ad litem fees was too late, ergo, untimely. In effect, Mandel contends that Taylor had to object at that time to the October 18, 2004 amended order appointing the guardian ad litem, requiring Taylor to deposit $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account, and reserving to the court the power to determine the apportionment of the guardian ad litem fees at a later date. For support, Mandel cites Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md.App. 463 , 798 A.2d 1195 (2002).

In that case, Steinhoff obtained a judgment of divorce from his wife, Sommerfelt, and the court reserved the issues of alimony, marital property, attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Following the court’s memorandum opinion and order in which the court granted Sommerfelt a monetary award of $191,403.00, Steinhoff moved to alter and amend the judgment, arguing that “the trial court erred by refusing to grant a Qualified Domestic Relations Order” to Sommerfelt, which would have allowed the court to transfer retirement assets to Sommerfelt as part of her award. Because the husband had failed to raise the issue of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order earlier, Sommerfelt argued that Steinhoff had not preserved the issue for appeal. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, referring to the husband’s motion to alter or amend as “a Stab at Belated Preservation.” Id. at 483 , 798 A.2d at 1206 .

The intermediate appellate court concluded that because the issue was not preserved for appeal during the pendency of the divorce action, it could not be preserved for appeal by raising it for the first time in a post-trial motion: The appellant may not exploit an appeal from a post-trial procedure as a device to outflank the non-preservation bar ¹²⁵ to an appeal from a trial procedure. One may not preserve an issue nunc pro tunc. The appeal as to this contention, whatever it is, does not turn square corners. If, indeed, it is the ... monetary award itself that is being appealed from, we will not allow the appellant’s reference to raising the issue in a post-trial motion to serve as a smokescreen obscuring the earlier and fatal non-preservation.

Id. at 483-84 , 798 A.2d at 1206-07 . On the Steinhoff foundation, Mandel argues that Taylor’s failure to object after the October 18th amended order was entered is fatal because guardian ad litem fees were addressed in that order. Taylor argues that she was not required to object to the amended order because it did not define what, if any, would be her liability for the guardian ad litem fees and because it was issued without a hearing and without giving her an opportunity to object. Taylor essentially contends that the issue to which she subsequently objected was not ripe on October 18th in order to require her to raise any objection.

To the October 18, 2004 amended order we now turn. We are in accord with our intermediate appellate court colleagues that court orders are construed in the same manner as other written documents and contracts, Md. Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey Communications, Inc., 110 Md.App. 493, 518 , 678 A.2d 55, 67 (1996), and if the language of the order is clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, taking into account the context in which it is used. Hosain v. Malik, 108 Md.App. 284, 310-11 , 671 A.2d 988,1001 (1996). Ambiguity exists, however, if “when read by a reasonably prudent person, it is susceptible of more than one meaning.” Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436 , 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999).

See also Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 378 Md. 139, 162-63 , 835 A.2d 656, 670 (2003). We have stated that “language can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects: 1) it may be intrinsically unclear ...; or 2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a ¹²⁶ particular object or circumstance may be uncertain. Thus, a term which is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another.” See Liverpool v. Balt. Diamond Exch., Inc., 369 Md. 304, 318 , 799 A.2d 1264, 1272 (2002).

If ambiguous, the court must discern its meaning by looking at the circumstances surrounding the order to shed light on the ambiguity, including the motion in response to which it was made. See Carpenter Realty Corp. v. Imbesi, 369 Md. 549, 561-62 , 801 A.2d 1018, 1025 (2002); Balducci v. Eberly, 304 Md. 664, 670 , 500 A.2d 1042, 1045 (1985). The October 18, 2004 amended court order, with its three basic provisions, was submitted by Mandel and signed by the circuit court without a hearing. The first aspect of the court order was the appointment of Mandel as guardian ad litem.

Although Mandel was not suggested by Taylor, she has not disputed his appointment as the guardian ad litem, because she requested the appointment. The second aspect of the court order required Taylor to deposit $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account. Mandel argues that the order for Taylor to deposit $ 1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account should have triggered an objection by Taylor, at which time she would have had to raise her statutory argument. In this regard, while “a voluntary act of a party which is inconsistent with the assignment of errors on appeal normally precludes that party from obtaining appellate review,” Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. 65, 69 , 427 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1981), a party is not precluded from pursuing an appeal when he or she merely complies with a court order, because such action is not voluntary.

See Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 199-200 , 725 A.2d 1027, 1032 (1999); Farmers’ & Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Harper, 153 Md. 128, 132 , 137 A. 702, 706 (1927). Thus, Taylor’s deposit of the $1,000.00 into her attorney’s escrow account pursuant to court order does not in and of itself preclude appellate review. The $1,000.00 was to be held “subject to further Order of this Court regarding apportionment between the parties of ¹²⁷ their respective obligations to pay the reasonable counsel fees of the attorney for the minor children,” and the court “reserve[d] for future determination” the assessment of guardian ad litem fees. Mandel argues that these final provisions should have initiated Taylor’s statutory objection to the assessment of guardian ad litem fees against her.

The amended court order, in its ambiguity however, failed to define Taylor’s liability, if any, at all. Apportion is defined as “to divide and share out according to a plan,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 61 (11th ed.2005), or to divide the “rights and liabilities between two or more persons or entities,” Black’s Law Dictionary 109 (8th ed.2004), but the amended order, however, contained no plan to divide the liability for the guardian ad litem fees. The order was silent as to the specific liability and stated only that the apportionment would occur in the future; pursuant to statute, the court could have determined that Taylor could not have been assessed guardian ad litem fees. Certainly, not until Taylor’s liability was fixed would she have been required to object, which she did.

Thus, she has preserved the issues involving assessment of guardian ad litem fees for appellate review. 11 ¹²⁸ Guardian ad litem fees may be assessed pursuant to statutory authority or express contractual provision. The statutory justification for the award of guardian ad litem fees against Taylor as the maternal grandmother, Mandel argues, can be found in Sections 1-202 and 12-103 of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1999, 2004 ReplYol.). It is well established' that in conducting statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always “to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 420 , 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352 , 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005).

We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Kelly, 397 Md. at 419-20 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 167 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1073 (2005). Further, whenever possible, an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisions which does not lead to ¹²⁹ absurd consequences. See Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 53 , 912 A.2d 658, 673 (2006); So. Easton Neighborhood Assoc. v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468, 495 , 876 A.2d 58, 74 (2005); Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305 , 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003) (“[T]he statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, ‘not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.’ ”).

If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Kelly, 397 Md. at 419 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427 , 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05 , 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. Kelly, 397 Md. at 419-20 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; Mayor and Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Division Phase III, 391 Md. 374, 403 , 893 A.2d 1067, 1084 (2006).

The relevant portion of Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1999, 2004 Repl.Vol.), states, [i]n an action in which custody, visitation rights, or the amount of support of a minor child is contested, the court may ... impose against either or both parents counsel fees. (emphasis added). The term “parent” is not defined in Section 1-202 nor anywhere in Title 1 of the Family Law Article, although when the General Assembly has intended a specific definition of parent, it has provided such. 12 We have had the ¹³⁰ occasion, in another context in which the Legislature has not defined parent, to give it its ordinary meaning. In In re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482 , 505 A.2d 507 (1986), we addressed whether a grandmother was a “parent” within the meaning of Section 3-829 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.). 13 In that case, the grandmother of a young man was ordered to pay restitution after the grandson assaulted a victim The grandmother, who had raised the juvenile from his tender years, contested the restitution order on the basis that she was not his parent within the meaning of the statute.

We agreed with the grandmother, holding that the “common, ordinary understand ¹³¹ ing of the term ‘parent’ does not include a grandparent,” and that “[w]here the General Assembly has desired to make one standing in loco parentis responsible it has known how to do so.” Id. at 489 , 505 A.2d at 511 . The In re Ramont K. opinion noted on two prior occasions, In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 521 , 471 A.2d 313, 316 (1984) (“We think it fully evident that the plain and popularly understood meaning of the term parent is ... ‘a father or a mother.’ ”), and In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 327 , 455 A.2d 966, 972 (1983) (“The term ‘parent’ is commonly understood to mean a father or a mother .... ”), we had interpreted parent as a mother and father. In re Ramont K., 305 Md. at 485-89 , 505 A.2d at 509-11 . Moreover,